


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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 3, June 1989

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Soviet Union

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15 December 1989

[Selected translations from the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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SOCIOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORM

Material Incentives in the New Economic Mechanism

18300830A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, Jun 89 (signed to press 30 May 89) pp 3-10

[Article by I.F. Belyayeva. Iraida Fedorovna Belyayeva is a senior science associate at the Scientific Research Institute for Labor of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]. She is the author of the monograph "Upravleniye sorevnovaniyem v trudovom kollektive" [Management of the Competition in a Labor Collective] (1979, as co-author). She has published in our journal the article "Labor Incentives for Engineers: Lessons of the Belorussian Experiment" (No 3, 1987)]

[Text] A realistic understanding of labor motivation, its inner mechanisms and a knowledge of the needs and interests which workers endeavor to satisfy in the production sphere are an essential condition for effective management of labor activity. Attempts to improve the economic mechanism without consideration of the state and dynamics of labor motivation have been undertaken repeatedly in our history. They did not produce anything beneficial. But judging from everything, this bitter lesson has still not been completely assimilated by economists and managers.

The data given below concerning the state of labor motivation for various employee categories and certain proposals on the practical employment of the new economic mechanism reflect the results of research conducted in 1986-1988 by co-workers of the Labor Motivation Sector of the Scientific Research Institute for Labor of the USSR Goskomtrud and the employees of its affiliates [1]. Research was conducted at 36 enterprises in 11 industrial sectors located in various regions of the nation from the Baltic to the Far East and a total of 8,800 persons was questioned.

The main result of the research is the stating of a low level of labor motivation among a majority of the workers and the lack of any interest in hard and high-quality work. This conclusion is not new, however it does require explanation.

In mass awareness and conduct, the following character traits are apparent evermore sharply:

- Professional activity in social production has ceased to be at the center of interests of the individual, giving way to family and domestic concerns. The employees endeavor to realize an ever-larger number of their needs outside the labor sphere;
- The prestige of high professional expertise has declined and as a result for a significant portion of the employees improved skills, job promotion, training and creativity have lost their value. This is expressed particularly strongly among the youth.¹ Thus, the development of professional expertise is considered very important only for 28 percent of the young workers and job promotion in 5 percent; study and creativity in the structure of their values of life stand in last place;
- The motives of social duty, social utility and orientation to the consumer ended up on the periphery of social awareness. A significant portion of those questioned (38 percent) voiced uncertainty that the work performed by them was necessary to others;
- Social and labor passivity have become widespread as the existing management system reproduces a conservative type of worker and eliminates the innovators. A majority of different levels of leaders prefer an efficient worker to an enterprising one.

The level of interest in work can be characterized by the following data: just one out of two considers it very important to earn well and only 40 percent has an interesting job. This shows the underdevelopment of the needs which a worker can satisfy by working and, respectively, the low possibilities for encouraging labor activity, even in increasing wages. The conclusion has gained practical confirmation in the course of the wage reform: "One of the lessons of the reform is that increased wages are not a prime motivator for labor activity for a rather significant contingent of workers" [2]. In the research an attempt was made to disclose the main types of workers depending upon the direction of their motives: 1) To the meaningful aspects of labor (interest in the work, independence in carrying out labor assignments, socially useful results of labor, self-realization in labor, professional growth and job advancement, social recognition); 2) toward extra-labor values (wages, satisfying social and domestic needs, providing a sufficiency, the possibility of using time and so forth).

Against the background of overall low labor motivation one can establish three modal types of workers: I—those oriented predominantly at the meaningfulness and socially useful results of labor; II—those oriented predominantly at wages; III—those for whom both the meaning and wages are of approximately equal significance.

The dynamics of the relationship of these types of employees in the period from 1982 through 1988 is shown in Table 1. Before analyzing the data, let us point out the following. From our viewpoint, type I corresponds more to the normative type as here the focus of

motives "on oneself" is combined with the high importance of motives of social benefit. Precisely for workers of this type, the economic mechanism should create favorable conditions for activity. It is from this criterion that we will assess the dynamics and motivation of labor.

Table 1

| Ratio of Employee Model Types | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-----------------|--|------|------|
| Sample | Year of Survey | Number Surveyed | Distribution of Employees Depending Upon Type of Labor Motivation, % | | |
| | | | I | II | III |
| Workers of 13 industrial sectors | 1982 | 2288 | 29.2 | 26.7 | 44.1 |
| Employees of Verkh-Issetskiy Metallurgical Plant | 1985 | 280 | 42.7 | 40.2 | 17.1 |
| Engineers, technicians and white collar personnel of Belorussian Railroad | 1986 | 330 | 39.1 | 35.1 | 25.8 |
| Employees of 11 industrial sectors | 1987 | 3796 | 50.9 | 37.3 | 11.8 |
| Including workers | | 3001 | 53.4 | 39.0 | 7.6 |
| Including youth | | 1646 | 50.4 | 46.8 | 2.8 |
| Light industry employees working under new management conditions | 1988 | 545 | 41.8 | 45.8 | 12.4 |

Furthermore, the focus of motivation was determined on the level of a value awareness as the most permanent and less dependent upon the situation. However, the linkage of value awareness and labor conduct is mediated by a practical awareness and by those specific demands which an individual places on his employment. These demands

depend upon many circumstances: the level of satisfying demands, the possibilities of satisfying them in the given production situation, group norms and so forth. Research has shown that there are definite differences between the value notions and the real requirements for a job (see Table 2).

Table 2

| Structure of Employee Orientation on Value and Practical Levels of Awareness | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Value Groups | Mean Rank of Group* | | | |
| | Normative | | Instrumental | |
| | Entire Sample | Young Workers | Entire Sample | Young Workers |
| Meaningfulness of labor | 5.0 | 4.8 | 8.1 | 5.8 |
| Social significance of labor | 10.3 | 9.0 | 6.3 | 9.3 |
| Wages | 9.3 | 10.3 | 4.7 | 5.3 |
| Status of employee in labor collective | 7.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 9.3 |

* Mean rank of group estimated on basis of ranks of values included in this group

On the normative level, dominant is the meaningfulness of labor while wages holds third place, in being behind the importance of employee status. The values linked to the social purpose of labor were in last place. On the instrumental level, priority goes to wages. A substantial metamorphosis has occurred with the social values of labor activity: among the older workers these emerged in second place while among the youth they shared third and fourth place, here reducing the mean rank of the group values.

Let us return to Table 1. The data given in it indicate that over the last 5 years, significant shifts have occurred in labor motivation. While in 1982, employees with a

type III motivation predominated, from 1985, the proportional amount of this type has constantly declined. The second trend is the dominating of the type oriented predominantly at the meaningfulness of labor. In the value structure, an interesting job for a significant number of those questioned is more important than high wages, although among the practical demands there is a predominance of those linked with wages. In 1988, at the enterprises which converted to the new management conditions, for the first time employees with a type II motivation began to dominate and again the proportional amount of the group with the transitional type III rose somewhat. This trend on the level of practical awareness, as was already stated, was apparent before. Cost accounting has merely accelerated its development.

We have not observed any sharp differences in the labor motivation of different sociodemographic and socioprofessional employee groups. But all the same the belonging of an employee to a certain group can be felt in the strength and significance of individual motives. Thus, professional and social values of labor are important for engineers and technicians more than for others. In the group of line leaders, the need for self-realization and self-affirmation is more strongly expressed. The youth more starkly show an overall labor passivity and low significance of the social motives of labor. Women more often than men are oriented at calm work and react more acutely to the working conditions. With all the designated differences, low labor motivation remains a common feature of all.

The described situation to a significant degree is related to the standard of living. For over a third of those surveyed, the per capita income was under 75 rubles. Almost one-half feels that their income suffices merely for food and essential household expenditures but even the purchasing of clothing represents a difficulty for them.

The income of over 90 percent of those surveyed does not allow them to satisfy their needs in accord with rationally based consumption standards and this does not ensure the reproduction of the labor force corresponding to modern needs. On the other hand, the inability to achieve material sufficiency for oneself and one's family due to labor in social production gives rise to a disdainful attitude toward work and toward professional expertise and creates grounds for theft and social parasitism.

Increased wages under current conditions would not be capable of solving the problem of an interest in work as there are no commodities to absorb the wages. The improvement in wages should be carried out through different channels. Research has shown that at the center of all employee categories are the problems of the justness of wages and their conformity to the working conditions and the end results.

The respondents assessed the justness of wages in three aspects: 1) in relation to the labor contribution (from this viewpoint, 34 percent consider wages just); 2) in relation to workers of equal skill (33 percent); 3) in relation to other members of the collective (33 percent). However, in answering the question: "What wage would you consider just for yourself," only 19 percent of those questioned mentioned the amount corresponding to their actual wage. The gap between the actual and the "just" wage averages 50-60 rubles. One may assume that the creating of opportunities for raising wages in a lesser amount will not be perceived as an incentive for increasing labor activeness. The level of claims within such limits (not more than 30 percent of average wages) is characteristic for labor of medium intensity and interest.

An awareness of the unjustness of wages is linked primarily to the fact that up to now mechanisms making it possible to clearly link the amount of earnings to the personal contribution have not yet been put into operation. At present, the "price" of an employee is determined by factors far removed from labor intensity and complexity or the assignments performed by them [3]. The existing mechanisms for calculating earnings make it possible for many to live on a medium level while working much below the average.

Research has shown that a majority of those questioned is aware of the dependence of the amount of earnings upon the end results of the collective's activities but do not see the linkage between the end result and their own personal efforts. For this reason, the effect of their efforts on the amount of earnings is not felt. At the same time, in the opinion of 50 percent of those questioned, the amount of earnings is significantly influenced by relations with the immediate leader. Under these conditions for a portion of the employees there is an opportunity to obtain income not backed up by professional ability or by intense and high-quality labor. Hence, the decline in the prestige of professional expertise.

The motivation dynamics is also influenced by a disbelief in the possibility of positive changes. The measures carried out up to now in the labor management sphere and widely advertised as a means for improving national economic efficiency and at the same time improving the standard of living of the population have not provided anything for a majority of the honest workers. One has merely to recall the Shchekino method which in practice led to a situation where for its initiators average wages ended up lower than in the sector as a whole; there were also experiments with a so-called increase in wages for scientific workers, when their rates had to increase within the limits of the existing fund and there was nothing the leadership could do but propose that individual co-workers write statements on shifting to a lower position at their own request.

Mistrust in the changes has become part of the flesh and blood. The desire to wait it out, not to cause problems and hold on has become much stronger than the desire to earn more. Moreover, the previous selection methods very frequently overlooked those who too zealously accepted the desired as the actual. All of this taken together shaped a doubt as to the possibility of increasing wages by higher quality labor and at the same time an attitude of working without effort and concealing the existing reserves.

Incidentally, life has provided other opportunities. Leaving aside the influence of the shadow economy on motivation (this is a matter of special research), one cannot help but mention the negative impact of attracting employees by higher wages to jobs with low meaningfulness of labor and bad sanitary and hygienic conditions. As a result of such a policy there has been polarization in the labor awareness of the values of the meaningfulness of labor and wages. The alternative of

having an interesting, meaningful but comparatively lowly paid job or a job with good earnings but of low interest has become a reality. Moreover, the increased wages for work under bad conditions combined with the relatively few opportunities of increasing earnings with interesting and skilled labor, with the low standard of living in both instances, have developed among a significant portion of the workers a very definite attitude toward the "price" of material well-being. They have agreed to accept the bad working conditions for the sake of achieving a higher level of prosperity. At the same time, the losses due to the bad working conditions (job-caused and professional morbidity, injuries, payments for benefits and compensation) greatly exceed the losses which society suffers because of other production factors. Thus, today we are confronted with a person who has accepted the fact that work in social production cannot in and of itself provide a normal standard of living and who does not believe the promises and assurances. And although mistrust and caution over possible changes are a trait common to a majority of employees, the real content, so to speak, the physical embodiment of this mistrust are different. Among persons who have maintained their professionalism, who are fond of their job and understand the social value of labor, the mistrust derives from a pessimism caused by their experience in life. Precisely they more often than others have ended up as outsiders where their social status clearly did not correspond to their factual contribution to the end results. And although they lack the material features of prosperity, in their expectations in the forefront more often are not material goods (necessary to them like all others) but rather status consideration as they are depressed most of all by the injustice of the social assessments.

Indicative is the reply by one of the respondents to the question of what personally for him was a good job: "A good job is one which you go to with pleasure, perform with satisfaction and at the pay window you do not feel insulted." Of course, these people want very much to believe that their time has come.

For 4 years now, there have been noisy discussions of the need to pay according to labor. However, as yet, no tangible shifts can be seen. This being the case, the grounds for pessimism are preserved and the social and labor potential remains unrealized. At the same time, precisely this group of workers more than the others is interested in a restructuring of economic relations and can become its social support.

Among the workers accustomed without any particular labor effort of obtaining their albeit not too large wage and consider work as a forced necessity and realize their real interests outside of professional labor activity, mistrust in restructuring derives rather from a certainty that "all of this will soon be over and they have not suffered from it." This is not the first time they have lived through innovation but up to now they have gotten along. And they will get along this time.

This group is heterogeneous in terms of the methods and means of adapting to what is happening. Here are many workers accustomed to simulating energetic labor activity. Including those who conceal their professional inadequacy behind intensified social activeness, predominantly where this entails the distribution of certain goods. These people at present can now be seen, so to speak, "in the front ranks of the fighters for perestroika," and they successfully chatter about it at various forums. Experience in life has taught them to support any initiatives and undertakings as much as possible but only in words, in succeeding here (and at the expense of this) in arranging their personal affairs.

Another variety is the employees who also are not brilliant in their professional skills, who focus on their material interests and are not too finicky in choosing the means for realizing them. Internal production cost accounting which presupposes strictest accounting of all material valuables is, as they say, like a bone stuck in their throat. Such persons respond to attempt to introduce new management conditions in a very unique manner: in Moscow alone, over the first half of 1988, internal security apprehended over 7,000 petty thieves, double the figure for the corresponding period of the previous year. Just the ascertained annual losses from theft, shortages and spoilage of valuable materials at the city enterprises exceeded 6 million rubles [4].

And, finally, there are employees, and they are a majority, with undeveloped needs, a low level of aspiration and here satisfied with their lives. They can be oriented both at the meaningfulness of work as well as at wages. But here the low importance of the social motives of labor, the focusing of needs on themselves and general passivity make irresponsibility one of the main traits of this group. "We have made machine tools and have known that these were no good and would not operate for the client," admitted the machinist S. Gulygin at a report-election party conference of the Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Sergo Ordzhaniukidze [5]. But this is not an isolated case. Research on the attitude toward labor among young workers has shown that indifference to the quality of the produced product is a widespread phenomenon. Thus, one-third of those questions generally could not assess the quality of the product being produced by them.

At present, the workers with poor motivation do not show any interest in the occurring changes. Research conducted at several Moscow light industry enterprises operating under the new management conditions has shown that, regardless of economic universal training and a really functioning system of economic education, a majority of those questioned could not define what was meant by cost accounting, self-financing and self-management.²

How is it possible to stir up such a worker? What is capable of shaking his position? Above all, radical, extraordinary measures.

In our view, a great effect could be produced not by a mass rise in wages but rather reducing the payments which are not confirmed by a real labor contribution. The problem is that labor passivity and a low level of aspirations supported by wage leveling lead to the loss of professional skills and abilities. Here the level of labor satisfaction is not reduced and can even rise, as a person begins to consider the existing situation a normal one.

In the opinion of Academician N.M. Amosov [6] and which we fully share, it is possible to escape from this situation only by employing the threat to actually reduce wages if the worker maintains low labor productivity. For employees with poor labor motivation, positive incentives have virtually no effect but the fear of the loss of what they have can have an impact.

In addition to the conformity of the amount of wage to the labor contribution by an employee to the end results of activity, an important factor which provides an incentive for effective labor should be the selectivity of the economic mechanism, that is, the inevitable dismissal of not only detected loafers and violators of discipline but also simply poor, badly prepared workers. "Even with the best and sincerest drives, when a person is engaged in an undertaking which corresponds to his dominant needs, poor skills remain a real evil" [7]. An efficient economy cannot be created by employees with a low professional skill potential. Moreover, the absence of a selection mechanism with all its apparent humanism ultimately is directed against the employee himself: in the first place, it does not encourage professional growth and, secondly, dooms him to a chronic awareness of his incapacity [ibid.].

What has been said above does not deny other methods of activation. This includes: increasing the purchasing power of the earned ruble; providing all groups and categories of employees with equal opportunities to earn, including here an equal "price" which must be paid for the possibility of having additional earnings. Finally, a very effective factor of activation is minimizing the share of useless labor not caused by social necessity.

Of course, such changes evoke resistance. The leaders will also be dissatisfied with this as for them the possibility of establishing the "price" of a worker is the grounds of authority and real power over the personnel. The "imitators" who have become skilled at defending their own interests behind social activity will also oppose these changes. Nor will the passive-indifferent employees support them immediately. A significant portion of them undoubtedly will be forced to change the place of applying their labor in line with professional incompetence or lose that portion of their income which is not confirmed by a real labor contribution to production. They will also lose those privileges which befell them as payment for passivity and the reciprocal "amnesty" for bad work.

The conducted analysis makes it possible to forecast certain particular features in the transition of the industrial enterprises to the new management conditions.

Any economic innovations are capable of providing the planned effect only in those instances when they conform to the interests of a majority of the employees. As the research results have shown, the actually existing types of employees differ significantly from those for whom the new economic mechanism was designed. Even employees oriented predominantly at wages and for this reason more sensitive to material incentives do not fully correspond to the type which the cost accounting mechanism assumes, as they do not possess initiative, entrepreneurship and drive. The overall low interest in work becomes a real obstacle on the path of widely introducing cost accounting relations. In the understanding of cost accounting among an absolute majority of those questioned, there is no orientation to their own active-ness in saving resources, in seeking out and realizing internal production reserves or reducing product costs.

The accentuating of material interest and the desire to stimulate labor activity predominantly by using the ruble, in being characteristic of the enterprises operating under cost accounting conditions, increase the level of claims for wages while the interest in the meaningfulness of the job, in not being reinforced by the incentive system, inevitably will die out. The absence of a rigid link between the amount of earnings and the personal labor contribution and the reduced interest in work itself bring about a situation where the workers begin to pressure the leadership, demanding (in far from all instances validly) an increase in earnings. From here precisely stems the widespread desire to increase income by raising prices and eliminating the cheaper assortment.

An effective transition to the new management conditions will be determined by whether or not the management bodies, due to the effective system of measures, will be able to influence the motivation for labor activity and bring this into accord with the new management conditions and whether the workers will be able to adapt the new conditions to their needs and interests, as has repeatedly been the case already in carrying out various economic reforms.

The search for measures which will provide a real change in labor motivation presupposes the abandonment of a number of established economic stereotypes. The first stereotype is the notion of the employee merely as an object of managerial actions, as the human factor in production. It must be recognized that the employee is the subject [principal] of labor activity capable of reflecting managerial actions through his interests and thereby changing their focus. Recognition of this fact requires consideration of the state of labor motivation of the masses.

The second stereotype consists in a one-sided understanding of the relationship between labor productivity and the standard of living. Not only is a rise in the

former an indispensable condition for an increase in the latter as the standard of living of employees itself is capable of influencing labor productivity. At present, we are living through a moment when a qualitative improvement in the standard of living should precede a rise in labor productivity. The overcoming of labor passivity and the low interest in labor in social production is impossible without investing more assets in the worker himself, without strong development of the social sphere, a rational and just distribution according to the results of labor.

The third stereotype which must be destroyed is the conviction of the omnipotence of material incentives for labor. The incentive system should be focused on the entire diversity of needs which a person can satisfy in the process of and by labor activity and the economic mechanism must shape and develop an interest in the meaningfulness and social utility of labor and reinforce the social status of the employees who have achieved the heights of professional expertise. An oversimplified understanding of the real needs and interests entails a reduction in labor activeness and a warping of the economic mechanism.

The viability of the mentioned stereotypes is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that under the conditions of the transition to the new economic relationships, the managerial workers do not feel any necessity to have information concerning the state and development trends of motivation for labor activity. This indicates that the time of fundamental, qualitative changes in the management mechanism still lies ahead.

Footnotes

1. In the 1987 research, some 1,646 young workers under the age of 30 were polled.
2. We surveyed 250 students of seminars and schools of economic knowledge.

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Influence of Social Development Funds on Attitude Toward Labor

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[Article by D.I. Zyuzin. Dmitriy Isaakovich Zyuzin is a candidate of economic sciences and a senior science associate at the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of Demography Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] As an element of the economic mechanism, the social development fund [SDF] arose in the 1960s (the fund for sociocultural measures and housing construction), however the ideas set out for it were not realized. The current economic reform presupposes a significant strengthening for the role of this fund. Virtually all the major individual social needs such as housing, sociocultural facilities and so forth, should be satisfied from the SDF. At the same time, there has been no solution to a number of major theoretical and practical problems related to this fund. In particular, there is the debated question of its incentive role. Thus, K.I. Mikulskiy warns that with the growth of the SDF "there is also a possible reduction in the incentive of the employees to increase their personal labor contribution and earnings, since often the possibilities of obtaining housing, using vacation homes, children's facilities, the acquiring of food and other benefits supplied by the enterprise are of greater importance for the employees than increased earnings" [1, p 241]. This assumption is based on the fact that the desire for monetary remuneration is the sole motive of labor activity. In addition, the author asserts that the obtaining of social benefits and services is not directly linked in the employee's mind with the results of his labor [1, p 242]. Is this the case?

In the first place, a high level of production activeness is established not by a single motive but rather by a system of motives which are organically interrelated. Here one of them is always the leading one.

Secondly, the increased importance of the enterprise's social function changes the type of link of the worker and the collective and, consequently, the system of motivation for labor activity. In what direction is this process being carried out? The given task was examined by us in the course of a sociological study conducted in 1986-1988.¹

With an increase in the SDF, the nonproduction activities of the labor collectives were significantly activated and social needs were more fully satisfied, although not to an equal degree. An analysis of the data (Table 1) indicates that the differences are due not so much to the urgency of

personal needs as they are, in the first place, with the possibility of the management to employ various goods as a means of encouraging labor activity and, secondly, with the presence in the collective of an opportunity to acquire various goods for the earned money. For

example, satisfying the need for housing is little related to the amount of the fund as the housing allocation is regulated by legislation. Moreover, for construction it takes not only money but also a well developed construction facility.

Table 1

Social Goods and Services Provided to Enterprises to Their Employees, % of Persons Questioned Having an Opportunity to Realize Corresponding Need

| Social Goods and Services | Amount of SDF Per Employee, Rubles | | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|----------|
| | To 50 | 52-120 | Over 121 |
| Company apartment | 31.0 | 10.6 | 34.7 |
| Dormitory | 37.9 | 70.4 | 76.4 |
| Children's preschool institutions | 47.5 | 54.4 | 80.3 |
| Pioneer camp | 55.6 | 80.0 | 85.2 |
| Boarding house, tourist facility, vacation home | 21.1 | 27.4 | 41.4 |
| General medical facilities | 46.2 | 61.8 | 83.3 |
| Public dining | 92.0 | 98.0 | 94.5 |
| Trade (stores, buffets) | 84.4 | 78.4 | 77.1 |
| Consumer services | 21.9 | 54.0 | 24.6 |
| Sanitary-hygienic facilities (bathhouse, sauna) | 8.0 | 12.5 | 35.0 |
| Sports-recreational facilities (stadium, swimming pool, gymnasiums and so forth) | 18.0 | 8.0 | 37.2 |
| Relaxation facilities (rooms for resting, psychological relaxing and so forth) | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Library | 58.3 | 74.5 | 90.5 |
| Training center (vocational-technical school, technical school, VUZ and so forth) | 44.5 | 74.0 | 72.5 |
| Orchard (garden) plot in cooperative | 39.0 | 8.5 | 33.3 |
| Enterprise transport facilities | 33.0 | 21.2 | 22.5 |

It is important to note that at enterprises with a relatively large SDF, the links of the employee with the collective become significantly richer and more diverse, as additional opportunities are opened up for satisfying social and spiritual needs. The dynamics of labor motivation can be analyzed from three directions: a) the instrumental attitude toward labor, that is, its assessment from the viewpoint of the immediate result (good earnings; possibility of achieving a certain sufficiency at home, obtaining social goods and services; a job which leaves a good deal of free time); b) values directly linked with the characteristics of the job itself, its meaningfulness and social organization (self-expression in labor, interesting work, prospects of advancement, independence in work); c) values related to the social prestige of the given type of work (work is a social duty, any work is good if it brings benefit to

people; respect of persons around; the opportunity to have contacts with interesting people, mutual understanding in the labor process).

The respondents assessed the given judgments according to a 3-point scale. The ranking of each value was determined from the number of choices of the maximum gradation of the scale and the rank of the group of values from the average of the number of choices of each value in the group (index).

As is seen from Table 2, the attitude toward labor changes as the SDF increases. Here the leading values remain those related to the attitude toward labor as a means of attaining material prosperity, consumer services and so forth. The rank of this group is virtually constant and does not depend upon the growth of the SDF at the enterprise.

Table 2

| Attitude Toward Labor Depending Upon Amount of SDF, % of Persons Indicating Given Value as Most Important | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|------|--------|------|----------|------|
| Motives of Labor Activity | Amount of SDF Per Employee, Rubles | | | | | |
| | To 50 | | 50-120 | | Over 121 | |
| | % | Rank | % | Rank | % | Rank |
| I. Instrumental values. Index | 55.1 | 4 | 54.1 | 4.8 | 59.2 | 4.3 |
| Good earnings | 66.0 | 1 | 52.2 | 6 | 58.3 | 4 |
| Sufficiency at home, acquiring of articles | 51.3 | 5 | 54.5 | 4 | 59.2 | 3 |
| Consumer services | 59.6 | 3 | 61.2 | 2 | 67.2 | 2 |
| Free time | 43.6 | 7 | 49.6 | 7 | 51.2 | 8 |
| II. Self-expression on job. Index | 34.5 | 7.5 | 40.3 | 7.2 | 49.2 | 7 |
| Professional self-improvement | 38.0 | 9 | 43.5 | 8 | 51.0 | 9 |
| Interesting job providing satisfaction | 60.0 | 2 | 68.2 | 1 | 72.0 | 1 |
| Prospects of advancement | 17.6 | 11 | 19.5 | 11 | 19.5 | 11 |
| Independence on job | 42.6 | 8 | 41.0 | 9 | 54.2 | 7 |
| III. Social recognition. Index | 46.0 | 6.6 | 48.4 | 6 | 53.1 | 7 |
| Social duty | 50.0 | 6 | 53.0 | 5 | 55.5 | 6 |
| Respect in society | 35.3 | 10 | 35.0 | 10 | 46.0 | 10 |
| Contact with interesting people | 53.0 | 4 | 57.2 | 3 | 58.0 | 5 |

However, the motivation structure has changed. The most essential restructuring has occurred in the group of instrumental motives. As the SDF has increased, a desire for high earnings has actually lost its dominant significance and there is a stronger orientation to acquiring goods as well as sociodomic facilities (housing, children's preschool institutions) and the rank of such a value as free time declines. As a whole, Kendall's coefficient of rank correlation between the instrumental motives of enterprise groups I and II as well as between the motives of groups I and III equals 0.3, that is, statistically insignificant. In other words, an increase in the SDF by 2.5-fold and more contributed to a fundamental rearrangement in the structure of the instrumental motives.

In the second group characterizing the attitude toward labor as a value in itself, one can observe less substantial changes. As a whole the rank of this group rises. At "rich" enterprises the interest in the meaningfulness of labor (a good job is an interesting job providing satisfaction) rises by 12 points and the desire for professional self-improvement by 13 points; independence in work assumes greater value, that is, the opportunity to plan it oneself and take decisions (by 12.4 points). Such a motive as a desire for an individual career responds little to an increase in the funds with its significance rising insignificantly (by 2.5 points). However, the intragroup structure of motives does not change.

Thus, under the influence of social factors, the system of motivation is reordered; this concerns primarily the motives related to material well-being. The importance

of motives related to the intellectual and social meaningfulness of labor is intensified, however qualitative changes, that is, changes in the structure, are not observed.

We assume that as the economic reform develops and as the importance of the social function of production is strengthened, there will be greater significance for the motives related to the spiritual elements of labor activity as well as the motives related to social recognition. The group of instrumental motives and primarily wages will gradually lose its dominant position. Does this mean that incentives for labor will be weakened?

Labor is defined by a series of aspects: by quantity, quality, creative independence and the intensity of employing individual labor potential. The nature of these relations determines the rise of qualitatively different types of labor activity. For example, the labor of a worker who does not fulfill the output norm but produces the highest quality product differs substantially from the labor of a worker who significantly overfulfills the norm but works on the brink of constantly damaged output. There is an analogous situation with the use of labor potential as with equal output one, as they say, gives all he's got and another works half-heartedly.

For assessing the degree of influence of one or another value orientation on the characteristics of labor activity, we employ the value X^2 . The coupling coefficient (in particular, Kramer's) between the value orientations and the indicators of labor activity lie within the limits of 0.01-0.1. In other words, the difference in the value orientations does not cause substantial shifts in labor

activity. However, of importance here for us are not so much the quantitative assessments as the direction of the changes.

The group of values "self-expression in the labor process" is most closely linked both to the qualitative and quantitative indicators of labor activity. The total index is 143.5. In

second place are the values expressing the social significance of labor with 98.7; in last place are the instrumental values with 87.9 (Table 3). Thus, the weakening of the incentives of a material-domestic sort, including orientation at monetary remuneration, and the strengthening of moral incentives for labor in no way reduce labor activeness, but, on the contrary, lead to a substantial increase in it.

Table 3

| Influence of Motivation for Labor Activity on Activity Results (Values of X^2) | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|------------------------|-------|
| Motives of Labor Activity | Characteristics of Labor Activity | | | | Index |
| | Overfulfilling Production Quotas | Passage of Article on First Inspection | Submitting Innovation Proposals | Use of Labor Potential | |
| I. Instrumental values. Index | 20.7 | 21.8 | 7.2 | 13.3 | 87.9 |
| Good earnings | 16.1 | 3.9 | 14.6 | 18.5 | 73.2 |
| Sufficiency at home, acquiring of articles | 25.4 | 24.8 | 6.2 | 3.2 | 85.1 |
| Consumer services | 14.0 | 14.8 | 6.2 | 15.8 | 64.9 |
| Free time | 21.4 | 44.3 | 2.8 | 17.8 | 107.8 |
| II. Self-expression on job. Index | 23.5 | 23.6 | 22.5 | 40.4 | 143.5 |
| Professional self-improvement | 36.0 | 15.7 | 18.0 | 21.5 | 124.4 |
| Interesting job providing satisfaction | 20.4 | 43.9 | 10.9 | 21.6 | 117.3 |
| Prospects of advancement | 16.7 | 21.6 | 55.0 | 94.5 | 214.5 |
| Independence on job | 16.3 | 12.5 | 7.1 | 24.2 | 76.4 |
| III. Social recognition. Index | 21.6 | 15.9 | 14.9 | 14.7 | 98.7 |
| Social duty | 30.0 | 16.3 | 5.3 | 14.0 | 95.6 |
| Respect in society | 21.3 | 8.1 | 30.3 | 17.2 | 98.1 |
| Contact with interesting people in labor process | 13.7 | 23.4 | 9.1 | 13.0 | 72.9 |

The influence of motivation on labor activity can be judged from such an indicator as the percentage of significant and nonsignificant linkages (the tabular value $X^2 = 13.1$). In the group of values of "self-expression" of the 16 present links, only 3 were insignificant (16.6 percent). The emotional attitude toward labor (an interesting job providing satisfaction) as well as the desire for independence contribute little to innovative activities: X^2 equals, respectively, 10.9 and 7.1. A desire for independence is also little related to the quality of labor: $X^2 = 12.5$ is statistically not significant. The most balanced is the labor activity of employees who value in work the possibility of professional self-improvement and the prospects of advance in position. The desire for advance also contributes to the engaging in innovative activities and increasing the intensive use of one's labor potential.

The labor of employees for whom social recognition is important above all is less harmonious. Here of the 12 connections, 3 are insignificant, or 25 percent. The attitude toward labor as a social duty and the orientation to social utility virtually do not contribute to creative activeness ($X^2 = 5.3$). Contact in the labor process has virtually no influence on innovative activity. The high value of work from the viewpoint of its social prestige

encourages the engagement in innovation but is not linked to labor quality: $X^2 = 8.1$.

And, finally, the least harmonious is the labor of employees who are oriented at instrumental values, that is, at social remuneration as out of the 16 connections 5 were insignificant, or 31.1 percent. The desire to obtain more forces work at a more intense pace and more active engagement in innovative activities, but is virtually not linked to the quality of labor: $X^2 = 3.9$. The orientation at sufficiency and the acquisition of things contributes to a rise in individual productivity (to a significantly greater degree than the orientation to earnings) but is not reflected in creative activeness and does not help to raise the intensity of employing one's labor potential: $X^2 = 6.2$ and 3.2, respectively.

Thus, if one were to speak about the influence of the restructuring of the system of value orientations under the impact of the SDF, one could make the fully concrete conclusion of its beneficial effect both on the quantitative and qualitative indicators of labor activity as well as on strengthening the creative activeness and intensity of utilizing employee labor potential.

As for the restructuring occurring in the first group of values (related to the assessment of the remuneration for

labor), here the situation is varied. The shift of the orientation from earnings to values of a material and domestic sort, without any doubt, contributes to the growth of individual output and significantly raises the quality of labor, however it reduces the creative activeness and intensity of utilizing labor potential.

The contradictory action of the SDF on the attitude toward labor clearly is to be explained by the inconsistency in realizing the possibilities residing in the new economic mechanism. First of all, one must mention the contradiction residing in the very mechanism of the social development of the labor collectives. This is caused by the fact that the principles of financing social measures aimed directly at increasing production efficiency (increasing the level of professional training, improving working conditions, providing safety equipment, increasing wages and so forth) and the measures related to satisfying personal needs are respectively exclusive. In the first instance, the expenditures are incorporated in product costs and in the second are made from the SDF formed from profit. A strange situation arises: in order to have more profit and, consequently, an economic incentive fund, it is essential to reduce costs. But with a slow pace of technical reequipping, the simplest route is to reduce the expenditures on internal production social needs, that is, on improving working conditions, improving skills and so forth. In saving in the satisfying of production social needs, the enterprise obtains funds for social needs of a nonproduction nature, but at the same time exacerbates them. Certainly reduced expenditures on working conditions, production sanitation and so forth causes a rise in the sickness rate, reduced labor potential and so forth. According to the data of our research, after the housing problem improved working conditions and medical services are the most urgent demands of the employees. However, up to now a majority of the leaders has considered these problems secondary. At the same time, the expenditures on production needs in no way of a social nature are "written off" against the SDF. In this manner, product costs are "reduced," profit rises and along with it the SDF. It is impossible to imagine anything more unnatural than such a "mechanism." The cost accounting models recommended by the law governing the enterprise do not substantially change this mechanism. A fundamental solution to the question entails a fundamentally new system of cost accounting: a lease or a cooperative form. But this will clearly be a long time coming.

However, a way out can be found.

In the first place, it is essential that the SDF become the sole source of financing in resolving social problems of both a production and nonproduction nature and the sole disposer of it should be the labor collective council. This, of course, does not free the SDF from encroachment by the management which endeavors to fulfill the plan for reducing costs but substantially limits its claims. Secondly, the SDF up to now has not had an effective influence on the value attitude toward labor due to the

predominance of command-administrative and voluntaristic methods in the allocation system. A decisive abandoning of them will increase the incentive role of the fund.

In the mind of the employee, the amount of the SDF is not linked to the results of labor but rather the share of goods depends upon relations with the leadership and is perceived as a gift—a "blessing" from the leader. Some 30 percent of those questioned felt that of decisive significance in the allocation of goods and services of a social sort was "the ability to get along with the leaders," while successes in labor were pointed to by 24.5 percent and working conditions by 12.3 percent. This undoubtedly reduces the role of the SDF as a factor in increasing individual labor activeness.

It seems to us that the SDF must be split into three parts and at each enterprise three funds must be set up: a) a general collective one; b) a shop; c) personal. Deductions from profits into each of these funds should be carried out upon the decision of the labor collectives.

The expenditures from the general collective fund must be channeled into capital investments in the social infrastructure such as the construction and reequipping of hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoriums, vacation homes, nurseries, training centers, for personnel training and so forth. The shop fund is designed for satisfying needs related to improving working conditions, safety equipment, production sanitation and so forth and should be spent at the discretion of the labor collectives.

The personal fund should accumulate on the personal account of each employee and be disposed of at his discretion (for paying for the services of the facilities of the social sphere at the enterprise as well as for purchasing reduced-cost trips, the building of housing and so forth).

The question arises: How does the personal fund differ from the wage fund or the material incentive fund? The answer is in its specific focus. Money from the individual social development fund would go to recreation, medical treatment, sports, for improving the cultural level, consequently, for the labor activeness of the worker. Precisely such a specific focus was assumed in introducing the SDF. We must have a clearer, more consistent mechanism for its forming, distribution and utilization.

Footnote

1. The basic method for collecting the primary information was a questionnaire of enterprise employees. We selected 12 enterprises, which had either converted to cost accounting or operating under the conditions of the large-scale economic experiment in Moscow, Tallinn, Minsk, Baku, Tashkent, Ashkhabad, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk. Included in the sampling were enterprises with a minimum social development fund up to 50 rubles per worker per year, with an average fund of 51-120 and a large fund of over 121 rubles. The respondents at each

enterprise were selected randomly. The survey covered 2,700 workers, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel.

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POLITICS. DEMOCRACY. THE INDIVIDUAL.

Professional Culture of Party Worker

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[Text] To what degree do the party workers consider themselves ready to carry out the new tasks presently confronting the party? How do they view their professional and personal qualities? Do they recognize the need for the restructuring of internal party life? In a word, what does a modern party worker think about his role in society? We have endeavored to elucidate these questions in the course of research conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Law at the Urals Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Sverdlovsk Higher Party School [VPSH] in the spring of 1988. This was carried out upon assignment of the Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom in the process of working out the interdisciplinary Cadres Program.

A survey was made of 929 students on the faculty for skill improvement of the VPSH, including 12.9 percent secretaries, 30 percent heads of departments and their deputies, 44.6 percent instructors and 12.5 percent secretaries of the enterprise party committees. First of all, one is struck by the fact that in the course of perestroika

the membership of the party committees has been significantly changed. By the moment of the study, 47 percent of those questioned had worked less than 3 years in the party apparatus and only 16.3 percent had worked over 20 years; 64.7 percent of the respondents was under 40 years of age and 10.7 percent were over 50. Women comprised a little more than 1/3. Virtually all of those questioned had become communists on the job. Some 40 percent came from a worker background, 12 percent from kolkhoz families and the remainder had white collar parents, including 1.5 percent which had been party, soviet and trade union workers.

Prior to transfer to the party raykom or gorkom, 36 percent of the respondents had been engineers and technicians, 18 percent were in party and soviet work, 14 came from the Komsomol, 7.4 percent had been school teachers or principals. Among those recommended for the party apparatus, only 5 percent had been workers and kolkhoz members and this is eloquent proof that at present such promotion is more the exception than the rule.

One out of every two participants in the survey was the graduate of a technical institution of higher learning. Persons with a higher humanities education were around 37 percent and graduates of the VPSH about 10 percent. Such a situation, unfortunately, is typical for the industrial regions and here one can see one of the reasons for the technocratic biases in party work. As is known, the party raykoms and gorkoms until recently were engaged primarily in resolving production problems, duplicating or undermining the soviet and economic bodies. For staffing the apparatus (even the ideological departments), there were predominantly persons with a technical education (it is worthy of note that the graduates of agricultural institutes among the participants in the survey were less than 1 percent). Undoubtedly, the education factor holds up the overcoming of technocratic thinking. And, as a consequence, not all the party workers under the conditions of perestroika were ready for the role of political leaders.

What were the reasons for promotion to party work? Some 14.6 percent of the participants felt that they had acted, as they say, out of the urgings of their heart. Some 30 percent at the moment of promotion did not consider themselves sufficiently prepared for this while 27 percent did not have any idea of the content of their future activity. One out of four had gotten into the apparatus, in obeying the demands of party discipline. Thus, even in the first stage of recruitment and promotion, many essential shortcomings are established in a future political leader.

A desire to engage in party work and a calling for it could have been more fully considered. Clearly insufficient attention was given to the personal aspects of career. The spectrum of such motives (in any event on the verbal level) was rather narrow. Some 33.7 percent came into the apparatus, in endeavoring to help perestroika and realize their ideas and plans for improving various

aspects of our social life. Some 14 percent of those surveyed were hopeful that in addition to all else the move would make it possible to resolve personal (material, housing and domestic) problems. Some 8.7 percent assumed, thus, increased personal authority. In our view, the last two views in and of themselves are in no way reprehensible. It is important in what context they operate.

At present, the main criterion for promotion to party committees is considered by many (52 percent) to be the successful fulfillment of official duties. Only 29 percent expressed the opinion that they should consider primarily moral qualities of the candidate, his orderliness and ability to work with others and an acute political sensibility.

Research has established one other important circumstance. One out of three respondents feels that in promotion to party work, that the crucial factor is the opinion of the raykom secretary or the economic leader, or at best, the enterprise "triangle." A majority pointed out that conflicts arose between the raykom and the labor collective in choosing the candidates. Some 27 percent saw the reason for this in the ignorance on the part of party workers of the personal qualities of the candidates while 16.7 percent saw protectionism. It is interesting to note that the raykom and gorkom workers themselves were very skeptical of the recommendations from the oblast committees. Only $\frac{1}{3}$ considered these recommendations sound.

What is the reason for such major differences between the oblast and rayon (city) committees? Some 50.6 percent mentioned the deeply rooted questionnaire method of recruiting personnel, 58.9 percent pointed to insufficient knowledge of the local cadres on the superior level, 16.3 percent rebuked the superior leadership for ignoring the opinion of subordinates and 12.2 percent felt that the gorkoms and raykoms themselves did not show sufficient firmness when the candidates were nominated "from above." These data again confirm that volitional methods which run contrary to the standards of internal party democracy are very vital regardless of their sharp criticism at the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The designated shortcomings also told negatively on the process of the professional development of the party apparatus worker. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, the average length of stay in the position of instructor is 3.7 years, department head 5.8 years and committee secretary 6.9 years. A significant portion of this time is spent acquiring the essential knowledge, skills and abilities. A year after promotion, the adaptation period was considered over by 6.1 percent of those questioned, while 12.2 percent of the respondents needed 2 years to master the position, 26.7 percent said 3-5 years and 49.8 percent by the moment of the survey still did not consider themselves fully developed workers (including 43 percent of the secretaries, 42 percent of the department heads, 62

percent of the instructors and 54 percent of the enterprise party committee secretaries). The necessary skills come particularly hard for the previous engineers and technicians with an average of twice the time than the graduates of the VPSH. It is no accident that many former engineers at the new position feel themselves temporary persons while around 90 percent pointed out that their main interests as before were tied to their previous specialty.

How did the persons questioned themselves assess their potential? Rather self-critically. First of all, they were concerned that they were not sufficiently prepared for an independent analysis of the complex phenomena of modern social life. Thus, 30 percent admitted that they lacked the necessary skills to compare opposing viewpoints, and promptly identify new trends in social life (20.1 percent), to discover the essence of various phenomena and compare them with the overall situation in the city or rayon (18.7 percent), and to see the whole behind the individual particular facts (16.5 percent). One out of 10 experienced difficulties in selecting the required literature and in analyzing and generalizing the information.

Many workers realize that they must improve the level of dealing with others. What questions arouse particular concern in the respondents? It is not always possible to change a negative situation (35.0); often they lack knowledge to be an interesting speaker (34.0 percent); they do not have the skills for directing debate (31.4 percent); in conversation many are hindered by the awareness of responsibility for each word and a fear of making a mistake (18.1 percent); or the inability to conduct a dialogue, to respond quickly to the words of the person being talked with, and freely (without notes) set out one's ideas (16.4 percent); to control one's emotional state (13.7 percent). Only 9 percent of those questioned did not experience problems in dealing with others.

It is interesting that former Komsomol workers complain more rarely than others of the difficulties in analyzing the various complex situations of life. We feel that one of the reasons for this is that until recently work in the Komsomol taught young people to accept a facile understanding of the problems of political leadership.

Over 80 percent of the respondents experience a chronic shortage of free time. It can be asserted with confidence that the lack of a scientific organization of labor is the basis for this. Up to now a mass of time has been taken up with participating in all sorts of sessions, commissions, staffs, organizational committees and so forth and, of course, paperwork. The following fact is indicative in the given context.

Only 58.2 percent of those questioned more or less regularly read artistic literature and current events. Some 2.6 percent do not read at all and the remainder only haphazardly. The questionnaire listed a number of works that had been very popular with the public. The results were as follows: 17.4 percent had not been able to

read "Plakha" [Execution Block] of Ch. Aytmatov, 46.1 percent "Novoye naznachenie" [The New Appointment] of A. Bek, 10 percent "Deti Arbata" [Children of the Arbat] by Rybakov, 53.8 percent "Igra" [The Gain] by Yu. Bondarev, 68 percent "Belyye odezhdy" [White Clothes] by V. Dudintsev and 71 percent "Vse vpered" [Forward Everyone] by V. Belov. The situation was no better with public affairs. Over 1/3 had not read the article by N. Shmelev "Advances and Debts," 64.6 percent the article of A. Nuykin "Ideals and Interests," 66.2 percent the article of A. Gelman "A Time of Gathering Forces." Many (38 percent) were not familiar with the article by S. Andreyev "Causes and Effects" published in the local journal URAL. Up to now it has been discussed on the pages of the oblast press. A knowledge of modern literature is presently not only indicative of overall culture but is also an essential element in the professional competence of a party leader.

The above-described situation shows the great oversights in the training and system of skill improvement for the party workers. In our view, neither the party schools nor the party committees themselves pay sufficient attention to the questions of the techniques of party political work. At the same time, this, like any other, has its own methods and procedures which are in no way exhausted by the usual concept of "advanced experience." We have in mind the ability to conduct a dialogue, debate and other forms of political activity under the conditions of democracy. The party school should make a profound study of the ethics of party work, applied sociology and pedagogics and psychology. Even where this is now being done, each of the disciplines is being taught outside its relationship to the techniques of party work.

The restructuring of party work has been held up by an unhealthy moral-psychological climate in certain gorkoms and raykoms. Not everywhere have they as yet abandoned the strict hierarchical principle of internal relationships, when a decision by a superior leader means an order not to be discussed. A vital, creative discussion of problems is still a rarity where each person could make his own proposals without keeping an eye on the opinion of the leadership. It is far from an accident that 72.8 percent of those questioned feel that the fate of a party worker actually depends upon a narrow circle of individuals. The following facts are noteworthy. A predominant majority (92 percent) recognize that omissions and errors are made. However, only 1/3 (31.3 percent) willingly admitted this. The remainder preferred either completely or partially to put the blame for the mistakes made on "objective circumstances" or on others. Here one feels not only concern for the "honor of the uniform," but also a fear of paying for the error with one's career—and this was how one out of every four raykom (gorkom) secretary feels. The right to make a mistake is an indispensable condition for a creative attitude toward the job but this has still not become a standard of internal party life.

In a leader the required exactingness is not always combined with comradeship aid and support. There have

been frequent instances when a worker fears turning to a leader for advice as they might suddenly consider him incapable of taking an independent decision. The respondents were asked to reply to the question of with whom they preferred seeking advice on routine problems: with relative, friends, work colleagues or an immediate leader? Some 83 percent opted for the first version and 36.6 for the second (it was possible to give both versions). Only one out of four pointed to benevolence as a character trait of the committee secretary.

How generally is a party worker perceived? We asked the participants in the survey to choose an image close to their understanding out of 15 characteristic descriptions. A majority (57 percent) considers party work similar to the profession of a diplomat. The conclusion emerges that the maintaining of good relations with the leadership is of concern to many more than winning authority in the masses. Some 37 percent chose the model of a "rat on a treadmill." In actuality, one must "run" a lot, however the efforts are far from always adequate to the result. This circumstance can serve as one of the explanations for the low satisfaction on the part of a majority of the party apparatus workers with their job as only 19 percent of them were fully satisfied. Undoubtedly, one here also feels the fact that in recent years the party leaders have felt themselves somewhat uncomfortable confronted with public opinion. During the age of stagnation in the mass mind there developed an image of a party worker far from the Leninist demands on the cadres. And although the critical view has real grounds under it and the party is decisively carrying out a course of restructuring its work, many party members have had a difficult time with the situation which has developed in the public mind.

Opinion of Respondents on Qualities of Party Worker and on View of These Qualities in Mass Mind, Percent of Those Noting Each Alternative

| Characteristics of Party Worker | Assessment... | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| | Corresponds to Reality | Present in Mass Mind |
| High culture | 20.3 | 15.9 |
| Efficiency | 41.3 | 18.2 |
| Careerist | 2.8 | 28.3 |
| Respects the law | 14.6 | 8.0 |
| Honesty, uprightness | 41.3 | 20.1 |
| Able to defend own principles | 25.2 | 11.0 |
| Has unmerited privileges | 2.3 | 54.4 |
| Aware of responsibility to the people | 35.1 | 13.3 |
| Oriented exclusively on leadership | 9.0 | 34.3 |
| Thinks independently | 20.8 | 7.6 |
| Does not desire material goods | 15.9 | 6.6 |

In the course of the research, the participants were proposed a list of characteristics and asked to assess their conformity to actuality, on the one hand, and the degree

of their dissemination, on the other. The results are shown in the table. Let us agree that the image of the party worker established in the perception of the respondents is rather self-critical. At the same time, they foster no illusions on the judgments in the mass mind. The notions of the parties actually do not coincide on any of the positions. Furthermore, if one judges from the opinion of the respondents, the persons around are unjust in terms of the party cadres as they exaggerate the scale of the spread of negative traits and underestimate the number of positive ones. This applies primarily to the notorious privileges. The party workers almost unanimously deny the existence of such but at the same time they recognize that a majority of those around support the directly opposite view. Such a contradiction can be overcome and confidence restored only as a result of a fundamental restructuring of party work and primarily by broadening glasnost. Certainly, for too long the image of the life and activities of the party leaders has been concealed from the people and this has inevitably given rise to rumors and gossip.

In the course of the research we examine the attitude of the party workers to perestroyka. This was far from unanimous. Let us recall that the survey was conducted on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference when there was a nationwide discussion of the ways and directions of improving our society's political system. The debates on this question were also very acute in party circles and this was reflected in the replies. Some 54.3 percent of the respondents felt that as a result of the democratization of society, the authority of the party worker had risen while 20.8 percent adhered to the opposite opinion. Some 24.9 abstained from answering. This was the highest percentage of abstentions on all the questions of the questionnaire. Some 58.1 percent felt that the broader sphere of activity and real rights of the soviets was not reflected in the role and influence of the party in our life, some 36.8 percent did not feel this. Some 80 percent of the party workers insisted on a legislative regulation of relationships between the party bodies and the soviets and economic organizations while 17.2 percent agreed with the existing state of affairs and saw no need to change it. Among the spheres of social life where a strengthening of party influence is needed first, a majority mentioned trade (71.9 percent), services (64.7 percent), public education (49.4 percent), public health (49.0 percent) and culture (46.9 percent).

The replies also reflected a definite uncertainty among the party workers as to their future, primarily in line with the cutback in the party apparatus. Here 38.4 percent were thinking of returning to their former job, 37.8 percent wanted to transfer to leading economic work, 14.2 percent to leading work in other public organizations while the remainder preferred to remain in the party apparatus or did not answer the question. Judging from everything, a majority of those questioned not only expressed a desire but were also actually confident that in the event of departing from the ray'kom (gorkom) they would still be employed in leading work. And, unfortunately, as long as the hope for the unwritten "law of

nomenklatura movement" is still a possibility then undoubtedly this will be an obstacle for a restructuring in party work.

Let us sum up the results. A majority of the questioned party apparatus workers realizes the need for a substantial restructuring in party work and feels that they cannot live in the old manner. At the same time, the realization of this positive idea is held up by the old norms and stereotypes which have become deeply rooted in the apparatus over the decades. It is not easy to overcome them. A portion of the party workers is psychologically unprepared to carry out recruitment and promotion of the cadres and establish relations with colleagues on a democratic basis. Not all of them feel themselves sufficiently protected against subjective opinions and views of the leadership and in some places shear arbitrary rule. This is yet another brake on party renewal. It is essential to work out and introduce new methods of party leadership.

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Civil Movements

18300830D Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, Jun 89 (signed to
press 30 May 89) pp 22-26

[Article by V.N. Berezovskiy and N.I. Krotov. Vladimir Nikolayevich Berezovskiy is a junior science associate at the Institute of USSR History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Nikolay Ivanovich Krotov is an instructor at the Cheremushkinskiy Rayon CPSU Committee in Moscow. They are both being published in our journal for the first time.]

[Text] The "etatization" of social life—this indispensable condition for the existence of the administrative system—entailed numerous negative consequences. Among the most substantial was the removal of large groups of persons from real involvement in political life. At present, we are reaping the bitter fruits of the sham unity which reigned for long years in a spirit of "we approve and support." The development of the independence of the people and the increased political activeness of the citizens are now being carried out in a contradictory manner, with great social and moral costs. Possibly this is the most visibly apparent in the informal movement. The relations of the members of informal groups with the authorities, on the one hand, and the regular citizens, on the other, have developed in a difficult manner, at times with tension. Nevertheless one cannot help but see that the rise and broadening of the scale of the independent movement and its desire for full participation in political life are proof of the dynamics of our society.

At present, many if not a majority of the associations are beginning to assume a political hue. Among the reasons for the change in the view one must mention first of all the spread in the mass mind of notions of the bureaucracy as an ungovernable force out of the control of the

party and soviet bodies as well as doubt as to the ability of many social institutions to cope with a number of global ecological problems and solve the tasks posed on the perestroyka agenda.

In the development of the present-day sociopolitical informal movement a definite role has been played by the fact that among its participants there are numerous representatives from the former so-called human rights groups. Without being able during the years of stagnation to legalize their views, they endeavored to appeal to public opinion either through "samizdat" or through the foreign mass information media. "Texts of programs were created, they studied their own classics, they published a diverse and rich range of 'samizdat,' and they had 'their own' authorities and heroes. This period of latent existence established many organizational traditions and the very style of relations within and between the groups as well as the means and methods of self-regulation and self-organization" [1]. The supporters of the mentioned movement, in being very heterogeneous in ideological terms, have now entered the informal groups. A portion of the so-called dissidents have established new associations but these have not broken with the organizational traditions of the groups of the 1960s and 1970s (the former seminar group "Democracy and Humanism," the Press Club "Glasnost," the independent publishing house Express Chronicle, the "Union of Interprofessional Contact of Workers," "The Democratic Union" and others). The characteristic traits of these groups are a radical confrontational attitude toward the authorities, the combining of club and circle contacts with public meetings and petition campaigns as well as active publishing activities.

Another source of the current informal movements has been the social initiative associations of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (the communard movement, the environmental groups and the interbrigade movement). These have set as their main task improving the cultural level of man, developing his personal qualities and collective awareness. During the years of stagnation their activities were forced to the periphery of social life. At present, these people are among the activists in the movement for perestroyka. It is a remarkable fact that particularly many of the former "communards" were in the mass information media bodies [2]. The interbrigade members under the aegis of the Komsomol Central Committee have conducted a number of information dialogue meetings and have actively joined in the work of various social groups and associations. For example, on the organization council of the Moscow People's Front there is a group of young communard-internationalists and in the "Union of Independent Socialist" there are the Alejandro Diaz and Manuel Rodriguez Brigades and so forth.

The "New Wave" in the informal sociopolitical movement arose and developed directly under the influence of the processes of democratization and glasnost in 1987-1988. Being very heterogeneous in its composition, it developed into a movement by various means. These

were the first more or less mass expressions of protest against the destruction of the national cultural historical heritage and actions in defense of the environment as well as discussions of current problems of political life. At present, in the "New Wave" one can isolate the following formations. Political clubs, seminars, circles investigating major questions of domestic and foreign policy of the nation, the processes of the social movement and so forth. Ecological and ecological-cultural clubs, groups, societies and circles acting to protect monuments of national culture and history, as well as protect nature and the health of man. To a certain degree this is the analog of the Green Movement in the West. The clubs of school and student self-government are closely tied to the various political clubs and consider the main thing in their activities a struggle for the interests of the students and senior graders. The communards are groups the members of which are concerned by the crisis state of the municipal economy. Here one can clearly trace trends to establish real control of the voters over the activities of the local soviets and executive committees, a desire to develop self-governing principles in resolving the questions of local life and attempts to realize various social projects involving a rebirth of an authentic neighborhood. All these initiatives can be characterized as an unique movement "from below." The "independent publishing houses" exist partially independently and also form autonomous informal groups or operate as the "organ" of one or another association. The publication runs, as a rule, vary from five to several hundred copies. Among them are newspapers, leaflets, the express chronicle, information bulletins and so forth.

A separate branch is represented by the countercultural and religious groups. These are the imitators of hippies, the Hare Krishna sect, the Society of Christian Community, Believing Christian Socialists and others. The aim of such associations is to indoctrinate man in a spirit of a religious or other unofficial belief. Here they do not conceal the desire to influence the political sphere in order to achieve a definite reordering of society in accord with their group values.

Such are the "components" of the modern politicized informal movement. In addition to them, ever-greater activity is being shown by the groups of the pedagogical community, social engineering, medical-psychological aid and so forth.

The club (group) continues to remain the basic cell of the sociopolitical informal movement. It acts both as an association of like-thinkers as well as a place of contact. In Moscow, according to the most approximate estimates, there are around 100 clubs. The size of the aktiv of such an association varies from 5 to 70 persons, and averages approximately 20 persons. As for the number of participants in activities (seminars, discussions, meetings), here the "spread" is significantly wider from scores of persons up to several thousand and at times tens of thousands. According to social composition, they are largely the intelligentsia in the humanities, white collar

personnel, engineers, technicians, co-workers from scientific research institutes and design bureaus, workers as well as school children in the senior grades and students. The basic age categories are from 15 to 25 and from 35 to 50 years. Recently, there has been an increase in the influx of persons over 50, and in particular, pensioners. However, the share of those who are 25-30 years is still slight. One other remarkable detail is the increase in the number of communists and Komsomol members. In a number of instances, communists head informal groups. In the association "Community," Komsomol members make up 60-70 percent. There are particularly many communists in formations the activities of which are of a discussion or planning nature. In Moscow, communists participating in the work of informal groups have formed an interclub party group and there are analogous Komsomol associations (recently one of them registered as a Komsomol organization under the Cheremushkinskiy Komsomol Raykom). The size of such a group is around 50 persons.

The inner structure of a club, as a rule, is as follows: a publishing organ (more often a club "express" bulletin); a theoretical seminar; working sections (temporary or permanent, including interclub) for preparing various social projects or conducting theoretical research; a working organ (council or secretariat) for carrying out routine organizational work; periodic meetings of regular members. Virtually each club has a library and archives as well as a room where discussions are held (most often on a fixed day of the week). As a whole, the independent formations have a rather flexible structure making it possible for them to adapt effectively to a change in external circumstances.

Also of interest are two other formations which have become very widespread in the informal movement. These are above all the sociopolitical centers. It is their task to study, discuss and support sociopolitical initiatives. An example of this is the Fakel [torch] Center (founders the Sevastopolskiy and Cheremushkinskiy Komsomol Raykoms in Moscow). In addition, from time to time various factions arise within the movement. These can operate rather autonomously (such as the "Democratic Komsomol Faction" which brings together members from the Moscow Interclub Komsomol Group and has put forward a packet of proposals on the radical reform of the Komsomol) or is part of individual informal clubs or groups (for example, all the informal groupings sharing the principles of a Social Democratic ideology are included in the Social Democratic faction of the "Democratic Union").

The attempts to shift in the long run to a party model of activity, in our view, underlie the establishing of factions. This idea in the politicized informal environment has become widespread. In Moscow alone we know of two or three-score "party" names, beginning from the "Party of Urban and Rural Owners" and "Democratic Party" and ending with the "Democratic Union."

Among the accomplishments of the informal groups, one can put the creation of two interregional information coordinating networks for exchanging experience, for providing help and coordinating actions in the course of various sociopolitical campaigns. The cells of the networks are from 90 to 190 clubs and groups from 8 republics and 79 cities (1988). Here there is no working leading center (in this sense the networks are completely "horizontal"), but there are regional information centers through which the necessary information is transmitted to the spot. Thus, there is an attempt to strengthen the organizational bases of the informal movement and broaden its influence.

At the same time, at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, a crisis could be seen in the informal political movement. Many leaders are well aware that the importance of the discussion clubs, spontaneous meetings and so forth which in the not distant past had been the only possible manifestation of social activeness under current conditions has declined. The inner reserves have been exhausted and often there are new forms for truly mass work.

The organizational instability, the constant splits, regroupings and at times acute confrontation even between associations which are close in spirit and ideas—all of this to a significant degree is explained by personal ambitions. Noteworthy is the admission by one of the old participants in the informal movement V. Igrunov: "At present very often the questions are asked: Why are you so divided? There are so few of you, possibly just a thousand or two and you are split in scores of clubs. Why can't you all unite? But the clubs not only are not uniting, but, on the contrary, are constantly splitting.... What is the matter? The clubs exist not in order to engage in discussions, although often the discussion sessions are dominated by those who must have their say.... But those who in fact support the clubs, and let the movement participants forgive me, and those who are parasitized by the chatterers—these are persons who are profoundly concerned with our development and our future.... But is it possible to act jointly without having a common understanding of what you will encounter and what you wish? When the taboo on free speech was lifted, it was suddenly discovered that probably the main thing which we had lost over the last 20 years was a clarity...about goals" [3].

The given circumstance along with an insufficiently serious scientific soundness to many debates impedes a mass influx of the scientific and creative intelligentsia into the movement. An exception is, probably, only several clubs in Moscow and Leningrad (for example, the Moscow Tribune, Democratic Perestroika, Perestroika, the Social Initiative Fund) and those informal groups which have stood at the sources of the people's fronts. At the same time, the situation of emphatic openness, a free clash of opinions and nontrivial approaches which in many ways are in sharp contrast to the customary atmosphere of official discussions (including in the system of Marxist-Leninist education, at lectures and

seminars on social sciences in VUZes as well as history and social sciences lessons in schools) have attracted to the measures of the informal groups a significant number of more or less casual persons who experience a natural gravitation toward free discussion and an exchange of opinions on the acute questions of social life.

There are two other distinguishing features of the sociopolitical informal movement: the obligatory presence of its ideological doctrine in the program documents and the absence of a strict, fixed apparatus and a multitier administrative structure.

Thus, the main features at present in the independent civil initiatives are: a narrowly group nature and at the same time a professional eclecticism (a meeting grounds, discussion as the basic method of activity and the forming of circles as the main organizational form), an antibureaucratic focus of political criticism and increased attention to the development of the democratic procedures in the activities of the groups and the relations between their members.

As a whole, in our view, one can agree with the classification proposed by O. Rummyantsev for the functional roles which are performed by the politicized informal associations: sociocultural, the role of a schooling in civil duty as well as restoring and strengthening the institution of social control and the opposing of official structures [4]. In truth, one must make a major stipulation and that is for now the potentials of the movement are not sufficiently utilized.

The historic contradiction between the moribund command-administrative system and the nascent democratic model of popular self-government has brought to light an independent sociopolitical movement. Its conversion into a permanent and constant element of sociopolitical practice is a reality.

It is perfectly possible that by the moment the given article appears the informal sociopolitical movement will assume new qualities, some of the mentioned groups will cease to exist while others will appear. However, no matter how diverse this movement is, it undoubtedly shows the significant changes occurring in the life of our nation and the awakening of the political awareness of the people.

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DISCUSSIONS

The Road Should Operate

18300830E Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, Jun 89 (signed to
press 30 May 89) pp 27-34

[Journal roundtable discussion of the operation of the Baykal-Amur Mainline. The materials were prepared by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences P.Kh. Zaydfudim and R.A. Kakhorov]

[Text] This year marks the 15th anniversary of that noteworthy day when, to stormy applause, delegates of the 27th Komsomol Congress saw off their representatives to build a new, unique transsiberian railroad with a then unusual, brief and ringing name, the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline].

There were no doubts as to the necessity of building the main line as scientists vied with each other describing the natural riches which the zone of the future route hid. The military quietly but tenaciously reminded us of the difficult international situation and the necessity of strengthening the southeastern frontiers.

The Soviet youth with their customary enthusiasm set to work realizing that the nation needed the coal, copper, apatites, iron ore and much, much else residing deep within Siberia and that it was essential to develop this untouched area as quickly as possible and this meant building the railroad.

Greedy for sensations, the journalists immediately baptized the BAM as the "construction project of the century" and ecstatically described the heroism of the BAM builders who were able in 50-below frosts to live in tents and vans and each day be satisfied with some macaroni and canned meat. Obedient composers created simple but ardent songs where they urged them, at whatever the cost, to live more happily for "it befell us to build the iron route, in short the BAM."

And the fellows built. They believed and built. And when from above there came the "initiative" to complete laying the embankment a year ahead of time, they set to work and did this a year early. And the names of the BAM heroes resounded throughout the nation and the heroes did not conceal the tears placing the last "golden" link in the steel throat of the BAM. They have given up 10 long years of their life for this....

However, the intoxication from the joy of the long-awaited victory soon dissipated. There were some unanswered questions: the road had been built but through-traffic still has not been opened; the cities were erected but some of them are already collapsing and those still standing are crowded, uncomfortable, inconvenient for life and they lack schools, nurseries, hospitals, sports facilities, and there are no recreation and entertainment facilities at night. A great fuss was made about the industrial development of the territory but virtually none of the 30 involved ministries has begun any way extensive work in the BAM zone.

The tone of the articles in the press changed abruptly. The newspapers were dotted with headlines: "The BAM—The Monument to Stagnation," "The BAM Builders—The Deceived Generation." More and more frequently the question was asked: Who needed it, this BAM?

Only now has it been realized that, having announced the development of the enormous Siberian territory, we did not have and, even now even 15 years later, do not have an integrated, clear overall plan of development. Will the wide-scale industrial exploitation of minerals in the BAM zone not lead to the destruction of the vulnerable northern nature? Where to start: with the construction of the mining and processing combines or, perhaps, would it not be better to establish the first BAM university in Tynda? Or possibly BAM should be turned into a "tourist area"? What should be the mechanism of future development? On BAM are there real social forces capable of putting this mechanism to work?

These and scores of other questions became the subject of an editorial roundtable held in the town of Tynda upon the initiative of the staff of the Komsomol Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol Shock Construction Site. Participating in its work were: the Department Head of the Geography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.B. Alayev, the Instructor of the Komsomol Central Committee V.N. Grushevskiy, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.V. Dmitriyev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Council Member of the Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee on the BAM P.Kh. Zaydfudim, Docent on the Chair of Scientific Communism at the Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute I.V. Koval, Docent of the Chair of Scientific Communism at the Chita Polytechnical Institute L.N. Klimovich, Candidate of Economic Sciences and Department Head of the Gorispolkom (Komsomolsk-na-Amure) V.A. Piyaykin, Candidate of Economic Sciences and Sector Head at the Far Eastern Institute of Economic Research Under the USSR Academy of Sciences M.I. Ledenev, the Instructor from the Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee A.I. Yemelyanov, the Manager of the Baykal-Amur Department of the USSR Promstroybank [Industrial and Construction Bank] B.S. Yusfin as well as the Deputy Manager for Economics at the Mostostroy-10 [Bridge Construction] Trust S.V. Dudarev, the school Principal

from Fevralsk S.P. Istomin and the Chairman of the Berkakit Settlement Soviet V.V. Startsev.

Leasing of the Territory—The Way for Developing the Region

P.Kh. Zaydfudim: The reasons for the current state of the BAM are well known. As shameful as it is to admit, social science has also played its unenviable role in this.

The very fact that the BAM zone does not have the appropriate scientific-informational support, in my view, says a great deal. Incidentally, the scientific research conducted on the BAM, from the viewpoint of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has for some reason lost its urgency, although recently we were able again to draw the attention of academy science to the problems of the main line.

At present, it is clearly too late to ascertain who is to blame. The important thing is to determine what we should do. The main task is to work out a fundamentally new, effective overall plan for the development of this region. And here sociologists will be indispensable.

The Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee on the BAM is fully engaged with this problem. If course, it is impossible with the forces of the staff alone to work out an integrated overall plan. Nevertheless, even now we have our own vision of the way out of the crisis for BAM. Where do we start? From the necessity of giving special status to the BAM zone. In the first place, this zone which covers 33 rayons should have its autonomy. Secondly, it is essential to establish a mechanism for implementing all those programs which over the long run will be worked out for BAM. Such an universal mechanism could be a territorial-collective lease contract. We understand this as the setting up of collectives which upon agreement with the local soviets could lease a certain territory and be involved in providing social amenities and industrial development in accord with the general plans for the development of the towns and settlements, the rayon development plans and, most importantly, considering the opinions of the people living on the given territory.

I should point out that the idea of a territorial-collective lease is based upon experience which we have in our nation as well as abroad.

In 1932, the Main Administration of the Northern Seaway was established in our nation and it was led by the well-known Soviet scientist O.Yu. Shmidt. This organization had subordinate to it virtually the entire Far North. Over the 31 years of its existence, the administration was able to solve a number of economic, social and cultural-ecological problems. The concentration of real power in its hands and the presence of state powers as well as flexibility made it possible to have a hands-on approach to organizing and enormous area of life, and precisely life, and not merely the carrying out of production tasks related to the development.

The idea of a territorial-collective lease has evoked great interest and support from the executive committee chairmen of a whole series of towns and settlements in Siberia, the Far East and Maritime Area. It is considered an alternative to the existing system of extensive primitive industrial development.

We are proposing a plan which does not run contrary to the state program for the development of the Far East. We see both strong and weak points as well as the positive socioeconomic focus of this program. However, no mechanism exists which is capable of putting it into effect.

A part of the program proposed by us should be the establishing of a Center for the Development of the BAM Zone and this would be a body which would have special powers given by the government. The task of such a center would be to formulate and coordinate a new policy of development through the lease holder collectives. However, we realize that the very idea of a territorial-collective lease requires a thorough elaboration from the economic, legal and organizational-managerial aspects.

Who Will Assume the Lease?

A.V. Dmitriyev: I would define the current situation on the BAM as ambiguous. Of course, this concerns all of us. But, in my view, we must not put all our hopes on all sorts of official rulings.

We are speaking about the administrative, economic and managerial independence of the BAM zone. But at present on the BAM are there not informal social structures and a circle of enthusiasts capable of assuming certain self-administrative functions? Are the BAM workers ready to follow your idea?

Generally, if one speaks about independence, then one must be certain that at present a social principal has been formed capable of carrying out the set tasks. With the aid of the press, we have become accustomed to the word "bammers." But does such a social community really exist in life? I don't know. And no one knows precisely. This must be studied. And if it does, then the proposed idea of a lease here, on the BAM, has every right to exist but if not, it is not worth, as they say, making a fuss.

For determining social policy here we should first of all realize who are the BAM workers, what are their current problems and what is the hierarchy of these problems? Only having correctly answered these questions will we be able to carry out a rational social policy. For this reason at present we need not profound sociological studies which would take several years but rather social statistics. And the BAM leaders without fail should possess such statistics.

I.V. Koval: Our group from the Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute has analyzed the urgent economic, social and psychophysical problems of labor productivity. At present, we are carrying out this work in Ust-Kut. It has

been discovered that the production potential of the BAM organizations is only 30-percent used. In the future the situation can further deteriorate since the volume of construction and installation work will decline.

The question is: what can we do with the labor potential which exists on the BAM? The local leaders have shown ambiguity over this question. On the one hand, they are endeavoring to keep the labor force on the spot and on the other are endeavoring to encourage its utilization. In the BAM zone there is a process of the loss of live labor. The people do not know what they would be able to do there and are being forced to leave. Of course, this is the result of the absence of an integrated plan for BAM development or, to be more precise, this is the direct result of the current development policy. In the near future the migration flows will increase and not only due to those who came here for 3 years, but for those also who have already adapted here.

What must be done? Anatoliy Vasilyevich Dmitriyev has correctly said that we must now determine the current interests of the BAM workers and what is of most concern to them. In part, we can answer this question. According to our data, the people are most concerned by the present and future of their children, they are not satisfied with the existing opportunities for the complete and harmonious development of the child. Moreover, the construction project offers too narrow a choice of jobs. Secondly, there is the future of the labor collective. Thirdly, the uncertainty of family prospects as it is difficult to plan a family life without knowing the development prospects of one's enterprise. As we see, children represent the main value for the BAM workers. In the future, this circumstance will have to be considered.

Yes, we now can say that we must urgently work out an overall plan for BAM. But just what will this represent? Certainly, this is not only an overall plan for the development of the BAM zone but also for the entire nation. This is also the progress of the productive forces within the system of socialism, considering the world division of labor.

Two questions are most pressing: activating the human factor and organizing a territorial community. The problem of activation rests on personnel skills, on specialists and leaders. According to our data, for example, in such a major trust as Lenabamstroy [Lena BAM Construction], specialists with a higher education comprise only 52 percent. And it is a complete disaster in terms of the sociological literacy of the personnel.

L.N. Klimovich: Before establishing why the young people are leaving, it is essential to know why they came. The motives impelling the young people to come here are extremely diverse as some are searching for their destiny, others, on the contrary, are fleeing from it, they are coming for the good wages or for the romance of it. The extensive propagandizing of the construction project also played a role as around BAM they created an image

of something of unusual interest and attractiveness and the youth became inflamed with the desire to participate in construction.

To one of the questions on our questionnaire: "Were your hopes met in coming to the BAM?" only 27 percent of the respondents replied affirmatively. Nevertheless, 29 percent of them wanted to remain here forever, although each person participating in the survey was asked the question: What would be in the future? and 58 percent of those questioned intended to work another several years while 8 percent proposed leaving in the near future.

Literally all of those questioned were dissatisfied with their job and this is the consequence of the poor organization of labor. The forthcoming transition to cost accounting causes certain fears as the poor organization of labor and poor discipline can tell on earnings.

Some 75 percent of those questioned were dissatisfied with housing conditions. There was great criticism of the domestic services and the poor quality, at times even absence of the most essential food products, and a shortage of warm footwear and clothing. The shortage of skilled physicians is particularly felt.

And, finally, leisure time. We have not been concerned with what a person would do in his free time. This problem particularly concerns the youth which is not burdened with families and which has more than enough free time. Here, far from civilized centers, this often leads to negative social consequences.

I.A. Yemelyanov: If we speak about the future of BAM, this is impossible without the indigenous inhabitants of these places. In my view, the situation on the BAM and the interests of the nationalities which have inhabited this territory since time immemorial have grown into a contradiction. The degradation of the environment—and this with the construction of the railroad has assumed threatening amounts—has led to the degradation of these nationalities. The way of life which we wish to impose is completely unacceptable for them. An important problem for the small nationalities of the North inhabiting the BAM zone is the sharp narrowing of the sphere of traditional types of activity. The construction of the railroad and the extensive felling of lumber have led to a reduction in the pastures and, hence, to a curtailing of the main employment of the indigenous population, reindeer raising. Hunting has also suffered greatly. There has been the gradual loss of the mother tongue and the nationality culture. Children of the indigenous inhabitants are instructed in boarding schools where they virtually forget their mother tongue and lose their national roots. If we add to this the extremely limited choice of work for adults, the poor living conditions and the leisure problem, then one can understand why the percentage of drunks and alcoholics among the indigenous population is high.

What are the ways out of this difficult situation? We feel that it would be most reasonable to restore the nationality settlements. Then the local population would become the real master of its land, they would take care of it and develop the nationality trades and traditions. What is preventing us from publishing a newspaper in the Evenki language or making a special insert in a future regional youth newspaper?

What Science Overlooks

M.I. Ledenev: Perestroyka just on a regional level is marking time. It is possible to dispute the overall concept of BAM. But certainly it is only a part of the general strategy in developing the productive forces of the Far East and this, in turn, is an element in the overall concept for the development of the national economy.

At present, it is essential to find a means for the forthcoming changes. I feel that this is ownership. I am confident that a person must be made the owner of the conditions of his reproduction. Only with such an approach will we see the force of the scores of millions of workers as a force creating socialism. Such perestroyka is impossible without an awareness by the population of their true interests. After a sobering comparison of the ideals with the reality, this process cannot go on smoothly. Science should help the various groups of the population more profoundly understand their real interests.

We have assembled under the aegis of the Komsomol Central Committee. How does this very powerful organization propose to rely on the real and long-range interests of millions of young people? The very existence of the organization depends upon how correctly the Komsomol is able to do this. For this reason it is essential to strengthen the political activities of the Komsomol.

Social development in this region will be slow. And here is why. The development of the Far East commenced relatively recently and the reason is the harsh climatic conditions. We will not alter these conditions and, consequently, production here must be based on resources the value of which will be returned over time. An orientation to the manufacturing and scientific-intensive production is, in my view, an idea that has not been completely thought out. Considering the particular features of these territories the activities of the settlers and cooperative members must be directed to expanded reproduction of the natural resources and man himself. A protectionist policy of taxation and crediting (reduced taxes to the point of their complete elimination and the granting of interest-free loans) should be an incentive. Other regional benefits must be employed on the general bases.

B.S. Yusfin: For me, as a BAM worker, I am disturbed by the following question: What is the time period for the research which you are now carrying out? It is a year, 2 or 3? Certainly, we cannot wait so long considering that we have already missed an entire 15 years! And where is

the guarantee that your research will not rest on the shelf just as scores of previous ones have? I recall in this context the story of the medical workers who spent over 1 million rubles to reduce the effect of blood-sucking insects on man in these areas. And what was the result? The mosquitoes and blackflies still give us no quiet and at present there is no answer.

I.V. Koval: The research is designed for a maximum of 6 months. Only in this instance can they be of use for the construction project. On the eastern, Chita and western sectors of BAM since April 1968 we have already collected and processed a good deal of data.

P.Kh. Zaydfudim: Boris Semenovitch [Yusfin] has raised the question correctly. Just look, the scientific potential has been building up for 14 years, extensive research was carried out which required enormous expenditures. And where are these materials now? They are useless.

It seems to me that generally sociological research can only become profitable when on the spot there is a precise mechanism for introducing its results. For now we have no such mechanism. The leaders of the BAM construction organizations, in being oriented at gross volumes of construction and installation work, do not need this research.

A.V. Dmitriyev: Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the level of sociological literacy among the leading workers is extremely low. This is also part of the heritage of the years of stagnation. But we are beginning to rectify the situation. At the advanced training courses for leading workers, the giving of lectures on sociology will be organized. We will also be able to send our own people.

Comment from the floor: At present, special research in the area of philosophy, sociology and ecology are extremely necessary. Who will order this and pay for it? The economic workers need this and the departments as well. The soviets most often do not have any money. And a good deal is required. Just for studying the ecological situation in such a small town as Tynda, according to our estimates, at least 10 million rubles are needed. And we have no idea where to find this money. I feel that the state should pay for such research. And it should not stint but rather boldly cut back on the money for the economic workers, these industrial magnates of ours.

What Is Above—Support or Resistance?

E.B. Alayev: Real life has forced many to revise and, above all, the existing forms of management. A few words about what the interdepartmental form of management currently is. It is based on enterprises which are directed by the main administrations and ministries. This system has reached a stalemate, it has become ossified and lost its maneuverability. And the weakest link is not within the departments but rather on their overlaps.

If we establish a future general concept for the development of BAM within the existing structure of economic management, then nothing beneficial will result. We must not count on the charity and intelligence of the ministries or on their numerous decisions. Practice indicates that if several decrees are passed on the same question, the question is not settled. The Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee has proposed a completely new approach to development. This is both constructive and timely.

V.N. Grushevskiy: In this regard I am bothered by the following: it took us almost 2 months to persuade the Komsomol workers of all levels that it was essential to set up on the BAM a fundamentally new social structure, a youth construction site parliament. And this happened not because the youth leaders are hardened bureaucrats. Not at all. It was too unusual an idea. They could not immediately decide on such a thing.

Or take the proposal of a territorial collective lease which is a good idea, a fresh one and very essential for the BAM. We forwarded the corresponding documents to the AUCCTU. They lay there for 2 ½ months and what happened? Precisely nothing. Neither yes, nor no. Here one can feel a stereotype of thinking. It was one thing to lease 5 or 10 hectares of land but they want to lease half of Siberia! That is a bit much.

At present, we are in great need of support on all levels, from the chairmen of the settlement soviets of the BAM zone to the USSR Council of Ministers. Otherwise things will get no farther than talking.

V.A. Piyaykin: I have several comments.

Whether or not now there is an overall plan for the development of the BAM zone, this will not eliminate a number of restrictions which time imposes on us.

The first restriction is that our work in introducing the territorial-collective lease should begin with the existing economic management structure.

The second limitation. If we want all our initiatives to assume a real configuration, they must be incorporated in the new state plan which will go into effect as of 1991. Moreover, the ministries and departments, in addition to the state plan, also have their own plans. And for now they do not even suspect what is being thought up out here. The question arises of dates. The transition of the labor collectives to a lease must be provided for within the future five-year plan along with the appropriate funds for material and technical supply. The physical plant of the territorial-collective lease and financing are very important questions.

All of this shows that highly skilled specialists must be involved as quickly as possible in working out the programs and subprograms for the region's development. Otherwise, we are wasting time and there will be a chain of incomplete studies.

And two wishes for the future developers of the general plan. In the first place, it should be flexible and dynamic. And this can be ensured only by the introduction of new and modern technologies, the involvement of the most modern equipment, information science and so forth. Secondly, the opening of joint enterprises and a free economic zone are an indispensable condition for the success in the new form of development.

A Good Undertaking Has Been Conceived

V.V. Startsev: The territorial-collective lease on the BAM is a remarkable idea. Only a lease of the territory can bring the BAM out of the blind alley in which it presently finds itself. The making of the BAM into an independent administrative unit is indispensable. It is essential to establish our own BAM region. And if we are to make a start with this idea, then at present we must give serious thought to certain questions. What will be part of the proposed BAM region? Will this territory be strictly tied to the railroad or, possibly, does it make sense to include here part of Yakutia and Magadan Oblast? What must be done in the instance that the oblast soviets refuse to turn over their territory to the BAM? In order to resolve this question, there must be a special decree on the introduction of a lease here on the BAM.

It is essential for us to clearly understand just how the popular self-administrative bodies will look in the BAM region. Will there be a supreme soviet for the given territory or will this be an unique parliament? I don't know. The serious elaboration of the proposed structures of self-administration in the plans are also important because at present we are encountering an inability of the local authorities to influence the social policy being carried out. Just take the construction of the Berkakit—Tommot—Yakutsk Rail Line as all the BAM trouble spots about which we have spoken so much are apparent here. As on the BAM, sociocultural facilities are far behind. Some 700,000 rubles have been spent on civil construction and this is the cost of just one (!) 80-apartment building while over 70 million rubles have been spent on temporary housing, that is, again people are living in barracks and hovels.

Could the rayispolkom somehow change the situation? Scarcely! There are no funds for construction. And it is a hopeless undertaking to force the ministry to give any thought about its workers. In the summer of last year, a session of the Kalarskiy Rayon Soviet (the Chita section of the main line) adopted a decision to stop financing for industrial projects as the main contractor—Bamstroyput [BAM Track Construction] Construction Administration had blocked up the plan for sociocultural measures. What did this do? Nothing! The former main administration and now the Bamtransstroy [BAM Transport Construction] Association intervened. And who would permit a production quota not from being carried out? But the people, that is no problem, they have been waiting and will still wait some more.

S.V. Dudarev: I would like to say a few words on the question of social policy in this region. Things are seething, as they say. It is a question of our 35 percent deductions from profit. I still in no way can understand why we pay this?! The state takes away 300 rubles for each worker from us but this money is earmarked, supposedly, for him, this man, for good support under severe climatic conditions. But in fact, we make all the expenditures ourselves: at first we pay for the state to provide for normal social and domestic conditions and we pay a second time when we ourselves create these conditions. The same thing can be said about other enterprise deductions into the state budget. Initially, we transfer this money to the state budget and then a portion of the money in the form of a subsidy comes from the Union budget to our region. Wouldn't it be simpler to have this money immediately go to the territory? It seems to me that the idea of a territorial lease in this sense would put everything in order. The people would be turned into the masters of their territory, they could dispose of it and the earned funds at their discretion.

S.P. Istomin: I am completely in favor of the lease as proposed by the Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee. I am a resident of this area, I was born and grew up here, and everything has happened before my very eyes.

It is terrible to say just how far the mismanagement has gone. Previously, they mined gold in our area and now in our stream there are not even any frogs as everything has dried up and perished. Previously, near Fevral'sk, there was one of the largest subsidiary farms in the oblast. The entire rayon was supplied with vegetables. Now there is nothing. And it makes no difference to many. They were all temporary workers here: they worked their 3-5 years, then went home. And after that not even the grass will grow.

It is essential to help man establish roots in these areas and help him find himself. But how can this be done? Only by instilling a feeling of being the owner, a feeling of ownership as was correctly said here. The leasing of land will produce this feeling. The people will begin building homes as they should be for normal life under our conditions and not those which have been designed somewhere in distant Leningrad. And they will build as many hospitals as are needed and not as many as are put down by someone in the plans. The same thing for nurseries and schools. And all of this will be made beautiful, comfortable and pleasing to the eye. Because it is done for yourself.

Just take a look at present-day Fevral'sk, it is nothing more than a big station. The houses are gray and dull. The person who designed our town could not look you in the eye. Because that person would be so ashamed.

Our salvation lies in the territorial collective lease. Let us now see to it that real deeds begin to follow the words.

From the Editors: In publishing the roundtable materials, the editors are hoping to receive to-the-point replies from the concerned organizations and departments in order to inform the readers of these.

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APPLIED RESEARCH

Sociodynamics of Disasters

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[Article by A.I. Prigozhin. Arkadiy Ilich Prigozhin is a doctor of philosophical sciences and laboratory head at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Systems Research Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time he appears in our journal. The author expresses his thanks to Gayk Sarkisovich Kotandzhyan whose aid made this work possible.]

[Text] Until recently, virtually any major tragic event in our nation—be this a natural disaster, a rail accident or a mine explosion—was shrouded in a solid curtain of secrecy. At present, there is scarcely any need to prove that the absence of information and a half-truth are harmless. But this is not the entire question. The "closing off" of the question dooms the scientific workers to enforced idleness and they do not have an opportunity to investigate the causes and preconditions of a disaster or analyze the problems arising in line with this.

Probably the first exception in this regard was the earthquake in Armenia on 7 December 1988. The announcement about it was transmitted over Central Television literally in several hours and during the following days after the tragedy we were not only terrified by its scale, sympathetic with the grief which befell the Armenian people, inspired by the courage of the rescuers and with a feeling of gratitude watched the truly worldwide expression of sympathy and aid but also asked a whole series of questions. Is it possible to predict the jolts? Why did the multistory buildings collapse and should they have been built here at all? Where was the equipment necessary to clear away the rubble? Why did the people in the stricken areas complain of a shortage of warm clothing when parcels were arriving here from all ends of the world?

In time, these questions have not diminished and many of them are difficult to answer even now. However, there is scarcely anyone who would doubt that without an open discussion of social problems inevitable in such situations it is impossible to prevent a repetition of the errors, to oppose the challenge of a disaster, mitigate the severity of the consequences and it will be impossible to increase the social protection for the public and activate the state institutions.

Definition and Typology of Disasters

With all the diversity of sudden disasters (precisely this is the definition given to a disaster in the reference literature), this anomalous phenomenon is characterized by a combination of two features: by the low probability of each specific instance and by the particular severity of the consequences. With the exception of those natural forces which bypass the territories inhabited by man, disasters cause a total disruption in the vital bases of individual categories of the population and the society as a whole. In addition to the death of people, they involve a change in the customary way of life (such a change can be momentary or comparatively extended in time), physical injury, mass stress, the growth of avoidance behavior, escapism and so forth. The mobilization of effort and resources for repairing the losses also leaves a trace on those who were not at the epicenter of events. The consequences of the most major disasters are felt not only outside the stricken area of a given country but also far beyond its frontiers. In a word, a disaster is a very acute form of social pathology, a phenomenon the causes and consequences of which are socially determined.

In degree of sociality, that is, the factor of involving social relations in their occurrence, it is possible to establish the following types of disasters.

1. **Natural.** The action of certain spontaneous forces of nature which is either rapid, momentary (hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes) and others are extended (droughts, forest fires). This group also includes disasters of "nonterrestrial" origin (for example, the fall of the Tungus meteorite). Man most often is still unable to prevent the blow of nature but he has sufficient experience to know how to oppose the challenge of nature and how to avoid unjustified losses. And while it is impossible to actually predict the fall of a meteorite, the tsunamis in coastal regions or earthquakes in mountainous ones should not take us by surprise.

2. **Ecological**, that is, socionatural. These are based upon an inadequate anthropogenic effect on nature and through it on man. Radical measures to prevent the results of such disasters in the current situation, unfortunately, are far from always effective. Certain consequences of the pernicious impact of human economic activity on the surrounding environment are already irreversible while others, having made a maximum effort, can be eliminated only over several decades. Examples of "ecological disaster zones" in our nation are numerous (the Aral, the Kalmyk Steppes, the cities and settlements of Bashkiria, the Volga, Ladoga and so forth).

3. **Technical.** Accidents in human-created material systems (explosions, fires, failure of equipment and so forth). The relative brevity of such disasters does not reduce the severity of their possible consequences.

4. **Social**, leading to losses of population and undesirable shifts in the demographic and social structures of a society. Among the causes are wars and wide-scale repressions.

The given typology of course is arbitrary. Nevertheless, it clearly brings out the differences in a social disaster per se and the social consequences of one or another disaster. The earthquake in Armenia was unprecedented in the strength of the subterranean jolt with over 10 points. However, there could have been significantly fewer victims if the buildings had held up, as was the case, for example, in the 1971 earthquake in San Fernando, California. Not a single inhabitant at that time perished in his home but in Leninakan, Kirovakan and Spitak a majority of the victims was buried under fragments of the multistory structures.

Clearly in such situations there are two sources of danger at work and the catastrophic consequences of these are autonomous: these are primary and secondary. The underground rumble and the jolts cause panic and stress and they destroy utilities; fractures and subsidences on the surface of the earth are capable of burying equipment, people and homes. This, so to speak, is the uncontrollable component of the disaster. But when there is the collapse of tall buildings built contrary to all requirements of seismic strength, when a physician is unable to provide aid because he does not have a special hand-cleaning emulsion, when our rescuers arrive in the disaster area after the foreign ones since only in our country do the people, supplies and dogs "pass through" various departments—all of this, as they say, is quite another story. The quality of labor, the customary inefficiency of officials, red tape and bureaucracy are social phenomena and their action at times is as dangerous as the terrible forces of nature. In principle even a very powerful earthquake in a densely populated region need not go beyond the limits of a purely natural disaster. Social factors give it the scope of a social disaster.

In speaking about a sociological typology of disasters, it is essential to consider, if one can put it this way, the quality of the social factor which caused their occurrence. In particular, it is important to know to what degree one or another factor is subjective, that is, depends upon the possibilities, desires and willpower of people, individual states or mankind as a whole. Let us examine these factors, having broken them down in order of growing subjectivity:

a) The limits of knowledge. The impossibility of predicting a catastrophic event with the present-day level of science and technology. It is essential to distinguish absolute limits (the possibilities of mankind as a whole) and relative ones (in an individual nation or region). Either can be extended due to priority in the scientific-technical and innovation policy for the safety goals of the public and due to a refusal of self-isolation.

b) Dysfunctions in culture. Standards, values and traditions which exacerbate the catastrophic effect of primary

sources of danger (a harmful labor morality, low value for human life, social passivity of the public and so forth). A change in the situation is possible as a result of the renewal of the economic mechanism and fundamental changes in the political and ideological areas.

c) Miscalculations. Random deviations, errors in assessing the situation, prospects, methods of achieving goals in plans. These can be historical (the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918); political (wrong assessment of the probable time of attack of Germany on the USSR); managerial (the location of nuclear power plants in densely populated or seismically dangerous areas); engineering (overestimating the reliability and strength of structural elements).

d) Crimes. The intentional causing of significant harm to a society or certain categories of the public: destroying the bases of their lives (the Stalinist policy vis-a-vis the peasantry which in the 1930s caused mass starvation in the Ukraine and in a number of other regions in the nation), genocide (the extermination of Jews and gypsies by the Nazis), sabotage (the putting out of commission of vitally important technical systems).

Clearly, there can be several versions of combinations, on the one hand, for sources of the occurrence of the disasters (as was already pointed out, there are also social sources among them) and on the other, social circumstances which aggravate them and to a varying degree depend upon man. Here the severity of the consequences, the danger and scale of the disaster vary.

Let us turn to Fig. 1 which makes it possible visibly to imagine the possible intersections of the sources and causes of disasters. Thus, the intersection 1a is unknown natural sources. This combination is most dangerous primarily as a consequence of the substantial dependence of anomalous phenomena on our planet upon cosmic processes. The frequency of occurrence and predictability of such events are significantly lower than the remainder while the vulnerability and unprotectedness of mankind are maximal. Precisely the natural-cosmic nature of the disaster gives it a globality and nullifies the goodwill of people, even if this is reinforced by planetary resources.

The intersection 2b represents a very serious but still more realized danger. The attempts to somewhat restrict it involve a profound value and rational reorientation of mankind. The zeal of technical progress, the "sprinter" planning (for short and direct time intervals), the cult of consumption and other failings of industrial society lead to mass illnesses, they threaten the biological degeneration of man and as a whole are fraught with more lethal ecological consequences than ignorance, mistakes and even crimes in this sphere.

Further we must point up the danger of technical mistakes as well as disasters related to failures in the level of labor and technical elements and structures (the intersections 3c and 3b). From the legal viewpoint some of such deviations can be interpreted as crimes (3d).

| building feature → | | | | | |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| building feature | social causes sources of origin | limits of knowledge | dysfunction in culture | miscalculations | crimes |
| | natural | a x | b | c | d |
| | ecological | 2 | | | |
| | technical | 3 | x | x | ? |
| | social | 4 | x | | 1 |

Fig. 1. Typology of Disasters

As for social disasters per se, the general processes in the development of modern civilization do not exclude such but their occurrence is less probable than the mentioned ones. Such disasters should be viewed basically as a consequence of criminal intentions (4d).

Thus, the low end of the diagonal points to an "imposition" of factors representing the least danger while the upper end shows the combination of the most terrible circumstances involving a global disaster. The central problem here is the dialectic of the unpredictable and the unpredicted. The distinction between both concepts is a mobile one. Prediction always has limits. On the one hand, its boundary is set by the objective cognitive abilities of any sociotechnical systems and, on the other, by the sociocultural context in the functioning of the latter, that is: labor morality, the value of human life, the skills and equipping of the corresponding services.

Let us correlate the particular features of the Armenian earthquake (designated by X) with the presented scheme. Probably there was scarcely anyone who could have predicted such a powerful underground jolt. However, in the given instance one should sooner speak about the relative and not the absolute limits of knowledge. It is no secret that in our nation the level of technical support for seismological research is significantly lower than in a number of other countries. (Let us recall that in 1975, Chinese scientists with an accuracy of several hours predicted a strong, almost 8. earthquake.) It is still for specialists to determine how much it would have been possible to reduce the severity of the consequences if we had had more advance equipment. As for the technical factors of the disaster, in our view, they "failed" primarily because of sociocultural factors and to a lesser degree because of engineer and other mistakes. Defects in crisis

management also exacerbated the disaster for the public and this we will take up below in greater detail.

The secondary sources of danger which are a factor of mass death for humans (in Leninakan, Kirovakan and Spitak these were the collapsed buildings which at one time had been accepted by the state commissions) reflect the state of professional culture and the labor morality of our society. Our professional culture is catastrophic in and of itself. These failings are characteristic not only of Armenia. Some 2 weeks before the Chernobyl accident, on 13 April 1986, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA published an article from the construction of the Rostov AES stating that the thermal cladding and the foundation of the reactor had been poured with concrete over bad reinforcing. Over the 6 months they had discovered over 50 major violations of the design and construction methods and six times they had taken the extreme step of halting construction. But the defective work was resumed. Why did the multitiered inspection system not go to work? The preassembly administration has incoming control over the quality of the building materials and structural elements but if they show severity they must answer for the damage and spoilage of materials due to incorrect storing and transporting at their own fault. The designers do not insist upon the observance of the plans because the construction workers will then accuse them of errors in the blueprints and frequent reworkings of the plans in the course of construction. And if the client, the administration of the AES under construction, does not accept the project then it is reminded of the quality of the equipment to be provided and the dates of its delivery. Everyone is afraid of counterclaims and conceals the failings of each other.

In completing our discussion of the typology of disasters, it is wise to recall that historically several images have formed in the minds of people: a disaster as retribution; as a testing, as a lesson, as the possibility of setting out along a new path. The first image is not only a religious one but also an ethical one. Alas, the unendurable "why?!" at times is still the common reply for many of our disasters.

Disasters also test the mechanisms of administration and self-organization of society. As was stated in the press (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 5 January 1989), even in 1986, the Earth Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences turned over its map of expected earthquakes to the Leninakan seismologists (here the Leninakan area was designated as one of the possible epicenters). They dispatched it to the republic leadership. No proper response followed. Irresponsibility on the part of the political leadership became one of the reasons of the tragedy.

The Social Structure of a Crisis Situation¹

The initial stage of the crisis situation which arose as a result of the Armenian earthquake was directly related to physical phenomena. (Here and below we will be describing Leninakan.) The first jolt at 1141 hours was the most destructive with over 10 points. The buildings collapsed in an instant. Mass shock, hysteria and cries for help. Four minutes later, there was a second jolt. It was weaker but exacerbated the effect of the previous one. Judging from the stories of eyewitnesses, the peak in the panic occurred during the third, least strong underground jolt which was, however, the most terrifying psychologically as there was the sensation of an ongoing disaster.

The city leadership and civil defense did nothing for approximately 1 1/2 hours, after which they turned to the troops.

Aid to those who had been injured or were in a state of extreme psychological distress began to be provided almost immediately. Basically, this was done by the residents themselves who had not been injured and were able to overcome their stunning. Then the number of helpers began to rapidly increase from relatives who arrived in the area from other places. The first stage in the development of the crisis situation which was characterized by spontaneous, chaotic reactions from the public to what had occurred lasted approximately 2 days. The limits of the next were limited by the beginning and end of organized work to seek out those who remained alive. The last of these was declared to be a 15-year-old boy who was pulled out of the rubble on 18 December.

The third stage was the clearing of the residential districts of fragments of buildings and removing the dead. The fourth planned for now for 2 years is the systematic rehabilitation of the zone (reconstruction, construction of new facilities, the return of the public, the arrival of new inhabitants and so forth).

Among the rescue groups arriving at the site of events one can establish specific (speleologists, mine rescue workers and so forth), nonspecific (medics, crane operators with equipment and so forth), support groups (supply workers, evacuation station and so forth), leadership and personnel of the crisis staff, press workers and researchers.

Substantial changes were observed in the sociodemographic structure for the population of the stricken areas. There were numerous deaths of children both of preschool age (a majority of the creches and nurseries was destroyed) as well as school children (in the village of Mets Parni a 2-story panel school collapsed and virtually an entire generation of village inhabitants was under the rubble, a colossal shift in the community structure!). Furthermore, in recent years representatives of the intelligentsia more than others had moved into the new multistory buildings. As is known, precisely these buildings buried under their fragments most of the victims. And hence it is very probable that there will be shifts in the social composition of the population. Finally, the sociodemographic structure is undoubtedly influenced both by evacuation and the independent migration of residents. It is expected that the percentage of their return will be substantially below 100. Unfortunately, the corresponding survey of persons leaving their homes was not carried out.

In a crisis situation the so-called socially weak groups suffer the greatest hardships. These are persons who did not recover from the shock, who lost relatives or dear ones who were also responsible for them. Due to various factors (age, state of health, dependence upon other relatives and so forth), the people comprising the given group previously were also marked by passivity and at times impotence.

A sharp change in the social structure in the population in the disaster area also occurs due to the rapid rise in the number of workers from construction organizations arriving here from the entire nation. Difficulties in living conditions, the rotation of personnel, ethnosocial differences with the traditionally single-nationality local population and so forth—all of this makes the "outsider—indigenous inhabitant" relations to one or another degree problematic and this merits special study.

Among the spontaneous regulators one must mention rumors which under extreme conditions assume a particular tint. For example, the arrest of looters which did actually happen in the stories of "eyewitnesses" are turned into "executions on the spot." Lack of trust in the authorities becomes suspicion and overcautiousness. The purely journalistic image in the articles of a central newspaper of an "underground bombing" is interpreted as an involuntary admission of the fact of machinations by hostile forces which caused the earthquake by directed explosions.

Due to the rapid change in the situation and the disruption of contacts between people rumors in a crisis

situation are even less able to perform a positive information function than under ordinary conditions. And their disorganizing influence increases.

Help

The central element in the disaster area becomes the element of aid both in a generalized, mediated manner (the area—rest of the world) and in an immediate, field form (the distributing of food, clothing and medicines on the spot).

What an unprecedented worldwide response the tragedy in Armenia caused is well known. However, one must also mention the reverse side of such a natural and noble undertaking. Due to the accumulation of unnecessary equipment (in particular, low-powered cranes) on the railroads and highways as well as other freight rushing in from all ends of the nation, progress to the center of events for particularly essential equipment and special teams was significantly delayed. For example, a fully-equipped rescue detachment from Udmurtia with an autonomous supply made its way into the area only after 12 days and was unable to rescue anyone.

This form of pathology—when help becomes not only useless but even often is an interference—is caused by the delay in mobilizing and delivering rescue groups (specific and nonspecific). With disasters of such a sort there is a dependence: a rise in the losses of time in an arithmetic progression leads to an increase in human casualties in a geometric progression. Moreover, the delays are also related to the absence of executive flexibility. For example, a group of rescuers from Lvov was prepared to fly out on the second day after the earthquake but permission came only on the fourth.

As for the help, here specific difficulties arise. The most important of these is the organizing of distribution. In the disaster area food, clothing, medicines and newspapers were handed out directly from vehicles on the squares. It was impossible to form a line and conflicts broke out in the crowd surrounding the vehicle. As a result, the winner was not the person in greatest need but the stronger. In such a situation there can be no question of a just, let alone rational, distribution.

Also very dubious is the approach where the distribution of various goods in crisis situations is carried out chiefly gratis. For example, bread is issued free. It is taken "in reserve" in amounts which are scarcely necessary. And in actuality, untouched loaves can be found on the sidewalk or being burned. Or the following scene: from a box set out on the edge of a city fountain, people hurriedly grab anything at hand. To the side, an old man is examining three similar tubes with some salve and which he had gotten there. Clearly, not understanding what their purpose was, he still put them in his pocket. He would probably throw them away later on...

One of the most vulnerable areas of work for the crisis staff with the population is notifying it concerning the places and rules for obtaining food products and

clothing. The corresponding leaflets in Armenian and Russian printed a week after the disaster were basically issued to the leaders of organizations for distribution. They were not put up through the city and many citizens for a certain time did not know where they could obtain essentials. As a whole, the "staff—public" link was organized predominantly from the top downwards and the response of the inhabitants to the actions of the authorities had virtually no impact on the latter. No provision was made for an extraordinary service for helping on social questions.

Probably the state is not capable of performing all functions of support for the afflicted public. In a socially developed society, many problems of social support are settled by charity, religious, consumer, political and cultural movements. The search for those who have suffered most and who are most unprotected consolation and support—all of this is closer to the nature of the independent associations. In a crisis situation it is a question not only of charity. It is essential to galvanize the people to mutual aid, organize supervision over the distribution of food, clothing and tents, formulate the demands on the authorities to correct their actions involving the interests of individual population groups, in a word, set up extraordinary self-administration in the residential blocks, microrayons, everywhere where it is essential to unite for survival.

Finally, there is also an ethical aspect in relation to aid. The person providing the help should not count on gratitude; sympathy and responsiveness are a need and an imperative of the heart. In extreme, crisis situations, this is particularly important. Here one must be ready for criticisms against oneself and even rebukes when the help (even for objective reasons) is not sufficiently timely and is ineffective.

There should also be a study of such a phenomenon as reducing the threshold of sensitivity to suffering. After the first oppressive impressions, one rather quickly becomes accustomed to death and the attitude toward it changes. There are burials without any rites and a stack of coffins (even near meal stations) with numerous children's ones. In an atmosphere of the devaluation of human life, involuntarily the feeling of sympathy is dulled and there is the sensation of almost an ordinariness of what is happening.

Possibly this partially explains the extremely low quality of food selection distributed to the people of Leninakan, at least at first: three or four cans of sprat in tomato sauce, a packet of for some reason usually soggy biscuit, too soft cheeses, a piece (often moldy) of smoked sausage and a can of stewed meat.

The special morality of a crisis area also involves the law. The actual "accessibility" of the personal property of the deceased and food in destroyed stores provokes their spontaneous appropriation, usually under the conditions of an overall food shortage. Many rescuers admitted that when their supplies had been used up and there was

nothing to eat, they had to remove food and mineral water from the destroyed stores.

Diagnosis of Crisis Management²

On two levels of managing the crisis situation—the central staff of Leninakan and Moskovskiy Rayon in the city which had suffered most from the earthquake, groups of experts were established and these included co-workers from the appropriate administrative apparatus. The work of each group included the following stages: drawing up a list of urgent problems (contradictions, difficulties) arising in the course of managing the crisis situation; the allocating of them by degree of importance or in terms of particular feature; structuring the problems depending upon to what degree each of them exacerbates the other; ascertaining the root problems in the given management system.

The first group of experts (from the personnel of the central staff) isolated a total of 27 problems (see the Appendix). Of these as the root ones they considered "the absence in the nation of a mobile system for responding to a crisis situation," "the lessons of previous disasters were not taken into account" and "technocratism in assessing the disaster and in managing the situation" (here and below the wordings used by the experts are given).

Thus, a social demand was designated: work out a mobile system for responding to crisis situations considering the experience of combating previous disasters and overcoming the technocratism in their assessment and in eliminating the consequences.

The expert group from leading workers in Moskovskiy Rayon of Leninakan isolated as the root problems a

number of managerial problems and above all "the multiplicity of power in the city (military, civilian, local, republic, central)" (1). In addition to this, also included here were: a predominant majority of the leaders did not handle the given situation" (2), "certain leaders mislead the central staffs" (3), "idleness of Civil Defense, fire-fighters and police during the first days" (4), "lack of coordination between civilian and military services" (5) and "lack of coordination between center and localities" (6).

In the assessment of this group of experts, all the listed problems, with the exception of the 4th, in one manner or another are interlinked and an exacerbation of one entails the exacerbation of the others (see Fig. 2).

Also of interest is the opinion of four experts from the Leninakan Central Staff over the question of which of the 27 isolated problems reciprocally exacerbate one another (Fig. 3, the number of the problems is given in the Appendix). As we see, the coincidence in the root block is rather significant. Here are those problems the solution to which reduces the acuteness of others. There are also differences in the understanding by the experts of the linkages between other problems (the arrows indicate the links of reciprocal and one-sided exacerbability).

In addition to the expert evaluations, for defining the situation the following were used: analysis of materials from the staff sessions, interviewing inhabitants of the city as well as involved and participating observation. Among the social problems detected by these methods, particular attention should be given to the alienation of the management systems from the mass of the stricken public. We have already mentioned the impoverished situation of the socially weak groups not covered by state




Fig. 2. Relationship of problems in root block. Assessment of experts from Moskovskiy Rayon of Leninakan.




Fig. 3. Relationship of problems of root block. Assessment of experts from Leninakan Central Staff.

support and about the information barrier between the staff leadership and a significant portion of the citizens. Here also lie the reasons for the mistake in combating dangerous rumors about the disaster, in the distribution of evacuation movements and so forth.

A study of the obtained data makes it possible to draw one other conclusion. The crisis management system suffered from excessive centralization which depressed the forming of horizontal links between the leaders of the different levels and impeded the initiative of workers. The inferior leaders under these conditions were oriented merely at carrying out the directives and their personal contribution to general solutions was minimal.

* * *

Thus, the sociology of disasters.

A new area of sociological science? Rather a sphere for applying many sociological disciplines which intersect on a socially significant phenomenon, event or fact under the condition of their repetition. Then it is possible to have the sociology of a meeting, an innovation, emigration and biography.... The sociology of the "genitive case," if one employs an analogy.

It is essential to build up knowledge about the patterns of conduct in crisis situations for various groups of the public as well as methods of action in extraordinary circumstances. This variety of social disorganization can be partially overcome by developments in specific aid, self-administration of the citizens, the control of migration flows, the introduction of special legislation and so forth. The equalizing of shifts in the social structure of the settlements and the restoring of their attractiveness for departed inhabitants also require sociological vision. In this sense, a disaster is an object not only for state administration but also for the sociology of the organization, the city, the countryside, crime, law, ethnosociology and social psychology.

The forming in disaster-struck localities of a new, including alternative, material and social environment confronts the sociologist with multitiered tasks. The most common, "upper" level is the change in administrative thinking and the "incorporation" of countercrisis ideas in it.

In actuality, what image of man openly or tacitly stands behind the process of the planned concentration of chemical, nuclear and other types of production where an emergency can lead to numerous victims simultaneously while operation in a stable mode does the same thing gradually? How built in is the criterion of danger in socioeconomic policy? In avoiding such questions, society is constantly in a state of passive risk caused by the inadequate level of sensitivity to disasters. The propagandizing of knowledge, collective actions by scientists, social expertise for crisis plans and other actions can be successful only with their appropriate scientific support.

The next level is the particular features of the way of life in crisis-prone regions. Indoctrinating in the public a respect for measures of increased precaution and the habits of daily vigilance require the corresponding developments even to the point of training programs which set out the rules of conduct (self-rescue and mutual aid) in disasters. As part of the crisis staffs it is essential to make provision for the functioning of an extraordinary social service designed to work with the victims and arriving groups, control the relationships of aid and so forth. In a word, sociology can and should make a major contribution to the prevention as well as the overcoming of social disasters.

APPENDIX

List of Problems in a Crisis Situation

1. Decentralization of management for each sector
2. Lack of clarity in allocation of functions and relations
3. Absence of feedback between managerial apparatus and executors
4. "Rush" of emotions
5. Low executive discipline
6. Inadequacy of assessment of situation
7. Incomplete manning of staff, absence of certain services
8. Absence of unified dispatcher service
9. Overloading of chief of staff with functions not his responsibility
10. Insufficient dedication to job
11. General chaos
12. Disorganization of everyday life
13. Excessive number of documents and meetings
14. Unavailability of resources in first stage of disaster
15. Poor information support for management
16. Lack of coordination of work with available resources
17. Lack of comprehensiveness in solving tasks
18. Lack of collectivism in taking decisions
19. Lack in the nation of mobile system to respond to crisis situation
20. Technocratism in assessment of disaster and in managing situation
21. Lack of system in programming and planning relationships between Union, republic and local levels

22. Danger of conglomerate designing of a future Leninkan
23. Underestimation of sociodemographic consequences of disaster
24. Insufficient consideration of lessons of previous disasters
25. Military do not consider psychology of public after disaster
26. Wrong equipment sent for aid, particularly during first days
27. Theft and looting

Footnotes

1. The author was in the region of the disaster from 14 through 24 December 1988.
2. This portion of the research was carried out jointly with the sector head of the Computer Center of the Armenian Gosplan, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences G.S. Kazaryan.

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Behind Barbed Wire—Another Life?

18300830G Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, Jun 89 (signed to
press 30 May 89) pp 45-53

[Article by S.I. Kurganov. Sergey Ivanovich Kurganov is a candidate of legal sciences and senior science associate at the All-Union Scientific Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major Interior Service. This is the first time he appears in this journal]

[Text] A traveling session of the people's court was being held in a corrective labor colony [VTK] for juveniles. A case was being heard dealing with a murder which had recently occurred here. The situation in the political education office, where the session was being held, corresponded little to the importance of what was going on. The prisoner docket was symbolized by a simple office desk standing a little to the side without the ordinary barrier and guard. On the faces of the murderers—shaved headed, lop-eared juveniles in black jackets there was nothing but boredom. They seemed the most disinterested persons here.

Soon after arrival in the convoy, two criminals (one of them had already served a term) got in trouble and were sent to the disciplinary cells where there was a hardened violator of routine and who already had 15 infractions to his score. He proposed to the novices that they commit an act of sodomy with him. During the night the fellows strangled him with a belt.

The convicts did not feel any remorse and in addition stated that if the situation were to arise again they would

do the same again and this put the judge in a quandry. As a result, the 16-year-old juveniles received a maximum term of 10 years.

It was perfectly obvious that the actions of the juvenile were clearly inadequate to the situation and showed either their particular degradation or the existence of certain factors still undetected by the court and probably related to the fact of incarceration. Certainly, for example, if someone had made such a proposal to them on the street, the matter would have ended with a fistfight at worst. Why such particular cruelty and harshness in places of incarceration?

In the novel "Chest" [Honor], G. Medynskiy has written: "The most terrible thing is not the guard, not the bars, not the lock and not the rules of the prison. The most terrible thing, it turns out, is your own community. The evil forced into the four walls has also endeavored to be an evil here, it has fermented in its own juice and has sought out methods of violence against man, the powerful over the weak, the brazen over the victim of their brazenness" [1]. The writer as well as the lawyers concerned with this problem (and, unfortunately, there are few of them) are convinced that precisely the relationships existing in the environment of the convicts are the source of their moral "damage," they neutralize the indoctrinational effects and criminalize the individual. These relations in arising spontaneously but subordinate to their own laws in the special literature have been named "the other life of convicts" (asocial subculture). This represents a system of values, principles and standards which regulate relations between the convicts and other persons.

But why are precisely such negative values and standards developed? At first glance, the answer is simple: evil gives rise to evil, and bad people create a bad society. However, the thesis, for example, of the decisive role of the social environment or the experiment of A.S. Makarenko who brilliantly showed that it is possible to create magnificent collectives from persons "of the last sort" do not fit into this scheme. What ruins the juveniles in the colonies? Is it the socially useful labor which many have become familiar with for the first time precisely here? Is it studies which many "on the loose" have grown out of the habit? Is it the lectures, the amateur artistic concerts or the athletic matches? Or the precise schedule of the day and the strict conditions?

In the domestic and foreign (chiefly, Polish) literature, attempts have been made to explain the sources and causes of the "other life" of the convicts. There are many hypotheses. One of the most widespread is the thieves traditions. However, the very fact of the existence of these traditions does not explain why they occur at all or why they have one or another content.

Another hypothesis is based upon the fact of the existence of sexual isolation, under the conditions of which the convicts divide into active and passive homosexuals and this makes it possible for the former to morally

justify the sexual exploitation of the latter and maintain a feeling of their own dignity. But here a counterargument arises: sexual isolation should cause the appearance of a "different life" everywhere that freedom of heterosexual contacts is limited.

Representatives of the third viewpoint criticize this hypothesis as very limited. In actuality, conditions of sexual isolation far from always lead to the occurrence of an asocial subculture. On the other hand, this does appear in closed institutions for 11-12-year-olds where sexual desires have not yet been formulated.

An interesting view has been advanced by A. Podguretskiy. In the colonies the opportunity for obtaining new impressions is sharply reduced and the detailed regulation of conduct makes life monotonous. The juvenile is in a state of frustration which often gives rise to stress and aggressiveness, on the one hand, and increased vulnerability, on the other. The group subjected to violence has three methods of maintaining solidarity. The first is to strengthen internal solidarity. This is possible when its members are linked by common goals important for each. The second is the transfer of aggression to individual members of one's association. The third is the establishing of their own "other life" existing within the group and based on informal ties [2].

The most persuasive for us is the viewpoint which links the sources of the rise of the phenomenon of "another life" with the nature of an individual's activities under the conditions of incarceration. The source for the genesis of the "other life" is the contrast between the life at liberty and in the ITU [corrective labor institution] and the desire of the convicts, in adapting to the new conditions, to bring them, as far as is possible, closer to the ordinary way of life [3]. Due to the fact that these attempts are made under unnatural conditions, the results often assume the form of social pathology.

This assumption was tested out in the course of research conducted in 1984 in 13 VTK and investigatory isolation areas in different regions of the nation.¹ Around 500 convicts were questioned aging from 14 to 18. In addition, a study was made on the criminal cases, the materials of the court investigations, the medical records of the convicts, the images of thief folklore and attributes. As experts we questioned 96 of the most experienced VTK co-workers.

The specific features of such a phenomenon as "the other life of convicts" is caused by the interaction of a number of factors characteristic precisely of punishment in the form of incarceration: the forced isolation of individuals from society; the incorporation of them in single-sex groups on a leveling basis; the impossibility of changing the immediate social environment; rigid regulation of conduct in all spheres of activity. The action of these factors is objectively, constantly and fundamentally unremovable since they are necessary elements of punishment. The convicts are strictly limited or completely deprived of the opportunity to normally satisfy such

fundamental needs as the need for self-respect, freedom, liberty and material goods. They begin to seek out new forms for realizing these needs and specific interests and values arise. This becomes the basis for consolidation. And a community which has particular interests and values also elaborates special principles and standards of conduct aimed at defending these interests and uniting the society itself. For the convict the "other life" is also objective in the sense that he finds already prepared conditions of existence, established forms of relationships and a settled set of procedures.

The community of convicts has a definite formal organization (detachments, brigades and so forth). However, in it there are also spontaneous processes of social self-organization and strata (layers) are formed which have a differing status, rights and duties in the sphere of informal contacts. In the hierarchical structure of the convict community there are five basic groups (castes).

The particularly privileged (the bosses) are the informal leaders, the "legislators," the arbitrators in disputes and conflicts. They provide the cohesion of the group and deal out punishment to violators. They dispose of the common property, they have the best sleeping area, better food and exploit the others. The privileged (swifties) are the "advisors" of the boss, the executors of his will and the interpreters of standards. They keep in subordination the basic mass of the convicts and possess great privileges. They make up not more than 5-10 percent out of the total number of convicts. The neutrals (lads) are the basic mass of convicts. They observe the standards of the "other life," but are not obliged to take an active part in it and under certain conditions can cooperate with the administration. They are prohibited from counterattacking with representatives of the lower strata or providing them with help or expressing sympathy. The unprivileged (piglets). Their authority is seriously undermined either by the violating of standards or by the presence of compromising data on their past life. They are deprived of all privileges and perform all the dirty work if the group has no "ill-fated." If there are, then they are used as a weapon of humiliating the latter. Those completely deprived of privileges (abandoned, ill-fated). Any authority is absent due to physical slovenliness, passive homosexuality or compromising conduct (stool pigeon, aiding the law enforcement bodies and so forth). The object of humiliation and oppression; they perform any dirty job, they are used for satisfying the sexual needs of other convicts (the number of this group is around 10 percent).

In the mechanism of internal group stratification, the most important element is the "registration." The aim of this is to study the new man, to learn his abilities and capabilities and determine the role and place in the social hierarchy. The convicts who were unsuccessful in "registration," are given the lowest status. For designating the belonging to the higher castes, they employ respectful nicknames (authority, grandfather) while for the lower ones they use bad-sounding and insulting ones (piglet, workbench and so forth). The social stigma can

be even more tangible such as the applying of tattoos (by force or deception), special markings on clothing and utensils and so forth. An anonymous survey indicated that a majority of the convicts (62 percent) had been subjected to the "registration," and a significant portion (32 percent) knew about it.

Usually the "registration" is conducted in the form of a game, puzzles or other tests. For determining the status of the convict, other circumstances are also of importance: experience (in everyday life and criminal), personal qualities (intelligence, willpower, physical strength, organizational abilities), the presence of compatriots in the colony, conduct in the investigation and the court. Recidivists, if they can reestablish their status, as a rule, are not subjected to registration.

The "other life" of the convicts is concealed from the administration but such attributes as slang, tattooing, nicknames and the "common pot" prove its existence.

The slang arose out of the need to conceal one's thoughts and actions from the "uninitiated," and this provided relative security for the criminal community. At present, this function has ceased to be the main one and slang has become a method of recognizing "one's own." The jargon of juvenile violators of the law is closely tied to youth slang and is used rather actively in the contacts of the informal groups. The spread of this vocabulary is in part explained by its imagery, expressiveness and irony and this particularly attracts juveniles. Initiation into a criminal or asocial group inevitably involves the learning of slang.

Tattooing performs various social functions, including, indicating the belonging to the criminal world, it facilitates the establishing of contacts with "one's own," and gives the status of the convict, in orienting the members of the community in choosing the strategy of conduct with the newly arrived.

Nicknames are an indispensable attribute of the asocial groups. They perform the function of social labeling, and reflect the role and place of the individual in the group. Usually nicknames show: physical handicaps (Mumbler, Cross-eyes, Pretzel); negative qualities of the individual and conduct (Germ, Polecat, Plague); the ironic emphasizing of individual qualities (stupid—Intellect, lanky—Little One); the nature of criminal activity (thief—Locksmith, black marketeer—Swede, Fred); status in the group hierarchy (King, Cockroach).

The system of small exceptions. It is particularly important for juveniles to demonstrate their originality, exclusiveness and uniqueness. This need is hypertrophied under the conditions of forced equality and leads to a desire to stand out and gain recognition at any price. The forming of an "elite" is a unique protest against the reducing of all to a common denominator. The bosses wear chest insignias (with the last name) written not in ordinary script but rather in Gothic or in Ancient Russian. With a school uniform they wear not an ordinary kerchief but rather lace collars and in their breast pocket are colored ballpoints. In formation they walk in

the last rank. The attempt by convicts to benefit from privileges not corresponding to their status are strictly punished. It is very difficult to combat such a system due to its extreme flexibility. One can do anything one wishes as a sign of individuality, an indication of exclusiveness (thickness of the heels, an always open jacket or, on the contrary, one tightly buttoned and so forth).

Each convict comprising the group must turn over everything he has to the common pot, depriving himself of the right to the individual use of his property. The "common pot" is the material basis for the cohesion of the group which parasitizes on the ideas of collectivism and comradely mutual aid. The presence of a "common pot" presupposes universal activity to maintain its abundance and establish distribution standards which reflect the existing hierarchy. One of the functions of the "common pot" is to provide material aid (in slang, "warming up") for convicts who have been subjected to disciplinary punishments.

Our description of the "other life" of course is schematic. But it does provide a certain notion of the complexity of the given phenomenon and of the powerful and harsh system for suppressing the individual which greets each new arrival in the colony. The commonness of social status and of certain basic values and the impossibility of changing one's immediate surroundings—all of this forces the convicts to adhere to the already established standards, although the orientation to their observance and the degree of one's identification with them vary among the different groups. The assimilation of the values of the "other life" by juveniles occurs comparatively quickly because the juveniles are easily attracted by its external attributes which have a vivid emotional tint, an overlay of romance, unusualness and secrecy.

The normative system functioning amongst the prisoners reflects rather its ordinariness than it does extraordinariness including "don't steal," "don't lie," "respect your elders." The distinction is that the morality of this environment has a strongly expressed group or corporate character: "don't steal from your fellows," "don't lie to them." In relation to one's members who have violated the standards, the community of convicts acts in the generally accepted manner it rejects them by social ostracizing.

The vertical mobility in the social structure of the "other life" is directed predominantly from the top downwards, movement into the upper layers is very difficult and for certain categories ("ill-fated") completely impossible. Under such conditions, the need for self-assertion assumes a self-contained and hypertrophied nature, since only group status determines the value of the individual and, consequently, the possibility of satisfying material and spiritual needs. The struggle to maintain or increase status has the nature of harsh conflict. The methods of self-assertion which are marked, as a rule, by cruelty are caused not by the particular moral depravity or congenital aggressiveness of the individual but rather by the inhumane essence of the "other life" the standards of which instill and cultivate violence. Very frequently a prisoner's actions

which do not keep within the confines of common sense and show, at first glance, the anomaly of the individual can easily be explained if one knows the camp laws and customs. For example, certain researchers link the escape of a prisoner about to be released with the presence of a particular psychological time in the prisoners. At the same time, these facts can be explained more naturally. A flagrant violation of the informal standard by a convict or his conflict with a leader are fraught with tragic consequences. At times, escape is seen as the only possibility of a way out of a critical situation. Self-mutilation in the aim of avoiding work is also easy to understand from the position of the "other life." A convict claiming the highest status should not work. A direct refusal to work entails disciplinary reprimands and a prolongation of the sentence. In order not to lose status and not to come into conflict with the administration, other ways are sought out and, in particular, self-mutilation.

Let us now draw up certain conclusions. In a convict community there are the same social and sociopsychological mechanisms (stratification, leadership, the forming of standards, imitation) as in any human community. The specific results of the action of these mechanisms are caused chiefly by the uniqueness of the social milieu and by the artificial and compulsory nature of forming the community. It is possible to isolate several characteristic features in the social structure of the "other life."

1. The attitude toward man and his value are determined chiefly not by his personal qualities but rather by the social role and group status. If the representatives of the "elite" are perceived by the "masses" as individuals, the role of the individuals forming the "mass" is completely confined to their status. There is a sort of "materialization" of the individual and the individual is not covered by the laws of conduct obligatory for the elect (for example, the prohibition against squealing does not extend to the "ill-fated"). The well-known Soviet psychologist, A.N. Leontyev, at one time came out sharply against the emasculating of the psychological being and the belittling of the internal activeness of the personality by the theory of social roles or functions. The idea of directly reducing the personality to an aggregate of the roles performed by it he termed one of the most monstrous [4]. But the tragedy of the situation is also that the study of interpersonal relations in a convict community confirms the fact of strictly role conduct.

2. The opposition of the convict community to the entire society (and the colony administration as the representative of it) occurs along the line of basic moral values such as honesty, justice, equality and so forth and this not only raises the value of the "we," but also forms a hostile image of "they." This assumes particular activity by the community leaders in compromising the representatives of the administration, in overstating their actual and apparent errors and disseminating false rumors. The same aim is pursued by the corresponding commenting on facts given in the press concerning negative phenomena in society. Incidentally, frequently workers of the law enforcement bodies use precisely this

to justify their disapproval of the publishing of critical materials. It seems that such a response actually is not always aimed at protecting the honor of the uniform.

3. The actual heterogeneity and inequality with formal equality. The privileged upper clique in proclaiming itself as the expresser and defender of the community interests endeavors to depict its narrow group interests and goals as common ones. For defending and justifying their privileges, the elite needs not only the existence of an external threat but also internal enemies. These are primarily the "bottom of the pile" ["opushchenny"]. In the first place, under the conditions of an extreme scarcity of material goods, the "bottom of the pile" are an object of exploitation and, secondly, their social status serves for the basic mass of convicts as proof of the value of their own status and at the same time a warning in the event of possible conflict with the leaders. For this reason, if at a certain moment there are no unprivileged convicts in the community or there are not enough of them, the standards of conduct are hardened.

4. The complete subordination of personal interests to group ones and the strengthening of the community not by observing the rights of its members but rather by delegating these rights to the entire community (actually, to the privileged groups). Total control over the distribution and consumption of material goods. Rigid centralization and subordination and the setting of standard conduct for everything.

The "other life" cannot be termed a formal organization as it occurs outside the sphere of professional relations and even contradicts them. But it also is not among the informal in the ordinary understanding as its structure is even more rigid than a formal one and the conduct of the participants is virtually completely governed by group standards. The phenomenon of the "other life" and its structure must not be identified either with small informal groups, although it gains its material embodiment in their activity. The reason for the rise of such groups in areas of incarceration and outside them is one—the need for human contact. Only under the conditions of the colony, the forming of such groups occurs more intensely. The rupturing of the former socially useful ties and the closing off of the social environment lead to a scarcity of human contact and as a consequence to increased contact.

The existence of small groups in a colony is completely natural and is determined by general sociopsychological patterns. Of course, under the conditions of incarceration, the tasks of such groups become more complex: they not only compensate for the emotional dissatisfaction in the sphere of human contacts and create a feeling of psychological protection, but also perform certain functions which are not specific to them, for example, economic (material support) and this is reflected in the very name of such groups (in slang, the "family"). But this particular feature is purely adaptive and does not change their nature and essence.

The small informal groups can be split into three categories: positive, negative and neutral. Communities with a negative focus, as a rule, oppose the efforts of the colony administration and the work of the independent convict organizations, they contribute to the splitting of the collective of inmates and thereby reduce the effectiveness of activities by the official organizations. These must be combated and it is essential to work for their breakdown and reorientation.

From the members of the neutral groups and the positive groups one basically selects and forms the aktiv of the independent organizations and this contributes to strengthening the official structure of the convict collective and opposes the disruptive influence of the negative groups. In knowing the prerequisites for the rise and existence of the "other life," it is possible to define the general areas of prevention (we have in mind the phenomenon as a whole and not individual aspects such as tattooing, slang, "registration," and so forth).

The former is related to the action of external factors and it is clear that it is impossible to fully eliminate them; consequently, measures are needed which mitigate the action of these factors. It would be advisable to abolish such penalties as the loss of visiting rights, to allow the convicts telephone calls with relatives, to introduce the practice of short-term leaves as a commendatory measure and permit extended visitations for the juveniles. The physical isolation of the convicts should not be turned into a social one. The stronger and more diverse the links of the convict with the outside social environment, the less the degree of opposition between "we" and "them," and the less the standards of the asocial community influence his conduct. It must not be thought that the hardening of conditions is the best means of preventing the "other life." Reliance on the strength of the locks and the bars is illusory. Rather the reverse is true: the strengthening of physical isolation (if at the same time social isolation is increased) leads to a strengthening of the influence of the asocial community.

In line with the reform being prepared in corrective labor legislation, we propose raising the question of the need to reduce the physical isolation of the convicts, at least juvenile ones. For instance, those who have firmly set out on the path of rehabilitation could be moved to dormitories outside the colony where they would be without any guard but under supervision (similar to how parolees are now kept with obligatory involvement in work). They could work on the subsidiary farms of the colony and at construction projects and enterprises under contract. This measure, in our view, could become an important incentive for choosing a new model of conduct and helps oppose the influence of the leaders. Moreover, at present the inmates having the right to travel outside the colony without an escort (unescorted prisoners) serve as one of the channels for the delivery of prohibited articles (money, alcohol and drugs) into the area. In living outside the area this channel would be closed down.

The proposed innovations are not only of narrow practical significance as a means of preventing the "other life." Their realization should also contribute to reducing recidivist crime, the general causes of which, among others, are failings in the activities of the corrective labor facilities (including errors in assessing the degree of "rehabilitation" of those to be released) and the difficulties of social adaptation among those released. The mentioned measures make it possible more precisely to define the degree of "rehabilitation" of a convict and also facilitate the adaptation of released persons and mitigate the presently extremely rare transition from conditions of incarceration, where the manifesting of initiative and independence is impossible, to an ordinary life. The introduction of a semifree system of keeping the juvenile convicts conforms to the recommendations of the standard rules on handling juveniles deprived of liberty and these are presently being worked out by the United Nations.

The second area in preventing the "other life" is related to the mechanism of action of the internal factors, and precisely here a great deal depends upon the efforts of the ITU administration. For combating the informal organization, Polish scientists have proposed employing the values and standards worked out by the organization itself [5]. For example, belonging to the group, its preservation and the value of "we" are one of the main ones. Successively rising pedagogical demands will be placed on the group established within the convict collective (without fail on a voluntary basis), and the failure to observe these demands will entail the disbanding of the group. In endeavoring to protect the very important value of "we," the community members will be forced to follow more particular interests and as a result of this there will be a gradual positive reorientation. Such an experiment was carried out at one of the educational institutions for juveniles. The structure of the informal organization was seriously undermined in several months.

It must be strongly emphasized that the quality of work done by the administration of the corrective labor facilities can influence only the degree of dissemination of the "other life" and not the sources or the rise of the given phenomenon. Just as it cannot be considered the product of the "evil will" of the criminals so it would be an error to see in it the consequence of the "evil will" of the administration.

It is essential to say this since recent publications, along with completely valid criticism addressed to the corrective labor facilities, have leveled the accusation that precisely the actions of the administration have given rise to the terror inside the camp which, supposedly, is advantageous to the administration itself. "In any limited social group, be it a school class, an army platoon, a detachment in a colony, a plant or a state, the suppression of internal liberty which is inconvenient for the leadership is easiest achieved by granting privileges to the minority. For preserving and strengthening these privileges, the scope of which is limited, a handful unites and begins to throw their weight around. The appearance of order is established in this manner [6]. Such a view seems superficial to us. If it

were all that simple, the problem could be settled by replacing a "bad" administration with a "good" one. There is the different question that the administration can use the informal leaders for its own purposes, giving them official power. This was done in the Stalinist camps where criminals were put in the position of the brigade leaders, and small group leaders, subordinating the convicts to them under Article 58. If an administration acts in such a manner, then it is truly a bad administration and in exchange for momentary advantages sooner or later there will be an uprising or mass disorders.

Coming back to the case described at the outset of the article, let us endeavor to explain the motives for the murder in the maximum security area. If the young men had accepted the proposal and played the role of passive homosexuals, their status in the colony would have been clearly defined as "bottom of the pile" with all the ensuing consequences (at least one of them, the recidivist, knew about this). They could not disregard this proposal as there was a great probability that the victim was a member of the elite (he was already serving his 15th punishment) and disobedience meant reprisal. The fellows were in a hopeless situation (from the standpoint of the "other life") and from their viewpoint actually acted in a state of extreme necessity (and this according to the law is grounds for release from responsibility). And they made their choice: it was better to spend 10 years at the colony under a new sentence but in the role of "authorities," than 4 years under the old but in the role of the "bottom of the pile." If the judges had been better informed on the particular features of the informal relations among the convicts, the sentence might have been different. This and similar instances (for example, escaping from the colony because of the threat of murder) make it possible to shed light on one other aspect of the problem: must a second crime in the colony always be viewed as circumstances which aggravate responsibility?

At present, in accord with the Resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "On Legal Reform," the criminal, procedural and corrective labor legislation is being radically revised. One of the areas of this reform is the humanizing of criminal punishment, reducing the maximum terms of incarceration and reducing the employment of a punishment in the form of incarceration.

Footnote

1. The previously mentioned hypothesis was tested out in the course of research conducted by co-workers of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR MVD under the leadership of Doctor of Juridical Sciences G.F. Khokhryakov.

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DEMOGRAPHY

Abortions and the Birthrate

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[Article by A.A. Avdeyev. Aleksandr Alesandrovich Avdeyev is a candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate on the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. This is the first time he appears in our journal.]

[Text] The decline in the birthrate in the USSR for many years has been viewed as a temporary phenomenon and not a typical one for a socialist society. There was the opinion that, in contrast to capitalism, socialism automatically leads to the growth of the population. Such a viewpoint was reinforced by the dynamics of the demographic indicators in our country.

The so-called compensatory bursts which followed the sharp drops in the birthrates during the difficult periods of Soviet history (the Civil War and chaos, the starvation at the beginning of the 1930s and the Great Patriotic War) were accepted as a change in the general trends. And although the compensatory rise never reached the point of the start of the decline, much attention was not paid to this. Moreover, as a consequence of the substantial decline in the mortality rate, the birthrate of the population remained relatively high and this also concealed the problem of the decline in the birthrate.

Due to the excessively optimistic view of the prospects of the reproduction of the population in the USSR, specialists overlooked an important circumstance: a decline in the birthrate in the process of the demographic transition and the spread of small families fundamentally changed the structure of the need of women for medical aid. While previously a large portion of the reproductive period in the life of a woman was taken up with pregnancy, birthing and breast-feeding of the child, at present

almost 2 decades in the functioning of the family are involved in preventing an undesired birth.

According to the data of a sampling in 1985, the average length that a woman remains married in the reproductive age is 23.1 years, while at the same time less than 4.8 years go for the birth of the number of children (2.46) expected by married women and each of them as an average for 18.3 years will protect themselves against pregnancy or artificially interrupt them [2, p 68; 3, p 77].

The objective need for aid in preventing an undesired child has led to a situation where an entire industry of performing abortions has arisen spontaneously in the public health system. A significant portion of the load factor for an obstetrician-gynecologist now goes for the

induced termination of pregnancy (each year over 10 percent of the women resort to abortions).

Contraception and Family Planning

At present, in terms of the frequency of abortions, the USSR is significantly ahead of the other developed nations with an analogous level of the birthrate (Table 1). Up to the end of the 1960s, the number of induced abortions increased steadily and this was primarily caused by the virtually complete absence of contraception and the widespread notion of small families. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, in line with the relative stabilization of the birthrate level as a whole for the nation, the designated trend has weakened.

As for assessing the total abortion rate for the Union republics on the basis of a demographic model, here one can see a very disheartening picture (Table 2).

Table 1

Frequency of Induced Abortion in the USSR and Certain Developed Countries

| Country | Year | Number of Induced Abortions | | | Total Rate |
|-------------------|------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| | | Absolute (thousand) | Per 1000 Women 15-44 Years of Age | Per 100 Pregnancies* | |
| USSR | 1984 | 6795.6 | 113.8 | 55.8 | — |
| | 1985 | 7034.0 | 117.8 | 56.5 | 3.649 |
| | 1986 | 7116.0 | 118.6 | 55.7 | 3.645 |
| Australia | 1984 | 54.6 | 15.2 | 18.5 | — |
| Bulgaria | 1984 | 113.5 | 61.9 | 48.1 | 2.0 |
| (1978) | | | | | |
| Canada | 1984 | 62.3 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 0.28 |
| CSSR | 1984 | 113.8 | 34.5 | 33.8 | 1.005 |
| Denmark | 1984 | 20.7 | 18.4 | 28.6 | 0.554 |
| (1983) | | | | | |
| England and Wales | 1984 | 136.4 | 12.8 | 17.3 | 0.367 |
| France | 1984 | 177.0 | 14.9 | 18.9 | — |
| Finland | 1983 | 13.4 | 12.1 | 16.8 | 0.362 |
| GDR | 1984 | 96.2 | 26.6 | 29.7 | 0.708 |
| (1976) | | | | | |
| Hungary | 1984 | 82.2 | 37.1 | 40.9 | 1.044 |
| (1983) | | | | | |
| Poland | 1984 | 133.0 | 16.5 | 16.0 | 0.5 |
| (1978) | | | | | |
| Romania | 1983 | 421.4 | 90.2 | 56.7 | 2.6 |
| (1979) | | | | | |
| Yugoslavia | 1984 | 358.3 | 70.5 | 48.8 | 2.1 |
| (1977) | | | | | |
| PRC | 1983 | 14371.8 | 61.5 | 43.1 | — |

Compiled from: "Naseleniye SSSR. 1987" [USSR Population. 1987], Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1988, p 318; Henshaw, S.K., "Induced Abortion: A Worldwide Perspective," INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Vol 13, No 1, 1987, p 14; Frejka, T., "Induced Abortion and Fertility: A Quarter Century of Experience in Eastern Europe," POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, No 9, 1983.

* Per 100 total pregnancies, except those ending in stillbirth.

Table 2

| Total Abortion Rate for Union Republics | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| Republic | 1979 | 1985 | 1986 |
| USSR | 3,784 | 3,649 | 3,645 |
| RSFSR | 4,526 | 4,433 | 4,261 |
| Ukraine | 3,246 | 3,332 | 3,296 |
| Belorussia | 3,076 | 2,907 | 2,416 |
| Uzbekistan | 1,961 | 2,201 | 2,176 |
| Kazakhstan | 3,765 | 3,455 | 3,071 |
| Georgia | 2,523 | 1,934 | 2,059 |
| Azerbaijan | 1,968 | 1,459 | 1,332 |
| Lithuania | 1,862 | 1,625 | 1,491 |
| Moldavia | 3,472 | 3,477 | 3,627 |
| Latvia | 3,238 | 3,154 | 2,927 |
| Kirghizia | 3,144 | 3,199 | 3,262 |
| Tajikistan | 1,994 | 1,814 | 1,788 |
| Armenia | 1,830 | 1,531 | 1,640 |
| Turkmenia | 2,221 | 1,962 | 1,637 |
| Estonia | 3,493 | 3,222 | 3,239 |

From the demographic viewpoint, the frequency of induced abortion is explained by the fact that an exceptionally small role is given to contraceptive agents in controlling the birthrate. Calculations made following the method of J. Bongaarts and S. Kirmeyer [4] show: in 1913, only 3.3 percent of the married women needed to use contraception; in 1930, the figure was 13.6 percent; in 1940, 37 percent; and in 1946, 55 percent. In subsequent years, this indicator initially declined somewhat (to 48 percent in 1950), and then again began to grow, reaching 52 percent in 1960. Since 1965, it has shown a relative stabilization on the level of 66-69 percent.

At the same time, the real share of those employing contraception was significantly less than the hypothetical. From 1970, this has been 32 percent. This also explains the stabilization of the abortion indicators. In other words, the too small proportional amount of married women resorting to contraceptive agents is the main reason for the frequency of induced abortion in the USSR.

According to the data of a number of sampling studies conducted in the nation, the structure of employed contraception is very archaic. There is a prevalence of so-called traditional methods marked by low effectiveness while the share of modern highly-effective contraceptives is insignificant. Thus, intrauterine devices are employed by only 10 percent of those surveyed while oral hormonal compounds by from 1 to 2 percent [5, p 151].

The wide employment of induced termination of pregnancy as a method for controlling the birthrate leads not only to poorer health of the women but the gynecological

medical facilities are also overloaded and they, in performing an abortion, actually form a future contingent of patients for themselves. Induced abortion causes substantial economic loss to the national economy as a whole. As was already pointed out, each year over 10 percent of the women of reproductive age terminate pregnancy under in-patient conditions. It is easy to figure that this leads to the loss of at least 21 million man-days of the annual working time fund.

The Policy Toward Abortion

At the beginning of the 20th Century in Russia, as in the other European countries, family planning was viewed only in relation to the question of the admissibility of an induced abortion in moral and legal terms. At the 12th Congress of the Russian Physicians Society in memory of N.I. Pirogov held in 1913, a majority of the participants was in favor of lifting the ban on induced abortion. The congress resolution stated that criminal prosecution of a woman for induced abortion was inadmissible while physicians performing an abortion at the request and insistence of the mother should also be free of criminal liability.

The developing debates were not missed by V.I. Lenin who responded to them in the article "The Working Class and Neomalthusianism" [1]. Having criticized the petty bourgeois line of argument prevailing at the congress for the need to allow abortions, V.I. Lenin posed the problem in the context of the question on democratic civil rights. Possibly, if this idea had undergone further development in the elaboration of an official view of family planning in our country, then everything could have turned out differently. But this did not happen.

Soon after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the People's Commissariat of Justice demanded an explanation from the Narkomzdrav [People's Commissariat of Health] as to in which case an abortion could be considered a crime and in which not. Following up on this request on 18 November 1920, a decree was adopted which lifted the punishment for induced abortion if this was performed by a physician in a medical facility. It must be said that during this period the designated problem was extremely acute. The imperialist and Civil Wars, the chaos and the hunger and the numerous epidemics had brought about an unprecedented rise in the number of induced abortions not only in the city but also in the countryside. Often these were performed by quacks and midwives under unsanitary conditions and by barbarous methods and this was reflected in the health of the women and often led to death.

The decree of 1920 pursued two goals: in the first place, to minimize the harm of abortion for a woman and guarantee her the possibility to terminate an undesired pregnancy under the normal conditions of a medical facilities and, secondly, to establish systematic observation of this social phenomenon.

The theoretical basis for the approved document was a recognition of induced abortion as a temporary phenomenon. The social explanation for its causes was the inverted concept of a "hindrance of the birthrate" and which explained the decline in the birthrate and the fewer number of children in a family by the action of the extremely unfavorable factors and primarily the food and housing crisis [6, p 15]. It was assumed that a family wanted to have as many children as possible but limited itself because of the very poor living conditions. For this reason, with the overcoming of the consequences of the Civil War and chaos, as living conditions improved, the causes of abortion would disappear and the birthrate would rise. Precisely this naive notion subsequently led to the collapse of all the work done to solve the family planning problem in our country.

For now the leaders of the Narkomzdrav were forced to state that the decree on abortions would not automatically solve the problem. There were clearly not enough beds in the hospitals and in 1920-1923, many of them were occupied by patients with infectious diseases. In a word, to bring abortion out from the underground was a significantly more difficult matter than had been assumed.

Precisely at that time, for the first time certainly, the concept of "interference" worked. The problem of providing skilled medical aid for an induced abortion could and must be solved by setting up additional beds in hospitals and training the medical personnel, as the existing public health structure was unable to meet the new task for it. Here common sense foundered on the thesis that both abortion and a decline in the birthrate were temporary phenomena which when once deprived of their material basis would disappear spontaneously.

For this reason the authoritarian administrative machine which existed at the beginning of the 1920s chose a different path: the gradual limitation of the availability of induced abortion. On 3 November 1924, a decree was promulgated on establishing abortion commissions to issue permission for a free induced abortion. First of all, permission was given for unemployed single mothers and then single workers having one child, women with large families employed in production, working wives with large families and then for all the remaining categories of insured and, finally, other citizens.

This innovation virtually nullified the recognition of the right of the individual and the family itself to settle the question of how many children to have and when and essentially eliminated that "fundamental democratic right of the citizen and citizeness" and which V.I. Lenin had urged to defend. Moreover, the establishing of abortion commissions and the setting of a priority in the right to abortion in practical terms meant that its causes had virtually no bearing on the motives of the individual and were completely tied to objective material conditions.

As a whole, the establishing of the abortion commissions not so much facilitated as it did exacerbate the situation. The number of registered abortions (legal and illegal) continued to grow. In 1924 (without data on the Northern Caucasus Region, Vologda, Kursk and Nizhegorod Provinces) there were 131,572, of which 37 percent were illegal. In 1925, the analogous indicators were already 200,000 and 29 percent. Although the share of illegal abortions had declined (in 1923, this equaled 42 percent), this happened extremely slowly and basically due to the district and provincial cities. As for rural localities, here as before over 40 percent of all recorded abortions occurred outside the walls of medical facilities [7, pp 23-25].

From 1924, they began collecting and processing statistics on the motives for abortion as well as the sociodemographic status of those undergoing the operation. Immediately it became apparent that more frequently than the other abortions were given to those who, under the established procedure, could receive permission last or next to last and not those who were in the most impoverished state. In cities, these were women 20-29 years of age, married, having one or two children and either working themselves or having working husbands. In the countryside, these were women 30-39 years of age with three or four children.

Since the commissions functioned only in the cities, the representatives of the poor and middle strata of the peasantry, being unable to get away from work in order to travel to the city, began to turn more and more frequently to the underground "specialists." But the less employed well-off peasant women could easily travel to the city for permission. In addition, definite advantages were given to the wives of important workers when the physician did not dare refuse the operation. For

example, in 1926, among those who underwent this operation in the rural localities of Odessa District, 80 percent were the wives of important workers. Proceeding from the existing situation, the Narkomzdrav in its circular of 17 March 1925 gave the district physicians the right independently to settle the question of performing an abortion because of medical and social indications [8, p 79].

The statistical data on the motives for the termination of pregnancy which were assembled on the basis of the reporting cards filled out by the commissions clearly did not coincide with the established priority but, on the other hand, helped to disclose new arguments in favor of the idea of "interference." In first place was the motive "lack of material means" which was pointed out by 50 percent of those questioned. At the same time, only 13-15 percent pointed to such a motive as "reticence to have children." Clearly, in considering the priority of rights to terminate the pregnancy, the women preferred mentioning those motives which, in their opinion, would influence a favorable decision by the commission. In this manner the illusion was maintained that the reasons for an induced abortion were of a temporary sort [9, p 32].

The ongoing growth in the number of abortions and the overloading of the gynecological hospitals, many of which were actually turned into abortion clinics, helped to continue the policy of restrictions and bans on induced abortion. On 12 February 1926, an explanation was given on the inadmissibility of abortion after the third month of pregnancy. During the same year, the Narkomzdrav prohibited abortions a) for women pregnant for the first time in the absence of important vital medical indications for them; b) before 6 months after the previous abortion.

The carrying out of a policy aimed at gradually limiting the availability of abortion was accompanied by lively scientific debates the participants of which were unanimous on one thing: abortions are an undoubted social evil and they must be combated. But the opinions did not coincide over the methods of such a struggle.

In the course of the discussions two main positions appeared. The first (it can be called pragmatic) was defended by Gens, Lebedev, Kurdinovskiy, Okinchits, Sinebryukhov and others. They proposed that it was essential to focus efforts on the broader dissemination of contraceptive agents and proposed reorganizing the work of the women's consultation offices, directing them to help prevent an undesired pregnancy and even establish special consultation offices which would have been the prototype of a modern family planning service in a number of countries.

The supporters of this viewpoint participated in the development of contraceptives and organized the first sociological-demographic research in the course of which they investigated the spread of various methods of contraception, the particular features of breast-feeding,

they established views concerning the number of children to be had and so forth. In 1926, the Saratov physician S.G. Bykov proposed a method of regulating a woman's reproductive function using vacuum aspiration. At present this method has become widespread throughout the world but in our nation, where it was forbidden for a long time, it is just returning. It can be firmly asserted that due to the scientific activities of representatives of the given school, the USSR in the 1920s was the world leader in the area of family planning.

The pragmatists saw specific persons and specific problems which they endeavored to solve as simply and effectively as possible. However, the absence of long-range analysis of the general trend of the birthrate led to a situation where they could not explain why, regardless of the intense work to disseminate contraception, the number of abortions continued to rise. And precisely this fact nullified all arguments in favor of contraceptives as the impression was created that the efforts made did not produce any effect and for this reason were ill-advised.

The opponents of the dissemination of contraception (and, respectively, the supporters of a legislative ban on the induced termination of pregnancy) such as Skrobanskiy, Ulyanovskiy, Karlin, Aleksandrov and others, saw in the increase in the number of abortions not a wide-scale social phenomenon which undoubtedly had a certain material base under it but rather the reflection of the latter in office documents.

One of the main ideologists of such a bureaucratic position, Prof Skrobanskiy, stated unambiguously: "We do not have the right precisely at present, for the sake of the future good of the nation, to follow a line of least resistance. For the sake of that same good we should now raise for discussion the question of abortion which has assumed monstrous forms as well as condoms which are to blame for the progressing decline in the increase in the population and the deterioration of its quality. It is also our duty to involve the broadest masses in this question in order to prevent the disaster approaching us. And I believe that human reason will conquer" [quoted in 9].

As is known, the "reason" that Skrobanskiy had in mind triumphed in 1936 when induced abortions at a woman's request were banned once and for all.

Why did the pragmatists "lose"? It is possible to answer this question only having analyzed the designated phenomenon (that is, family planning) in the overall context of the bureaucratization of the Soviet state at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s and the forming of a totalitarian system of power. The ban on induced abortion was a major step in the offensive by the bureaucracy against the independence of the individual citizen. Certainly under the conditions of totalitarianism the admission of any right of an individual to an independent assessment of conditions and the taking of a decision, including on family planning, undermines the authority of the charismatic leader and, consequently,

means an attack on the foundations, the authoritarianism and hierarchy of the institutional forms of power.

In addition to the main, social reason for the ban on abortion—the encroachment on human rights in a totalitarian society—there were two other important circumstances. In the first place, after the campaign to eliminate the kulaks as a class, hunger descended on the nation and this led to a drop in the increase rate of the population and at that time this [the increase] was viewed as an instrument for achieving political goals.

In this context, the ban on abortions was interpreted as a means helping to increase the birthrate. Secondly, due to the apologists of the idea of “interference,” induced abortions began to be viewed as an unique indicator of social development and the standard of living. After it was declared that socialism had been basically built in the USSR, it could be felt that the objective basis for the refusal to produce a child had disappeared. This completely deprived the abortion commissions of any opportunity to recognize any social grounds for abortion.

The activities of the abortion committees began to be viewed predominantly from the number of refusals. Here, if a commission recognized the validity of a social or economic motive, then it turned out that it agreed with its objectivity and, consequently, denied an improvement in the living conditions. Support for a request for permission for an abortion by the factory-plant committees and other public organizations was often given a political interpretation and viewed as a manifestation of “opportunism.”

The halting of the publishing of statistical data in 1930 and the ban which lasted for 6 years on induced abortions without medical indications did substantial harm to studying the problems in the family planning area. Gradually disappearing from the pages of scientific publications were the names of authors who had actively studied the social factors of abortion and contraception and by 1955, when induced abortion was again permitted, a majority of works in this area had been completely forgotten.

The organizing of statistical reporting also suffered significantly. The prevention of abortions by the disseminating of contraceptive devices was excluded from the range of duties at the women's consultation offices and merely the observance of the ban was monitored.

During the year following the ban, the number of recorded abortions declined by more than 3-fold in the city and by more than 4-fold in rural localities, however soon thereafter their growth was again noted. Here abortions because of medical indications were less than one-tenth of the total number.

During the entire period the ban was in effect, there was a sharp increase in the number of illegal abortions and this led not only to an increase in various diseases (chronic inflammations, sterility, disruption of ovary

functions) but also to increased mortality from peritonitis, perforation of the uterus and uterine hemorrhaging.

Thus, the futility of prohibitive measures in combating abortions was confirmed but the price of such vision was very high as after the abrogation of the decree, all activities related to the prevention of abortions had to be reorganized and the elaboration of the family planning concepts began virtually from scratch as they had to redo all that had been done from 1920 through 1930.

Six years after the permitting of abortion, the number of women dying from its consequences declined by 2.5-fold. There was a significant decline in the number of illegal abortions and this occurred much more rapidly than after the 1920 decree. Thus, in 1924, the share of abortions performed outside of hospitals in Moscow was 61 percent (including 56 percent illegal), while 4 years after the lifting of the ban in 1955, this indicator equaled 20.9 percent in the USSR cities [10].

Statistical accounting of abortions began to be kept and this undoubtedly was much more complete than in the 1920s but was organized on a much lower methodological basis. While previously data were collected on a differentiated basis by age and social groups, now they gave only the total number of induced abortions on a certain territory over a year, and this information was not published. As a result, there were fewer opportunities for statistical and social analysis of the various factors involved in abortions and fruitful scientific debates on the problem were excluded.

The monopoly of the Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] after 1930 on information continued to survive and the bureaucratic methods of management remained inviolate. The latter again led to a dualism in the family planning concepts. The practical measures to combat abortion which had been worked out by individual researchers on the basis of empirical material did not correspond to the theoretical provisions declared by them on the role of abortion and contraception in reducing the birthrate. This was particularly noticeable in the interpretation of the results of an experiment to reduce the number of abortions by the broad use of contraception among the public. This was conducted upon orders of the Collegium of the USSR Minzdrav at the beginning of the 1960s in seven cities where the medical facilities provided a sufficient number of beds for female patients undergoing the corresponding operation. In the women's consulting offices they organized offices for preventing an undesired pregnancy and hours were set for the obstetrician-gynecologist on questions of contraception.

Encountering difficulties and real problems related to the prevention of abortion, the authors of the experiment concluded that it was essential to establish a strong scientific research center “to seek out and test new contraceptive agents as well as agents for terminating

early-term pregnancy. This center would include a clinical department, physiological, chemical and embryological laboratories, a reporting-statistical buro, a buro for propagandizing contraceptive devices and their designing and a central consulting office for preventing pregnancy" [11, p 83].

In actuality, it was an issue of establishing a special service, since the name "central consulting office" also assumed the presence of peripheral consulting offices for family planning. At the same time, no practical conclusions were drawn from the experiment. Here a negative role was again played by the insufficient theoretical analysis of family planning as a social phenomenon.

In the 1950s and 1960s, certain Soviet specialists were again caught up in the idea of "interference." The illusion of the validity of their position was supported by the high increase in the population in comparison with other developed countries. A familiar motive had returned: as the living conditions improved the birthrate would rise and the number of abortions would decline. The researchers were strongly influenced, in particular, by the monograph published in 1969 by Ye.A. Sadvokasova "Sotsialno-gigiyenicheskiye aspekty regulirovaniya razmerov semi" [Socio-Hygiene Aspects of Regulating Family Size]. Here the author divided the reasons for abortion into the unconditionally removable (a lack of material well-being, a shortage of housing and so forth with 35 percent of all the reasons in the city and 26.3 percent in the countryside), conditionally removable (the absence of a husband, family problems and so forth with 16.5 percent and 18 percent), removable (the presence of a nursing child and a large family with around 10 percent) and unclear (36.9 percent in the city and 45.2 percent in the countryside) and this included the reticence of the mother or father to have a child [12, p 154].

Such a rectilinear understanding of the reasons for abortion remained a long time in the literature. Moreover, arguments were again raised in defense of tightening up the abortion legislation. Thus, Ye.A. Sadvokasova and V.K. Kuznetsov viewed induced abortion as the reason for a decline in the birthrate and a reduction in the number of abortions as a reserve for maintaining the birthrate level [13, pp 160-169]. Even the authors of the mentioned experiment, having proposed establishing a special service, in moving on to a theoretical analysis of the relationship between abortions and the birthrate, defended the position of the idea of "interference." Numerous publications from the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s virtually introduced nothing new in the theory of family planning on the designated level, while the number of abortions at the same time continued to remain very high.

A Family Planning Service Is Essential

The steady trend for a decline in the birthrate which was maintained from the end of the 1960s led to a realization that if effective work was not carried out to disseminate modern highly efficient contraceptives, the number of

abortions would not decline. And although the ban on publishing statistical data concerning abortions impeded this work, selective demographic and sociological studies got the problem off dead center. Nevertheless, one can scarcely hope for a fundamental change in the situation without a revision of the basic methodological premises on the attitude of public health to regulating the birthrate and family planning.

At present, the system of medical aid in this area begins operating only after a pregnancy has occurred and it is a question, thus, merely of protecting it or terminating it. But if the contact between the woman and the public health system were made under different circumstances (for example, in preparing the young man and woman for marriage, in conducting a premarital medical examination and so forth) the picture could be different.

The time has come to set up a special family planning service. Without a fundamental restructuring of the existing system in our nation for general medical aid to women, it will not be possible to carry out the new tasks, since it is basically oriented at sick persons and not healthy ones. Of course, the introduction of new approaches would significantly increase the load factor for the medical facilities. In particular, the extensive dissemination of modern contraceptives would require constant supervision over at least approximately 40 million women and preventive work as a whole should cover not only the 70 million women of reproductive age, but also the men as well as the excluding of the latter from our concern will reduce the effectiveness of consultation.

A change in the investment and structural policy in terms of general medical aid for women is also required due to the restructuring in the type of reproductive behavior. The growth rates for capital investments to develop the network of women's consultation offices and family planning services, in comparison with the development of the birth assistance system, should be greater. For now the growth in the number of beds (medical and obstetric) for pregnant women and maternity cases surpasses the increase in the number of women's consultation offices. The same is true of the training of personnel and the supply of equipment.

The effectiveness of the family planning service depends largely upon consideration of the nationality, sociopsychological features, cultural traditions and this presupposes conducting special research and practical work by physicians, psychologists, sociologists and demographers. Certainly a major role here should be played by the Family and Health Association which is being established in the nation. The presence of such a social organization will not only help to increase the responsibility of the parents for the health of the children, their own and the family as a whole, but will also make it possible to exercise democratic control over the activities of the state public health system and ensure the right of each Soviet family itself to determine how many children it wishes to have and when they will be born.

In conclusion, let us point out that the minimizing of the number of induced abortions is a primary but not the only task of the service. Even after this problem has been settled, much remains to be done in order to achieve the main goal of effectively protecting the health of the mother and the child as well as the entire family.

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FACTS, COMMENTARIES, NOTES

Notions of Schoolchildren on Drug, Toxic Substance Abuse

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[Article by a collective of authors. The authors are employed at the All-Union Scientific Center for Narcology of the USSR Ministry of Health. Viktor Viktorovich Guldán is a doctor of physiological sciences and laboratory head; Olga Lvovna Romanova is a candidate of psychological sciences and senior science associate; Olga Konstantinovna Sidenko is a senior laboratory worker; Anna Mikhaylovna Korsun and Marina Vladimirovna Shvedova are junior science associates. This is the first time they have appeared in our journal.]

[Text] For a majority of juveniles, the first try of a drug remains a solitary, random episode. But a portion of them sets out on the path of the systematic consumption of psychoactive substances [1-4]. Such involvement entails a number of circumstances, among which the most important place is held by the dissemination of information concerning drug and toxic substance abuse. The task of our research conducted in 1988 was to study the sources of such information and the particular features of the notions of drug and toxic substance abuse among juveniles, the emotional attitude toward the social stereotypes of "drug addict" and "toxic substance abuser" and the style of conduct in situations leading to the experimentation with drugs.

We studied 134 schoolchildren from 10 to 17 years of age at one of the general education schools of Moscow. In the course of a conversation which was a confidential, anonymous nature, we investigated sources of information and ideas about drug and toxic substance addiction, the reasons for trying drugs or the refusing of them. For studying the style of behavior of the juveniles in a hypothetical situation which would provoke experimentation with drugs, we employed projective techniques in the form of incomplete stories. From the results of anonymous conversations, we compiled six such stories with three types of histories. The content of the situations of the first type came down to the appearance of a contemporary who was a drug or toxic substance abuser in the immediate circle of the juvenile. In the second instance, one juvenile proposed that another try a psychoactive substance. The third type of situation was the first independent experiment of the juvenile. For studying the emotional attitude toward the social stereotypes of "drug addict" and "toxic substance abuser," we used a color relationship test or CRT [5].¹

Table 1

Sources of Information on Narcotics and Toxic Substances, Percent of Persons Replying

| Sources of Information | Age Groups | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 12-13 Years | 14-15 Years | 16-17 Years |
| Films and TV broadcasts | 50 | 38 | 21 |
| Newspapers, magazines | 26 | 23 | 28 |
| Conversations with adults | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| Stories of comrades | 12 | 18 | 19 |
| Personal experience | — | 10 | 20 |

The conducted questioning disclosed the following sources of information: feature and documentary films, TV broadcasts, books and pamphlets, newspaper and magazine articles, talks with adults (parents, teachers, narcologist physicians), stories of older children and contemporaries, personal experience (Table 1). Senior graders more often discuss these questions between themselves. Those questioned were reluctant to describe their personal experiments.

The different sources had a varying impact on the juveniles. It turned out that the schoolchildren 10-12 years of age, for example, under the influence of the films seen begin to play as "drug addicts," while juveniles 13-17 years of age developed false notions of the prestige of drug addiction. From the data of the questionnaire, interest in the problem can also be heightened after reading sensational stories in the press. Often the preventive work of adults who are not specialists is based upon exaggerated views, excessive moralizing and intimidation and is far from always effective [6]. In parallel, other "work" is going on: the schoolchildren discuss the

problems among themselves, where there are "experts." According to the data of an anonymous written survey, among schoolchildren 14-17 years of age, from 10 to 35 percent have tried drugs at least once. And with age the number of initiated who have tried or used psychoactive substances increases. (It is important to point out that at the moment of the survey none of the students of this school had been registered at the juvenile office of the narcological dispensary.) While in the official antidrug propaganda, the main subject of discussion is the harm of drug and toxic substance abuse for the health, in conversations with contemporaries the subject is something quite different. Only 11 percent of the girls and 8 percent of the boys in the group of 14-15-year-olds talk about the harm of psychoactive substances between themselves, and 10-24 percent in the group of 16- and 17-year-olds.

Undoubtedly, such a shifting of accents and often the direct divergence of information disseminated by adults and juveniles intensifies the interest of the children in the problem. Regardless of the abundance of information sources and the diversity of information contained in it, the schoolchildren are unable to distinguish the reliable from the unreliable. This gives rise to a great deal of confusion. Thus, students 12-13 years of age adhere to the opinion that drug and toxic substance abuse are the same thing. Only individuals knew the differences in the drugs and the methods of using them. A dangerous version has become widespread among the 14-15-year-olds. The essence here is that toxic substance abuse is drug addiction in a "mild form." Such confusion is also characteristic for schoolchildren 16-17 years of age. Precisely such confusion creates prerequisites for a flippant attitude toward toxic substances which even with a single use can cause catastrophic damage to the brain [3].

Table 2

Degree of Understanding of Juveniles About Drug and Toxic Substance Abuse, Percent of Those Replying

| Informed About: | Age Groups | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 10-11 Years | 12-13 Years | 14-15 Years | 16-17 Years |
| Substances and agents | 50 | 80 | 78 | 94 |
| Methods of intake into organism | 50 | 73 | 75 | 86 |
| Subjective sensations | 12 | 30 | 64 | 83 |
| Negative consequences | 80 | 92 | 96 | 100 |

The schoolchildren were rather well informed on narcotics and toxic substances, they know about the poppy and the opium derivatives, hemp and hashish in different variations (marijuana and so forth), various medicinal preparations and agents of household and industrial chemistry and cocaine (see Table 2). Most frequently they mentioned household and industrial chemical agents and then poppy and opiates, cannabis and hashish and most rarely cocaine. The older the student, the greater the number of drugs he knew. At the age of 13, the respondents could name an average of 3 or 4 drugs and by age 17, already 5. There was also an

increase in the number of nonrepeating names in each age group with 13-14-year-old juveniles naming 15 different substances, while the senior graders could name 24.

As for the methods of introduction of drugs into the organism, the schoolchildren were familiar with the following: injection using a syringe, tablets and powders, the inhalation of gases, powders and smoking of cigarettes. Juveniles over the age of 12 could describe in detail the inhalation techniques.

On the subjective sensations occurring in the use of psychoactive substances, the juveniles could learn from comrades or from personal experiments since in educational and preventive work this in principle is omitted. As the survey showed, among the schoolchildren of all ages, there is a stereotypic, illusory notion that narcotics and toxic substances cause pleasant sensations, exotic experiences, they improve the mood and generally have a positive influence on the state of a person. Characteristic descriptions of subjective sensations encountered in our research included: "easiness, an influx of forces, the clearing of the mind, euphoria, and the absence of painful sensations," "everything is seen in a rosy light, everything is very good and a laughing mood arises."

Also obtained were descriptions of negative subjective sensations such as nausea, vomiting and fainting. In the younger age groups, positive components prevailed outside the dependence on sex in the subjective sensations of the individuals. With age, the number of positive components in the subjective sensations declined. Girls 16-17 years of age, for example, spoke 4-fold more frequently about negative sensations than about positive ones. Thus, it is clear that with age there is the abandoning of the illusory, stereotypic notions in favor of more realistic ones.

As the consequences of drug abuse, the schoolchildren understand the psychological dependence upon the drugs as well as harm to health and social well-being. In all age groups, regardless of sex, harm to health was mentioned most frequently. This was mentioned by 93 percent of those questioned in the young age groups and 78 percent of the senior graders, linking with drug and toxic substance abuse various disturbances of physical and mental health as well as the probability of death. It is interesting that the disturbances of physical health are mentioned 6-fold more rarely than mental.

Equally important for the juveniles was the disruption of social well-being including a change in relationships with parents, peers (the loss of former friends, respect of the school class, asocial company) and conflict with the law (theft, the forging of prescriptions, labor colonies and prison). Dependence upon drugs is given a small place. Although in words virtually all those questioned asserted that it was possible to become addicted with a single try, and it was impossible or very difficult to shake the addiction, in the projective stories the second consumption of a drug was mentioned in approximately 17-38 percent of the cases and addiction was described in 10-18 percent. In other words, regardless of the rigid verbal stereotypes of "try and be addicted," the schoolchildren far from always linked together the first experience, repeated tries and addiction.

Table 3

Motives of Behavior in Schoolchildren in an Initiating Situation, Percent of Those Replying (I—Boys, Young Men; II—Girls, Young Women)

| Motives | Sex-Age Groups | | | | | |
|---|----------------|----|-------------|-----|-------------|----|
| | 12-13 Years | | 14-15 Years | | 16-17 Years | |
| | I | II | I | II | I | II |
| Consumption: | | | | | | |
| Cognitive effect | 9 | — | 19 | 28 | — | 14 |
| Emotional effect | 9 | 25 | 3 | 19 | — | — |
| Without programmed effect | 64 | 75 | 78 | 48 | 100 | 72 |
| Did not reply | 18 | | | 5 | | 14 |
| Refusal to consume: | | | | | | |
| Fear of negative consequences | 25 | 31 | 20 | 100 | 100 | 83 |
| Physical rejection of psychoactive substances | 25 | — | — | — | — | 17 |
| Absence of psychoactive substances | 50 | 69 | 80 | — | — | — |

The change with age of notions concerning drug and toxic substance addiction is shown in Table 3. Students 10-11 years of age judge them chiefly as they are described in the process of preventive work. The young people are best informed on the possible consequences of drug and toxic substance addiction and least of all on the purposes of consumption and subjective sensations. The ideas of schoolchildren 12-13 years of age are broader, but they also know little about subjective sensations. Important changes in the structure of the ideas occur after the age of 13 with a sharp increase in knowledge about subjective sensations. If the number

of mentionings of them for the 4th graders is taken as one, then for 8th graders the corresponding indicator increases more than 5-fold. Such abrupt changes are undoubtedly related to the widening of the personal experience of the juveniles and their friends. All respondents 16-17 years of age described in detail the drugs and toxic substances, the methods of their use, the subjective sensations occurring here and the possible negative consequences.

As a whole, the notions of drug and toxic substance addiction suffer from a certain oversimplification and

schematic nature. In the perception of the concepts of "drug addict" and "toxic substance abuser," as a rule, there is a high share of the emotional component. In the younger groups (11-13 years), sharp negative judgments are linked to these concepts. With age they gradually mitigate. Juveniles 14-15 years and young men 16-17 years of age voice either feigned indifference or formal condemnation of drug addicts and toxic substance abusers.

A different attitude toward the stereotypes of "drug addict" and "toxic substance abuser" was diagnosed using the color test (CRT). This test makes it possible to investigate the unconscious components of an emotional attitude toward social stereotypes, bypassing the defensive mechanisms of the verbal system of awareness. Emotionally repugnant colors such as gray, black, dark blue and brown are associated with the stereotypes being studied. The mean Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation for the various age groups between the associative spread and the preference spread shows that the unconscious components of the emotional attitude toward the studied stereotypes are not differentiated and have a sharply negative character.

How do the school children behave in a situation which leads toward experimenting with drugs? An analysis of the projective material has shown that the respondents more often identify themselves with a juvenile trying a drug if it is a question of a toxic substance. For example, in the stories of female 7th graders, identification was noted in 55 percent of the stories if it was a question of toxic substances but only 20 percent if they were drugs. This fact shows directly that among juveniles there is a dangerous illusion on the lesser harm of toxic substance abuse in comparison with drug addiction.

The assumed conduct in enticing situations depends essentially upon sex and age. Interest in the problem rises by 14-15 years and declines at 16-17 years. In the stories of the respondents, boys were more active in any experimental situations than girls. This is demonstrated particularly clearly by the content analysis of the situation in terms of the test parameter of refusing drugs. Thus, in the stories of juveniles 12-13 years, boys tried drugs 9-fold more frequently than girls. Girls in the stories of all the respondents more often refused any experiments than agreeing to them.

The respondents also differed not only in terms of the attitude but also the nature of the response to an enticement proposal. This may be active in searching for an opportunity to experiment or passive by obeying the person initiating this. The refusal to try can also be active in the form of struggle or passive in flight. In the stories of boys, there is the active acceptance of the proposal by the character or the refusal of it. In the stories of girls the favorite method of conduct in such situations is flight. However, with age the situation changes and the stories of the 14-15-year-old juveniles show that at this time the young people, as never before, are inclined to take a risk.

The schoolchildren include the family, the school class and company as well as formally interested persons (police workers, narcologists) in the situation of experimenting with drugs. In the stories of the 12-13-year-old boys, the main role in the outcome of the experimentation is given to the formally interested persons. In the group of 16-17-year-olds, on the contrary, they, aside from the immediate "heroes," are the sole participants in the events. In the stories of girls, there is a strong influence of the family and comrades (friends, classmates).

Judging the situation as a whole, the worst trends seem to us to be: the absence of inner prohibitions in terms of toxic substances in contrast to narcotics and the dependence of behavior upon circumstances in the group of 12-13-year-olds, the inclination for risk and increased activity in the 14-15-year-olds as well as the placing of friends and family outside the context of the situation by young persons 16-17 years of age.

From our viewpoint, extremely important was the study of the motives for trying or refusing to experiment with narcotics. The survey disclosed the following causes of refusals: fear of consequences (addiction to the substances, harm to health and social well-being) as well as allergies and the absence of narcotics. In all age groups, possible negative consequences caused particular concern. In studying the motives for experimenting we encountered the fact that in the young groups, an assessment commentary was given instead of motives. Among the 14-15-year-olds there was the predominance of a desire for an emotional effect and the senior graders indicated the most diverse motives.

The picture obtained as a result of an analysis of the projective material differed sharply from the questionnaire data. Outside dependence upon sex and age, the main ones in the first trial of drugs were motives related to the particular features of juvenile contacts in the group and the main reason for refusal was not the fear of health but rather the impossibility of obtaining drugs.

The discovered discrepancies in the motives are the result of a mismatching of the official standards, rules and prohibitions known to the schoolchildren and the realities of the juvenile subculture and proof of the dual attitude of the juveniles toward drug and toxic substance abuse. The authoritative method of asserting truths on this score, the undifferentiated, dogmatic nature of the disseminated information and the presence of "blank spots" in them—all these shortcomings of preventive work lead to confused and uncoordinated notions in the young juveniles and outright contradictoriness in the older ones. The schoolchildren, without reflecting, repeat the adults: "try it one time and you are addicted," "narcotics are white death" and so forth, but in a situation enticing experimentation they are not against testing the truthfulness of such conclusions in their own experience. Undoubtedly, in a majority of instances common sense and experience in life make it possible to gradually get rid of a portion of these notions. However,

do not the schoolchildren pay too dear a price—their health—for the knowledge gained in experience? The excessive categoricalness and moralizing and the arguments not pertinent to the juveniles about harm to health, all being inherent to preventive work, often produce the reverse effect. Among the schoolchildren a sharply negative emotional attitude toward the stereotypes of “drug addict” and “toxic substance abuser” which are distant from their social experience does not prevent a willingness to indulge in various experiments with drugs and there are few who would seriously believe that this was a real threat to their future.

The cognitive-emotional dissonance in the structure of the notions of schoolchildren concerning drug and toxic substance abuse, in arising in the existing forms of antidrug propaganda and the forms of experience functioning in the juvenile subculture in and of themselves can be a factor impelling a search for the truth by experimentation. For this reason, further research should be devoted to the conditions, causes and forms of the occurrence and existence of illusory, stereotypic notions in the minds of the juveniles as well as to working out methods of antidrug propaganda which would meet the sex and age features of the schoolchildren.

Footnote

1. The experiment's procedure lays out sets of cards of eight colors in accord with personal preference from the most suitable for describing the given image to the least suitable. Then as a result of comparing the obtained sets, the attitude toward the stereotype is ascertained.

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TIMES, IDEAS, FATES

Fear of Democracy (Sociopsychological Portrait of L.D. Trotsky)

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[Article by L.A. Radzikhovskiy. Leonid Aleksandrovich Radzikhovskiy is a candidate of psychological sciences and senior science associate at the Scientific Research Institute for General and Pedagogical Psychology of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Our journal has published his article “From Alienation to Dialogue” (No 6, 1988, as co-author).]

[Text] Lev Davidovich Trotsky.... One of the best-known and least-understood figures in our history. Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet during the days of the October Revolution, the people's commissar for military and naval affairs during the years of the Civil War, in the eyes of the people and the entire world “Bolshevik No 2” expelled from the party by the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution. Beginning in 1923, “Bolshevik No 2” became the opposition leader No 1. In 1929, he was exiled from the USSR and in 1931, Stalin stated: “In actuality, Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of communism. In actuality, Trotskyism is a forward detachment of the revolutionary bourgeoisie leading the fight against communism, against Soviet power and against the construction of socialism in the USSR” [2]. Several years later, at the Kamenev—Zinoviev Trial (1936), he was sentenced to death in absentia. In 1940 he was murdered in Mexico.

Trotskyism has become one of the myths of our social conscience and this word for decades became both a curse as well as a very severe accusation which meant only one punishment.

Over the last 30 years, the passions around Trotsky have died down and students have studied the infinite list of his errors devoid now, in truth, of the previous criminal and demonic shading. And only now have conditions appeared to begin the demythologization of Trotsky [3].

Differences of Opinion in the Comintern Section

I will not endeavor to delve into all the fine points, often semidetected, in the political struggle between Trotsky and Stalin in 1922-1929. As long as the archives are closed, too much is still left to conjecture.¹ Rather, let us turn to the ideological and social basis for the political struggle of those years.

The main point of difference was formulated rather theoretically (the arguments in the dispute were, basically, infinite quotations from Lenin and Marx): was it possible to build socialism in one, single country, in

Russia? Stalin and Bukharin answered affirmatively. This was also the official party position. Trotsky and Zinovyev argued no, it was impossible, due to the cultural and technical backwardness of Russia. But what practically would follow from this? Should one leave and surrender power? No, Trotsky certainly was not urging this.

Clearly, he continued to adhere to a cosmopolitan orientation. From this viewpoint, the work of building socialism in the USSR was important not only in and of itself but also as a method for winning over the world proletariat, to provide it with an opportunity to join forces, in a word, to serve as the prologue of world revolution. Internationalism for which not the national interests of Russia but rather revolution and world revolution were in the forefront, had been generally accepted in the party prior to October (let us recall the slogan of "defeatism" during the years of World War I for which public opinion abused the Bolsheviks as traitors, German agents and so forth).

The paradox, however, is that this very "antipatriotic" ideology involuntarily gave rise to a purely Russian tradition. One of the particular features of Russian culture and ideology, at least in the 19th and 20th Centuries, was that it contained internationalist elements which denied Russian statehood but remained completely within the Russian problems. Actually, this was the tradition running from Chaadayev and then Herzen—the nihilists—the "devils" of Dostoyevsky—the members of People's Will—the Russian (or Russo-Jewish, as Trotsky) revolutionaries from the beginning of the century.

Of course, it makes no sense to link Trotsky to Chaadayev. Actually, he was an expresser of the ideology which in ordinary life was embodied by Makar Nagulnov with his dream of "world revolution" and that everyone be "equally swarthy." This applied to the supporters of Trotsky to the heroes of the Civil War such as Muralov, Mrachkovskiy, I. Smirnov, Sklyanskiy and Antonov-Ovseyenko; to diplomats like Rakovskiy who dreamed not about receptions in the Parisian City Hall but rather of a "Red Paris," of a "Soviet of Worker Deputies of the City of Paris"; to leaders of the world revolution who did not have deep roots in Russia such as Radek and others.... Behind these leaders came a broader mass of commissars from War Communism who had left their hut "in order to give land to the peasants in Grenada." However, was this entire mass actually following Trotsky? No, a majority of these people, and particularly the communists who joined the party after the Civil War, firmly supported Stalin. Only a small portion of the Old Bolsheviks, those who came to be called "generals without an army," remained with Trotsky.

What was Stalin's position?

We do not know whether Stalin in the 1920s believed in world revolution or not. The important thing was something else that objectively he did not need it. And he

correctly realized that also it was not needed by the party or those very communists who believed sacredly in it. For Stalin, world revolution was dangerous for a very simple reason. The leader in the communist world and the master of the Comintern, Stalin held this position, clearly, for just one reason: he was the head of the only ruling communist party. As soon as another ruling communist appeared, and particularly in a leading European country, most probably in Germany which during those years was much more economically developed than the USSR, Stalin would automatically retreat into the background, even within his own country. Next to him, Bukharin, Radek, Zinovyev, without mentioning Trotsky, all of them had a superior knowledge of the European situation and Germany and in addition possessed enormous international authority. Certainly it was clear that in the new situation they without fail would squeeze out the "provincial leader"? The conclusion: for the absolute power of Stalin any contact with Europe was not necessary and was dangerous; this could mean the end of his power in the Comintern and the beginning of the end of his power in the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. For this reason, world revolution for Stalin actually meant revolution against him personally.

For approximately the same reasons, world revolution did not hold anything good for the "new leaders" grouped around Stalin such as Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and others. To draw closer to the unfamiliar, not understood Europe meant to confine oneself and let ahead the "international ideologists," the former emigres, the polyglot cosmopolites, the party intellectuals, all those Lunacharskiys, Cicherins, Litvinovs, Stevlov and Krasins.

And, finally, the rank-and-file party functionaries, these Makar Nagulnovs—although they had studied English they had not made such progress as to direct the English revolution....

Certainly, even the most cynical workers of the apparatus were scarcely clear about this. But instinctively they felt their group interest unerringly. And Stalin realized this. World revolution as a slogan remained on the agenda up to the mid-1930s. The VKP(b) in formal terms considered itself only a section of the Comintern. From this viewpoint the party label was observed flawlessly. The rank-and-file communists and Komsomol members as before believed sacredly in the idea. Why disappoint them? Moreover, messianism gives enthusiasm to people. For this reason, in words there was a movement toward the West (including the Western communists) while in practice there was a separation from them, even to the point of the espionage mania, in words the VKP(b) was part of the Comintern while in reality the Comintern was one of the sections of the VKP(b) Central Committee; as a slogan it was domestic policy for the sake of foreign while in real life it was precisely the reverse.

What was hidden from the party behind the slogans was clearly seen by foreign observers. All of them—the Russian Mensheviks, the observers of the Western newspapers and diplomats in 1927 agreed on one thing. Behind the struggle of Stalin and Trotsky over the problem of the victory of socialism in one country stood a clash of different political policies: Trotsky for world revolution, the revolution of the romantic, and that of Stalin, the abandonment of world revolution and political pragmatism. For this reason, they all in 1927 welcomed the victory of the “moderate” Stalin.² They saw in Stalin an actual deviationist from Marxist ideas and from 1927, a candidate for national dictatorships.

The Bugbear of the Thermidor Reaction

This is precisely how the Trotskyites also saw Stalin. In their struggle against Stalin in 1925-1927, they moved precisely this question to the forefront. It must be pointed out that Trotsky's logic was not original. Absolutely everyone—from Milyukov to Markov, from Grand Duke Kiril to Dan, from the moment of the introduction of NEP [New Economic Policy] assessed the situation in the same manner (although the conclusions, understandably, were different and conformed to their own political values). It was completely probable that there would be such a transformation, when Soviet power invisibly and peacefully (at least now and then peacefully) would be turned into a “normal” bourgeois republic³ and there would occur a “Thermidorian degeneration” similar to what had happened during the years of the Great French Revolution. And the word “Thermidor” became perhaps the most widespread in the political vocabulary of those years.

But on what “road” would this occur?

And here, in the answer to this question the key to understanding the political struggle. The Mensheviks, the Liberals, the Monarchists and Leftist Communists—they all saw just one alternative to war communism and that was a bourgeois republic. The nation, supposedly, if left to itself, if the productive forces (primarily in the countryside) would develop organically in it, without fail and inevitably would become a bourgeois republic. It is here and not in the battle of quotations that recognition of the impossibility of building socialism in one country lay.

Some including the Monarchists and Liberals considered socialism (even in Russia!) an Utopia or bluff. Others such as the Menshevik Socialists, in considering socialism inevitable in principle, viewed the October Revolution as premature and hence senseless as Russia still had to go through a long stage of capitalist learning. Finally, the leftist communists and Trotskyites believed in the only form known to them of a socialist society, war communism. For Trotsky, the years 1918-1920 were the peak of his life, the towering inspiration of history, the moment of truth which remained with him always. War communism consisted of to interrelated parts: economic

in the form of the absence of a market and commodity-monetary relations, direct distribution of goods and products from the center and the political with the dictatorship of the party.⁴ With the introduction of the NEP and market relations, the economic structure of war communism was undermined but not completely. The political structure was even strengthened (the ban on party factions at the 10th Congress). Even the new economic and social relations eroded the iron political dictatorship of the party and this meant that the degeneration of the system would be completed and a normal bourgeois society would arise. In order not to permit this, Trotsky urged for a tightening of the screws in the political area, the thwarting of any attempts at democracy and the greatest possible strengthening of the party dictatorship. If one loosened the reins and gave the people democratic rights and free choices, in his opinion, the Thermidor was inevitable. Trotsky “would not compromise on principles”: an absolute dictatorship of the state in the area of the economy, political life and the regulating of social relations.

What did all of this mean in practical terms?

A sharp rise in heavy industry (curiously Trotsky asserted that he was the first to propose building Dneproges [the Dnieper Hydropower Project] while Stalin argued that for us now to build Dneproges was the same as a peasant buying a record player rather than a cow [7, p 2]). Superindustrialization pursued two goals: economic in increasing the industrial and primarily the military might of the nation and social with the strengthening of the state sector at the expense of the plundering, elimination or, in any event, the extreme weakening of the private sector (private family agriculture, private trade and so forth). In this manner the market as the economic base of the Thermidor would be destroyed and a 100-percent economic dictatorship of the state would be established. In the political area there would be the preservation of the total dictatorship of the party at any price. In the social area, the reestablishing of the privileges of the proletarian vanguard. There would be an offensive against those classes which are or could be the concrete agents of the “Thermidorian degeneration,” against the “new owners,” and “the privileged intellectuals of the city and countryside” [8]. These were the speculators, the nepmen, the kulaks and, finally, the bureaucracy—party and state....

And here we reach the key element of Trotsky's political program, what was central to it and at what all his efforts were aimed.

The Dictator That Wasn't

The question of the theoretical possibility of building socialism in one country and of the times and prospects of world revolution—all of these were ultimately theoretical problems. But the struggle against the Thermidorian elements of society required political action. Such

a struggle would involve not an abstract "world bourgeoisie" but rather specific persons. Precisely this problem became the main point for applying the political will of the Trotskyites.

Such "Thermidorians" as speculators (by definition "bourgeois") and the new bourgeoisie of the city and countryside were the most obvious and caused the greatest indignation in the people. Since the market had reappeared, these people again held a privileged position in society and began to live better than the workers, the middle and poor peasantry, better than the rank-and-file communists and the veterans of the Civil War. At that time, there appeared the remarkable expression: "Why did we fight?!"

Trotsky in his analysis of the social situation went farther than the regular Philistine who with hate watched the nepmen drive by in a car. Proceeding from society's structure, Trotsky isolated as the main "Thermidorian" group not the nepmen and speculators but rather the bureaucrats and the backbone of the party-state apparatus. Why precisely this group? Because power was in its hands.

The position of the Trotskyites on this score was set out very clearly in November 1927 at the 16th Moscow Provincial Party Conference by their strongest enemy, Bukharin. "On the basis of the regrouping of forces in the nation, under the influence of the policy which is being carried out by our party, supposedly, in turn, the corresponding degeneration of our state apparatus is coming about, that is, a radical change in the class nature of power in the nation. First of all, there will be a divorcing of the general state apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship from its class proletarian base and then there will be the conversion of the state apparatus into a certain nonclass independent force and then this apparatus which is independent of the proletarian class base supposedly, in Trotsky's expression, will receive another "social order" from the other class and there will be a slide to kulak and nepman positions. This gains a sharply defined expression in the theory of the so-called "Thermidor." An outright Cesarean, Bonapartist coup will follow the Thermidor, that is, the counterrevolutionary degeneration of the state.

"In line with this, the appropriate assessment has been given for our party. Our party which has its backbone in the party apparatus, in the first place, will supposedly become divorced from the proletarian mass and then...the apparatus will be separated from the main party mass, it will gain independent significance and then it will begin to put a different class basis beneath it...in feeling its way...a bourgeois base. This is the expression of Thermidorianism and Bonapartism. From this a practical conclusion is drawn that the existing party regime is the main danger the overthrow of which is the first duty of each party member, each revolutionary" [9].⁵

Yes, the struggle against the party apparatus (with Stalin personally at its head) and against the regime established

by this apparatus in the party became the main practical goal of Trotsky. Here are several statements by Trotsky from his last speech at the Central Committee Plenum after which he was expelled from the Central Committee: "The Stalin-Bukharin faction which is keeping fine party members in the domestic prison of the OGPU [United State Political Directorate]...the apparatus faction which maintains itself by violence over the party, by stifling party thought and by disorganizing the proletarian vanguard not only in the USSR but throughout the world.... The coarseness and lack of loyalty which Lenin wrote about are no longer mere personal qualities; they have become the qualities of the ruling faction, its policy, its regime.... The main feature of the present course is that it believes in the omnipotence of violence—even against the party itself.... The situation began to change from the time of Lenin's illness. The recruitment of persons through the secretariat and the apparatus grouping of Stalinists obtained an independent nature free of the political line. This is why Lenin, in weighing the prospects of his retirement from work, gave the party the last advice: "Remove Stalin who could bring the party to a split and death".... The party did not promptly learn of this advice. The select apparatus hid it. The consequences are now apparent to us all.... In persecuting, depriving of work, arresting, the ruling faction is employing a club against the party itself.... The worker party member is afraid in his own cell to say what he thinks and fears to vote out of conscience" [8].

The warping of internal party life began to build up since the retirement of Lenin and this was certainly the most striking change which occurred in the life of the nation during 1922-1927. This was constantly written about by all the oppositions, beginning with the Trotskyite in 1923 (the "Platform of 46"): "The regime established in the party is completely intolerable. It is undermining the very activity of the party, replacing the party with a selected bureaucratic apparatus" [10].

Now Trotsky went farther: he linked together two facts. The first was indisputable: the elimination of internal party democracy and the unchallenged dominance of the apparatus. The second was more than dubious: the apparatus itself in one way or another was linked with the "new bourgeoisie," it had actually become a detachment of it and was degenerating. The conclusion was: the suppression of democracy was nothing more than the start of the Thermidor, the Thermidor in action. What should be done? The answer was clear: fight against the Thermidor and broaden internal party democracy.

But what democracy? Within what limits? For what reason?

Democracy as a value in itself, from Trotsky's viewpoint, was false, bourgeois, rotten liberalism which concealed the real Thermidor, that which the Trotskyites were fighting against. Equally unacceptable for Trotsky was the reply that democracy is the most important component part of socialism, the reason why the revolution came about. This was opportunism, again opening the

way to the bourgeois Thermidor (direct and secret elections and democracy were the path to the restoration of capitalism).

Thus, to all the questions of what was democracy? within what limits? and for what?—only one, clearly absurd answer was given: democracy is for the sake of strengthening political dictatorship. Democracy inside the party should be within those limits within which it strengthens the political dictatorship of this party in the nation. And in order to somehow justify this amazing conclusion, into the syllogism they introduced a second premise: the problem is not that the Stalinists are destroying democracy in the party, democracy for us is not an end in itself, it is not a fetish, rather the problem is that the Stalinist bureaucrats themselves are “class degenerating,” they are merging with the new bourgeoisie and are acting as its weapon. The falseness of this second premise, the obvious falsehood, for there had been no merging of the party-state apparatus with the new bourgeoisie to any noticeable scale—this falsehood nullified the entire appeal of the Trotskyites in the struggle for internal party democracy.

Democracy for the sake of dictatorship! Trotsky, in following this casuistic, went so far as to say that the Stalinist regime was bad because dictatorship...was too weak in it! And in order to strengthen the dictatorship, it was essential to take apart the party apparatus and broaden democracy! So Trotsky, in view of the rumors spread in 1927 on a possible intervention, stated that if the enemy approached Moscow, it was essential to throw out the “weak,” “indecisive” Stalinist leadership and establish a real dictatorship. This, it turns out, is why he needed democracy!

All this senselessness clearly showed one thing. Democracy cannot be divided into parts, it does not recognize boundaries, as does dictatorship. In the 20th Century, in contrast to the ancient world and medieval times, there was no democracy “for oneself” and dictatorship “for all the rest.” In precisely the same way there is no “fleshless” dictatorship, a dictatorship without the rule of bureaucracy. Let us imagine for a second that Trotsky had been victorious over Stalin. What would he do afterwards? Clearly establish a “new” dictatorship, a dictatorship with democracy within the party. But what would such a dictatorship mean? Just one thing—the rule of a new—Trotskyite—bureaucracy, because dictatorship always acts in the person of its specific agents. And subsequently these bureaucrats inevitably would introduce a dictatorial regime into the party.

Party history shows unambiguously that this was not mere speculative suppositions. All the Politburo members who later became members of the opposition and as such attacked the bureaucratic apparatus, while they were in power were the most avid defenders of it and did not cease repeating that internal party “democracy without limits” would kill the dictatorship, would kill the party and would kill socialism (for them all these three concepts were synonyms). Both Kamanev,

Zinovyev, Bukharin and Rykov wrote thus at one time. Nor was Trotsky an exception, although his opposition activities and attacks on the apparatus started earlier than the others. Nevertheless, at the 11th Congress in 1922, he said: “But imagine yourself in a situation of ‘we’ and ‘them’: on the one hand, for instance, the Central Committee and on the other—such cases do occur. But this already will mean a calamitous situation of the nation will be exploited for a banner which could become the banner of Kronshtadt, and only Kronshtadt!” [11].

This is democracy: a communist who criticizes the party Central Committee for specific instances objectively undermines the dictatorship and is working for the Kronshtadt revolt. In being guided by this—and only this—logic, Kamanev and Zinovyev a little more than a year later would be tarred with the same offenses as Trotsky and a couple of years later Stalin and Bukharin would accuse Trotsky, Kamanev and Zinovyev of a Menshevik deviation and objective connivance with the White Guards.

This blind alley, this duality, this awkward position of being against bureaucracy for the sake of dictatorship had been clearly spotted by the Mensheviks. “Democracy is the nut which the opposition cannot crack. For the Stalinists everything is clear...for them any democracy is a harmful luxury, a laughable prejudice of the elderly or a Komsomol member; for them mass activity and the people’s independence are a phrase in resolutions but not a serious task for serious people” [12]. Well, what about opposition? “The dictatorship is inviolable, the party monopoly is essential, all other parties are inadmissible but democracy is necessary? Who can solve this problem?” [13] jeered SOTSIALISTICHESKIY VESTNIK.

Yes, the position of the Stalinists was undoubtedly more logical and, in this sense, clearer. Like Trotsky, they considered just one thing to be the measure of socialist victories: the strength of the total dictatorship in political life and the economy. Here they realized the Trotskyite slogan of superindustrialization at the expense of plundering the countryside. Here there were no differences and Trotsky could merely complain that his plan had been employed without recognition for the author. But the supporters of Stalin, in contract to the opposition, applied total dictatorship without any concessions to internal party democracy. Having destroyed the “new owners” and the “privileged intellectuals of the city and countryside” in 1928-1930, they seemingly completely carried out the Trotskyite program of combating the Thermidor. At the same time, by this very act they established an irrevocable rule, a final dictatorship of the bureaucracy in the party, the state and the nation; they carried out a Thermidorian revolt which in some way was new, not anticipated by the founding fathers, not foreseen by Trotsky but obvious and painfully apparent and this was a purely bureaucratic Thermidor.

Trotsky's program was carried out but the Trotskyites precisely during these years (1929-1930) in hundreds if not thousands were sent off to prison, to the "political isolation cells." And this dichotomy also determined their psychological state in prison: "The Trotskyites are sitting there—and that is the entire point!—not only without any real faith in their cause but also with the strongest doubts as to the rectitude of their line" [13]. Was this not the reason for the rapid moral decline in the opposition and the reason for the infinite confessions which began directly at the 15th Congress when they were expelled from the party? They had begun a slide which in several years would bring them to the repulsive glorification of Stalin and several years after that to the confessions in the trials.

Romantics and Petty Officials

Such closeness in the actual programs and positions of Trotsky and Stalin inevitably raises the question of what lay at the basis of their implacable struggle? Possibly an ordinary struggle for personal power or a game of chance between ambitious men demoralized by it but not wanting to be removed to the sidelines? Undoubtedly when it is a question of Trotsky, the aspect of personal ambition and outright demagoguery was of great importance. But I am confident that this was not the only thing. Not only Trotsky but hundreds and thousands of Trotskyites because of their views went into exile, to prison, and many of them to the last day remained courageous and unbent. No, there was not a fanatic faith in Trotsky rather above all there was a hate of Stalin, the Stalinist bureaucracy and Stalinism. With the formal closeness in the actions and programs of Trotsky and Stalin, they and their supporters represented two different social types or, if you wish, two stages of dictatorship—the revolutionary heroic and the formal bureaucratic, a dictatorship of "bayonets" and a dictatorship of "petty officials."

In his autobiography, Trotsky wrote: "When the nomads of the revolution moved to a sedentary way of life, philistine traits, sympathies and the tastes of complacent officials were awakened, revived and developed in them.... There was nothing which contradicted party principle. But there was a mood of moral complacency, self-satisfaction and triviality" [14, p 244]. And further, he pointed to the "molecular" (in the sense of unnoticeable—L.F.) processes of degeneration in the upper layer of the party" and to the "liberation of philistinism in the Bolshevik" (ibid., p 245). At present, for us this seems unjust in terms of the communists of the 1920s and rather these words could apply to the wartime and particularly to the postwar Stalinist officials such as Getmanov and Neudobnov ("Zhizn i sudba" [Life and Fate] by Grossman) and their later followers. But Trotsky was writing about what he saw. And not only Trotsky. Actually, all that he was saying was nothing more than a transposition into prose of the well-known poetry of Mayakovskiy: "On Rubbish": "The revolution has been caught in philistine threads. More terrible than Wrangel this philistine way. Rather off with the heads of

the canaries so that communism is not vanquished by the canaries" [15]. Actually, Trotsky describes the quiet moral and psychological degeneration in the upper layer under the conditions of the NEP.⁶ There were no urgent revolutionary tasks and material abundance abounded, one had merely to put out one's hand. And for a Bolshevik who had degenerated into a Philistine, it was merely a question of extending the hand and joining forces with the nepmen. And if such a union occurred then there would be not just the psychological but also the concrete sociopolitical base of the Thermidor. Then the coup, the restoration of capitalism, the restoring of private property were inevitable all the while maintaining the political dictatorship of the "new owners"! There it was "Soviet monarchy" in full bloom, the most terrible form of counterrevolution.

However, Trotsky was either sincerely in error or was consciously confusing things. He underestimated the abyss lying between the party and the new bourgeoisie, the abyss which the dictatorship was carefully working to deepen. A Bolshevik could unbeknownst to himself degenerate but could he make a conscious, direct contact with the nepmen? For the enormous majority of both the old and new party members this was excluded.

But why does it now seem to us that in the 1920s there was no degeneration at all? Because we look at the 1920s in reverse perspective, we look at them through the 1930s, often without distinguishing between the 1920s and the 1930s. But here there was a fundamental difference.

The problem was that the "Stalinist revolution" of 1929-1930, the "great coup" which destroyed the NEP, also became a moral and psychological turning point. For the first time since 1920, the party was again confronted specifically with grandiose, revolutionary tasks and this brought about the corresponding moral upsurge and the corresponding moral jolt. Seemingly at the beginning of the 1930s, the mood of the first revolutionary years had returned to the party. But it only seemed this way....

"The Stalinist course which seemed to everyone like the course of 'war communism,' but...devoid of its naive belief, its heroic enthusiasm, its grandiose heart-inspiring dreams and merely parodied its ideological drive for the sake of perpetuating the omnipotence of a handful of dictators" [16]—this is a description which picks up on much but is not completely correct. For it was precisely that naive belief, heroic enthusiasm and daring dreams—all of this did exist at the beginning of the 1930s at least in the middle and lower party ranks. Something else was lacking which distinguished the true war communism from the Stalinist military bureaucratic.

What was not there was truth. Stalin urged the masses to one thing but himself endeavored and hoped to bring them to something else. For this reason, he lied to the masses, through the secret police he listened to what they

had to say, he endeavored to teach them not to think and act independently. This is the fundamental opposition between the Leninist war communism and the Stalinist parody of it. For this reason the upper level artificially held in check by an "iron bridle" in its enormous mass then again degenerated but now followed the path of degeneration much farther than during the years of the NEP.

What was Trotsky striving for? For the restoration of an "authentic" war communism. This was a recollection. A recollection of that unbelievable period of 1918-1920, when actually an iron dictatorship derived strength in true internal party democracy and not only internal party but also the broadest true democracy, in a free independence of the working class. And against such a background any normal bourgeois democracy should seem like a game. But this was the essence of the recollections and hopes of Trotsky and the Trotskyites (corrected, let me repeat, with an enormous dose of personal ambition and demagoguery on the part of Trotsky).

Were these hopes realistic? No, they were absolutely Utopian. And not only because they were not realized. History may contain many variations but that variation of the 1920s no longer existed. That form of revolutionary democracy which the Trotskyites recalled could not be created by fiat. It arose in an exceptional situation when the masses in truth had discovered their second breath. For precisely this reason the constant, permanent revolution which Trotsky dreamed of was unnatural. To repeat a revolution artificially in the situation of the end of the 1920s was impossible. It could only be simulated by the forces of bureaucracy. Trotsky's times were over, never to return again. And this happened not in 1929, when he was exiled from the USSR, not in 1927 when he was expelled from the party, not in 1923 when the defeat of the opposition started. This happened in 1921, when the NEP was introduced.

Semienlightenment

Before assessing the overall historical sense of Trotskyism and the contribution of Trotsky and his supporters to our history, let me say a few words about Trotsky in emigration (1929-1940). During all these years, without fear for the vengeance of his terrible enemy, he continued to struggle against him. One of his sons who remained a hostage in Russia was executed, and the other died under suspicious circumstances in Paris in 1938, and Trotsky felt that he has been poisoned by NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] agents. Trotsky himself was a hunted man and he was ultimately murdered. He was murdered when he was writing another work against "Cain-Dzhugashvili." Trotsky to the end of his days unconditionally supported the October Revolution and considered himself a student of Lenin. A return "to the dear teacher Axelrod," that is, to the Mensheviks, as Stalin has predicted for him, did not happen and Trotsky continued to deny

Menshevism, social democracy, and considered himself and supporters to be the "Leninist opposition" and the Bolshevik-Leninists.

But his main concern remained the fight against Stalin and Stalinism and since in those years Stalin was inseparable from the USSR, this fight could be viewed as a fight against Soviet power. During the years in exile, while observing events in the USSR from outside, Trotsky seemingly revised much in his own views. As before, he saw the main social danger for socialism in bureaucracy. "The Stalinist direction has a social base in the form of the multimillion bureaucracy which has grown up out of a victorious, but isolated proletarian revolution in a backward country" [17]. "Stalinism...is not an abstraction of 'dictatorship' but rather a grandiose bureaucratic response against the proletarian revolution.... The Stalinist forgeries...are the product of a concrete social struggle and the most treacherous and cruelest of all: a struggle of the new aristocracy against the masses which raised it to power.... Each reaction gives rise, fosters and strengthens those elements of the historical past which the revolution attacked but which it was unable to deal with" [18]. "In a poor nation, and the USSR is still now a very poor nation where...sufficient food and clothing are still available only for a small minority of the population—in such a country millions of bureaucrats, large and small, endeavor first of all to resolve their own 'social question' and ensure their own well-being. Hence, the greatest egoism and conservatism of the bureaucracy, its fear of dissatisfaction in the masses, its hate of criticism, its rabid tenacity in stifling any free thought and, finally, its hypocritical-religious cowering to the leader" [19].

Trotsky had voiced similar (possibly a little less sharp) accusations against the Stalinist bureaucracy before. The new thing was his attitude to his own ideas which had been carried out, that is, toward industrialization and collectivization. "The drive for records in collectivization, without considering the technical, economic and cultural capabilities of agriculture has led...to lethal consequences. It has killed the incentives of the small commodity producer long before it was able to replace them with other, higher economic incentives. Administrative pressure which in industry soon depletes itself in agriculture has been completely impotent.... After the administrative stifling of the NEP, the "Six Conditions of Stalin," including cost accounting and so forth, have been turned into an empty set of words.... What sense does it make for a worker to have a few extra rubles a month if the lacking vital products must be purchased by him on the market at a 10-fold increase? [20] So here now is Trotsky in favor of cost accounting, market relations, or abandoning the "prize leaps of industrialization" and collectivization!

And the general conclusion is that "it is impossible to emerge on the right path except by eliminating the Stalin reign (seemingly this is the first time he introduced this term—L.R.). It is essential...by free criticism from top to bottom to revise the entire Soviet system and mercilessly

purge it of all the accumulated rubbish. It is essential, finally, to carry out the last insistent piece of advice of Lenin: **remove Stalin** (emphasis of Trotsky—L.R.⁷).... The involvement of the workers themselves in leading the nation, its policy and economy, effective control over the bureaucracy, an increased feeling of responsibility of the managers in terms of the managed—all of this undoubtedly will have a beneficial effect on production itself...and reduce the costly economic zigzags.... Soviet democracy is primarily a vital need for the economy itself. Conversely, bureaucracy entails tragic economic surprises" [7, p 6]. But particularly interesting is the conclusion: "The elimination of the bureaucratic autocracy coincides not with a shaking up of the Soviet system, as might have been feared 3 or 4 years ago, but on the contrary, with its liberation, with its rise and flourishing" [ibid.]. Remarkable words! Hence, "3 or 4 years ago" (1928-1927) Trotsky, in proclaiming a fight against bureaucracy, in his heart feared the real "elimination of the bureaucratic autocracy coincided with a shake-up of the Soviet system"! Here is an involuntary admission of his very profound inner dichotomy in the struggle against Stalin. Bureaucracy cannot be tolerated but it is terrible to discard it because...the reins must be loosened and the entire system will come to an end! Only now had he recovered his sight...but had he?

Yes, in exile Trotsky remained Trotsky. No matter how much he hated Stalin, no matter how he attacked him, his inner dichotomy remained in the fight against Stalin and Stalinism, his insurmountable adherence to war communism. He understood, he understood a great deal about democracy but he was unable to take the final step. In one or another stipulation, seemingly insignificant but all the more psychologically important, the old Trotsky was apparent again. Under these conditions what really were his appeals for democracy worth? It is impossible to judge what would have happened were Trotsky in power in the 1930s but I feel that in this instance one would not be able to speak about the triumph of democracy or the triumph of socialism.

So this dichotomy between dictatorship and democracy, this gravitation to a "good," "pure" dictatorship explains the unconditional loss of the semidictator Trotsky to the complete dictator Stalin, a dictator with prejudices to a dictator on whose banner was inscribed "All Is Permitted!"

Yes, objectively the party and the nation with the arrival of the NEP was confronted with the great choice: socialism, economic and political democracy or a new war communism, economic and political dictatorship. The NEP, within certain limits, introduced economic democracy. Lenin by his plan for universal formation of cooperatives for the public proposed making economic democracy universal. He realized that the system should be completely democratized and that it was impossible to have an economic democracy with a political dictatorship as the latter would "consume" the former. For this reason, he proposed not merely to fight against the bureaucracy and its leader Stalin but rather to carry out

a series of fundamental changes in the very political system (and here Trotsky did not understand Lenin, for he did not want to understand him). This was the issue of a definition of just what socialism itself was.

Socialism is, as K. Marx wrote, the absence of private ownership of the means of production and the absence of exploitation and oppression be it economic, political or social. For such socialism, freedom—both within the party and outside it—is not a maneuver, not the means, but rather the end. And this socialism is not an icon, not the ideal on an eternally retreating horizon but rather it had to be built, gradually freeing ourselves from the rubble of war communism. As true freedom and self-government of the people broadened, there would never be a danger of the restoration of capitalism or a rebirth of bourgeois parties for the simple reason that the people would always be in favor of the party which had liberated it from enslavement, for the party of freedom.

A Pedestal for the Leader

Precisely such a conception of socialism which Lenin endeavored to develop in his last works came to naught and not due to Stalin but to an entire generation. The generation of heroes in the Civil War and the "honest bureaucrats" in peacetime. The stronger our dictatorship, the more socialism—this was the motto of that generation. For Lenin, the situation where the people had an opportunity of choice was the greatest victory of socialism, socialism in action; for a bureaucrat in power this was the end of socialism, the restoration of bourgeois parliamentarianism, the Thermidor. Here Trotsky and Stalin, Kamaney and Zinovyev are unanimous.

And later—later what happened was what could not happen. Having eliminated Lenin's legacy both in the narrow sense (about Stalin) and in the broad (about democracy) and having turned Lenin ultimately into a dead god, the party inexorably advanced along the path of subordination to dictatorship.

Here Stalin was forced to speak openly of this opposition: "...In the heads of one part of our workers there still live the vestiges of the old war period when our party was militarized, vestiges...that our party is...something like a system of inferior, medium and superior institutions. This is absolutely a non-Marxist view which still has not gained a final form anywhere...." [22, p 9]. "Not gained anywhere"—here the author was clearly being overmodest.

To accept a real dictatorship, fearing the danger of an apparent dictator. Here is the formula of the striking symbiosis of Stalin—Trotsky. In the situation of those years (1923-1924), all the leaders felt the danger of someone's personal dictatorship. As a barrier against Trotsky, Kamaney and Zinovyev proposed his personal enemy, Stalin, as the general secretary. Thus began the path from a possible dictatorship to an authentic dictatorship. In order to bring the party which would never consciously accept this to a recognition of the dictator, it was essential to maintain a state of siege. But a state of

siege requires someone to conduct the siege. As for the outside enemy, everything was clear as there was a capitalist encirclement with England and France who were just waiting to attack. But there was a closer enemy, the internal one in the form of the petty bourgeois remnants, the unstable populace which could be led only by a united and undivided party. The slightest weakening in the internal party regime would lead to a weakening of the party's dictatorship in the country. For this reason the greatest danger was a split. "In our situation of capitalist encirclement we need not only a united, not only a solid but a true steel party capable of resisting the thrust of the enemies of the proletariat" [22, p 23]. But in order in the party to cross the edge, to move from unanimity, from discipline to a leader, in order to justify such a move, something was still lacking. What was lacking was a real danger of an internal split, a real splitter against whom the party could rally. And it would rally around the leader.

And there he was, this splitter. Moreover, having vanquished the splitter, Stalin could assume his authority. Neither before the revolution nor in the Civil War had Stalin won the authority corresponding to the status of a leader—neither in the party, nor in the nation nor in the international workers' movement. The authority came only during the years of struggle against Trotsky and having defeated Trotsky "himself," protected the party against such a danger.

What Trotsky did for Stalin in 1923-1927 was to bring him to power. And all the time Trotsky was an active party, fierce, able and indefatigable. And all his efforts, everything completely ended up on Stalin's side. The main thing that gradually the logic set by Stalin took root in the party: any dissidence, in order to survive, is forced to turn into a grouping and a grouping becomes a split. Trotsky understood this logic and by his actions repeatedly reproduced and reinforced this in the party conscience. From then on such an approach would extend not only and not so much to the Trotskyites but rather it then became the main standard of party life. Stalin had achieved his goal and Trotsky had helped put the loop around the party's neck (and certainly around his own). So, the Trotskyite struggle against the Stalinist "Thermidor" became the most important component part in the system of the Thermidor itself. Yes, within the closed bureaucratic structure any dissidence would lead not to democracy but merely to the further strengthening of dictatorship.

Trotsky even after exile continued to struggle against Stalin. That is, he thought he was fighting Stalin. Actually, this was a struggle to further consolidate his [Stalin's] positions. Trotsky, as before, did everything he could to fan the edges of a no-longer extant internal party struggle and which Stalin had to encourage and strengthen as he evermore strongly put the party under his control. Stalin's strategem was the same banal provocative one: the party was surrounded by enemies on the outside and within we are threatened by camouflaged

(and hence, particularly dangerous) Trotskyite double-dealers. Hence, it was no time to lessen vigilance. Closer the ranks, higher the standard and banner with the portrait of the leader! All thoughts must be kept in step! This was the only effect from the writings of Trotsky. In the new fight against the Trotskyites everything was in practical terms already reduced to sheer provocation. This senseless exacerbation of the class struggle reached its apogee, as is known, in 1937. The year began politically with the trial of the "Trotskyite Center" and with the Central Committee Plenum and the report by Stalin "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures to Eliminate the Trotskyite and Other Double-Dealers." This was a signal for the total rout of all party bodies and for the Stalinist cadre revolution.

Such was the historical role of Trotsky, to raise up, strengthen and bring to power the murderer of millions and to place his head on the block in the numberless series of others. Such was the price that Trotsky paid—and would that it were only he!—for the fear of democracy.

Footnotes

1. The best known paradox of such a sort: why Trotsky at the beginning of 1923 rejected Lenin's well-known proposals for an alliance to fight against Stalin in line with the "Georgian Affair" [1, p 239]? Trotsky in his memoirs referred to the fact that he was ill. But to me this version does not seem honest.

2. At the beginning of the 1930s, the American businessman T. Campbell who had visited Russia published a book entitled "Russia—Market or Threat?" In it he described the following conversation with Stalin: "Stalin admitted...that under Trotsky they actually would have tried to spread communism throughout the world. He said that this was the first reason for the break between Trotsky and him. Trotsky believed in world communism while he, Stalin, wanted to limit his efforts to his own country [4]. These words by Campbell, in differing markedly from the official Soviet line of those years, caused a sensation. Stalin hurried to disavow them in the article "Mr. Campbell Is Fibbing."

3. Incidentally, the Russian monarchists were against a parliamentary republic and they liked the soviets more. Thus, the emigree "Tsar" Kiril wrote: "The future form of the Soviet state will be a Soviet monarchy...parliamentarianism is bankrupt and the Soviet system has completely proven itself as a form of strong power" [5].

4. The formula "dictatorship of the party" was officially adopted by the 12th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. Later, Stalin came out against it and it was eliminated. They returned to the classic "dictatorship of the proletariat." However, Stalin's arguments against this formula were, of course, pure hypocrisy. "The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the leading instructions from the party plus the carrying out of these instructions by the mass organizations of the proletariat plus their realization in the life of

the public" [6]. But if this system: party—commander, people—soldier, is not a "dictatorship of the party" in the harshest form, then what does "dictatorship" mean?

5. It is interesting that having set out the views of the Trotskyites in this manner, Bukharin answered them as follows: "It goes without saying that to repudiate this in essence, that is, to show that our party is not Bonapartist, not Thermidorian, would be below the dignity of our party. We can with much greater right level the charge of Bonapartism and the Thermidor against those street 'heroes' who on four feet crawl after every market woman at each station" (applause) [9].

6. Trotsky, being a leftist extremist, confused two completely different things, normal human nature and bureaucratic corruption.

7. At the trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite bloc in 1936, Vyshinskiy interpreted this phrase as proof that Trotsky was urging the murder of Stalin.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Village Elders

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press 30 May 89) pp 120-121

[Letter by V.P. Karpenko from the village of Sagupovka, Cherkatsiy Oblast.]

[Text] Dear Comrades! For 4 years, I have been working as a physician in Novgorod and Kalinin Oblasts, an area where lie the roots of Russian history and the Russian state, folk creativity, literature and art, an area of great names and great devastation. Even now much has been written about the "prospectless" villages and one would like to believe that the planned remigration flows, the social amenities (including the construction of roads and central gas supply) and progressive management methods (the contract, lease and so forth) would return the former glory to this greatly suffering land and a viable life to its inhabitants.

As of now, the situation in the Russian Nonchernozem Zone is extremely bad. Confirmation of this is my humble demographic survey on a small territory: the Ostashkovskiy Medical District of Vyshnevolotskiy

Rayon of Kalinin Oblast. When I began studying materials on the natural movement of the population over a number of years, I at first glance did not discover any alarming facts. In truth, the natural increase over this entire period was negative: from -4.6 in 1981 to -3.5 in 1987 (for the rural localities), but the figures themselves remained rather stable and for the last 2 years even declined. The population declined slightly: in 1983 as a total in the rayon there were 106,700 inhabitants and in 1987, 104,200; in the rural localities the figures, respectively, were 20,000 and 27,000.

However, the population distribution over the individual villages and its age structure show an unhappy picture. As of 30 April 1988, some 3,542 persons lived in 93 population points of the district.

There are five rural soviets, five sovkhoses, five schools (one secondary and four 8-year), five nurseries, seven feldsher [middle-level medical personnel] stations, and a 25-bed district hospital. A large portion of the villages has neither stores, club, library, hard-surfaced roads, bus communications—not only with the rayon center but also with the central farmsteads. A significant portion of the population (46.5 percent) and a majority of the sociocultural and service enterprises are concentrated at the sovkhos central farmsteads. In two of them (Dyatkovovo and Kuznetsova) they have built several multi-apartment buildings with amenities that are common for a city while at others all the utilities are limited to intermittently working water supply (street water pumps) and delivered gas in tanks. In the district hospital in the in-patient facilities there is a water line and central heating, in the out-patient dispensary there are stoves and wash basins but no sewage. One-fifth of the population points (19.4 percent) does not have any population, in 35.5 percent of the villages there are from 1 to 10 persons, in 32.2 percent from 11 to 50 and in 12.9 percent over 50 persons.

In the district, as well as everywhere in the rural localities, there are more women than men (respectively, 57.3 and 42.7 percent), few children (17 percent of all the inhabitants) and many elderly (33.4 percent). The population of nonworking age (the elderly plus children) comprise over one-half (50.4 percent).

Particularly alarming is the fact that in one out of every five villages only elderly people have remained and in one out of ten the voices of children cannot be heard.

Finally, one is struck by the amazing difference between the central farmsteads and the other villages in terms of a number of important indicators (number of children, average of the inhabitants and so forth) and this, in my view, is one of the main reasons for the ongoing dying out of the Russian countryside.

The central farmstead as before attracts to it the young and the working-age population of a sovkhos (work or education, housing and relative conveniences, a circle of friends and the possibility of forming a family), dooming the old people in the abandoned villages to an unmerited

difficult solitary old age. Moreover, with an abundance of various organizations in the rayon which should be concerned with the population (the rayon social security, the rural soviets, hospitals, the military commissariat, the party and trade union bodies and the public) it is difficult to name a specific body which would have the appropriate opportunities for providing such villages with all types of services needed by the elderly. Who can chop firewood, heat a home, wash, prepare food, feed, warm, provide solace and embellish the last days? In practice, a portion of these concerns rests on the sovkhos administration but the concern is not included in the plan, wages have not been increased for this and orders and bonuses are not given.

All of this inevitably leads to definite moral and demographic disproportions, to a change in the family structure, and to the disappearance from our lives of such concepts as charity, compassion, concern for parents, respect for elders and so forth.

Who then should be concerned for the elderly: children? relatives? local authorities? the state? I ask myself these questions in recalling that in the village of Kochevo two women 73 and 69 years of age have remained, in the settlement of Blagodatnoye there is a 60-year-old old man and two old women 74 and 66 years of age, while in the villages of Argukheno, Aleksandrova, Osinovka and Liponekha there is just one woman (from 67 to 79 years of age). And at one time here, as M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting with the workers of Krasnoyarsk Kray, "...people lived here, they raised grain and livestock...."

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